The NPOIU, established in 1999, was responsible for gathering and coordinating intelligence on protest activity and so-called ‘domestic extremism’ across England and Wales.
In 2006, the unit came under the control of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), which operated through the Terrorism and Allied Matters Committee. It worked alongside two related bodies: the National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) and the National Domestic Extremism Team (NDET).
In January 2011, the NPOIU and these related units were rapidly merged into the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) within the Metropolitan Police Service. This was due to the revelations regarding Mark Kennedy and other undercover officers.
The government confirmed that the NDEU took over NPOIU’s functions on behalf of all police forces in England and Wales.
However, the undercover deployments, which the NPOIU had previously controlled, transferred to local police forces.
By 2013, this structure evolved into the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU). In April 2016, it was renamed the National Counter Terrorism Police Operations Centre (NCTPOC), which absorbed NDEDIU’s responsibilities for domestic extremism. In 2018, there was a further change in the responsibilities for ‘domestic extremism,’ which was deemed less serious than terrorism, and which was taken under the auspices of the NPoCC.
In 2020, NDEDIU established a new section, the Strategic Intelligence and Briefing (SIB) team, whose responsibilities were redistributed, with protest and disorder elements now managed by the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC).
From 2011, the NDEU and later NDEDIU retained many of the NPOIU’s intelligence functions, though the scope and oversight mechanisms changed. However, neither unit could deploy undercover officers.
Both the NDEU and NDEDIU were responsible for collecting, storing, analysing, and disseminating intelligence on domestic extremism. They also supported local police forces by providing tactical advice and coordination to reduce the threat from extremist-related criminal activity.
Within the NDEDIU, the Strategic Sensitive Intelligence Unit (SSIU) functioned as a specialised intelligence and informant-management section:
The role of the SSIU was the coordination, strategic direction, de-confliction, tasking and funding of national Domestic Extremism Confidential Human Intelligence Sources (CHISs).
The successor unit also inherited and maintained the National Domestic Extremism Database, which stored intelligence on individuals and groups associated with protest movements. A specific branch, the Protest and Disorder Intelligence Unit, managed strategic intelligence concerning public order and protest.
These units liaised with international law enforcement and security agencies, particularly across Europe, to assess and respond to cross-border ‘extremist’ threats.
As mentioned, while the NPOIU engaged in undercover deployments, neither the NDEU nor NDEDIU conducted such operations themselves; instead, these became the responsibility of local forces.
The NDEDIU also developed ‘open-source’ and social media monitoring capabilities, now known as ‘digital and terrestrial tension monitoring’.
In strategic terms, it contributed to national threat assessments of protest-related criminality and disorder.
Within the NDEDIU, the Strategic Sensitive Intelligence Unit (SSIU) served as a specialised section for intelligence and informant management. The Independent Office of Police Complaints’ Operation Hibiscus report identified the SSIU as responsible for the coordination, strategic direction, de-confliction, tasking, and funding of national Domestic Extremism Confidential Human Intelligence Sources (CHISs).
This demonstrates that, although the NDEDIU did not direct undercover policing deployments, the SSIU continued to use civilian informers to gather intelligence on activist and protest movements designated as ‘domestic extremist’. It was within this environment that shredding of Inquiry-relevant documents occurred, in breach of a standing SO15 (Counter Terrorism Command) order prohibiting destruction of materials potentially relevant to the Inquiry.
NDEDIU officers stated that the unit did not engage in undercover deployments, but the Hibiscus report adds the caveat that it did not do so ‘directly’. This implies that infiltration of activist groups may have continued indirectly, using covert officers provided by other police units or national agencies.
Protest intelligence gathering responsibilities were taken away from ACPO in 2011, but its successor organisation, the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) got those responsibilities back in 2020.
The Strategic Intelligence and Briefing (SIB)
Within the NPCC-run National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) the Strategic Intelligence and Briefing (SIB) team took over the responsibilities held by the NDEDIU. The SIB provides ‘national-level intelligence assessment, coordination, and situational awareness on protests, disorder, and major public events across England and Wales’.
- 2011: The National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) is subsumed from ACPO into the National Domestic Extremism Unit (NDEU) under the Metropolitan Police Service Counter-Terrorism unit (SO15), taking on protest and disorder intelligence nationwide.
- 2012: NDEU merges with its precursor bodies and, by early 2013, is rebranded as the National Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU), broadening its remit to ‘disorder intelligence’.
- 2013–2015: The Strategic Sensitive Intelligence Unit (SSIU) operates within NDEDIU, coordinating Confidential Human Intelligence Sources (CHISs) against ‘domestic extremism’ and activist networks.
- 2015 —NDEDIU Renamed National Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit (NCTIU)
- January 2016 — Renamed National Counter Terrorism Domestic Extremism Intelligence Unit (NCTDEIU)
- April 2016: Renamed the National Counter Terrorism Policing Operations Centre (NCTPOC). NCTPOC absorbs NDEDIU’s domestic extremism responsibilities - and also counter-terrorism operational functions.
- 2018: In terms of gathering intelligence, responsibility for Extreme Right‑Wing Terrorism (XRW) and left‑wing/anarchist/single‑issue 'terrorism' (LASIT) moved from the police to MI5.
- 2020: Low‑level ‘aggravated activism’ is now handled by the National Police Coordination Centre Strategic Intelligence & Briefing team (NPoCC‑SIB) and more serious cases by Counter Terrorism Policing under MI5’s strategic lead.
- 2025: Strategic Intelligence & Briefing Team (NPoCC) creates a ‘National Investigation Team’ focusing on environmentalism, anti-government and cultural nationalism’.