Sir David Christopher Veness was born on 20 September 1947. He was the Assistant Commissioner for Specialist Operations of the Metropolitan Police from April 1994 to February 2005 and had ultimate oversight responsibilities for the SDS.
He was Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security for the United Nations until 2008 and embarked on a career in private intelligence since.
Veness has submitted a statement to the Undercover Policing Inquiry and provided oral testimony on 27 July 2026.
Full profile to follow.
The following is an excerpt of the profile on David Veness at our former website Powerbase:
As head of Special Operations, Veness oversaw various units, including counter-terrorism and the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), which targeted protestors. In this role, Veness knew and worked closely with Bob Lambert of the SDS. The two men would have a long association, including through the work of the Muslim Safety Forum, and, after both had left the Police, at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (see below).
By October 2004, Veness was secretary of the Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPO-TAM). At the time, TAM was running the national domestic extremism units, including the National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU( and its infiltration of protest movements during the time of Mark Kennedy and others. A number of Veness's subordinate officers would go on to join the TAM board, including his former deputy Bob Quick who was its chair in 2008-2009.
In a notable incident earlier in his career, in July 1992, Veness along with Commander Roy Ramm seconded fellow Deputy Assistant Commissioner Ian Johnston's authorisation of the use of an undercover policewoman to get close to Colin Stagg in the Rachel Nickell murder enquiry. Johnston would go on to act as Condon's trusted lieutenant in matters relating to the Stephen Lawrence murder, including delivering Condon's apology over the role of the Metropolitan police in the Lawrence murder inquiry, including his own 'obstinacy ', before heading up the British Transport Police.
In his witness statement to the Undercover Policing Inquiry, Veness repeatedly accepts corporate responsibility for failings within the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS), apologises for the use of sexual relationships by undercover officers, and states that such conduct was 'wrong'.
However, the central theme of his evidence is that the SDS was a small, highly secretive unit buried deep within a vast command structure of around twenty Specialist Operations branches and approximately 2,000 officers. He argues that detailed management and oversight of the SDS was delegated through the Special Branch chain of command and that matters relating to the unit would only exceptionally have reached his level. Throughout his statement, he emphasises reliance on his subordinates, the pressures created by terrorism and national policing responsibilities, and the limits of his personal knowledge of (and responsibility for) SDS operations.
Veness could not recall 'Operation Muscat'. Whether Veness' account is accurate might be called into question by the fact that he signed off on £2.5m expenditure for Dines' relocation, which would have been unusual, if not unique, even within a lengthy police career.