

For Alexandros Michael Daskaloudi

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Abstract

The juxtaposition of *policing* and *protest* promote narrative, descriptive and analytic structures through which it becomes possible to explain demonstration events. The police-protest relational pair facilitates assessments and explanations of events of this kind. However, the June 18 1999 London demonstrations, or the *Carnival Against Global Capitalism*, became a focus for the indeterminacy or contestability of the ideas of *protest* and *policing*. The event threw into sharp relief cumulative and, in some ways analogous innovations in both public assembly staging and public order policing. The event can be seen as an occasion during which cumulative and fundamental transformations in both these forms disrupted expectations about what protest and policing practices now involved, and about what the terms of 'police-protest relations' now were. A question that runs through this thesis concerns the semi-theoretical structuring of explanations of political demonstration through the police/protest pairing, and the degree to which such structuring is affected by empirically observable transformations in protest and policing as forms and practices. The thesis is especially concerned with the relation between the theoretical and the ontological dimensions of *protest* and *policing* in the particular case of *J18 (London)*.

Keywords: J18 (London), police-protest dichotomy, demonstration, explanatory strategies

Introduction

Reflection (*reflexio*) is not occupied about objects themselves, for the purpose of directly obtaining conceptions of them, but is that state of mind in which we set ourselves to discover the objective conditions under which we obtain conceptions.

Transcendental reflection is a duty which no one can neglect who wishes to establish an *à priori* judgement upon things.

– Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*

On June 18 1999 (J18) demonstrations were staged in the financial districts of over 70 cities in 43 countries. Most of these took place at the same as the opening of a meeting of the International Monetary Fund in Cologne. The theme of each of the events was decided locally by a range of groups and individuals. In London around 10,000 people gathered in the Square Mile of the City to join a *Carnival Against Global Capitalism*. This gathering

represented the convergence of a number of what were then termed single issue or single cause campaigns. Connections between these groups, individuals and campaigns were performed on a platform of anti-capitalist opposition to City-based economic practices that were global in reach. The *Carnival Against Global Capitalism*, or *J18 (London)*, came to be widely regarded as an errant demonstration event. It represented a rupture or a breakdown of some kind and appeared to remain indiscernible for some time. Current affairs and news media attempts to reconcile this event with its wider situation continued months after its taking place. More precisely, ongoing speculation and debate about what happened in the event and about what it meant or what it could mean continued until the end of November 1999, after which attention turned to the high-profile anti-WTO events in Seattle.

Insofar as the political demonstration is an event, it is subject to causal necessity. For instance, etymologically, *event* is synonymous with *outcome* or *effect*. In Kant's view the principle that 'every event has a cause' is a formal one that brings order and intelligibility to the sense impressions. In terms of the ability to render an unusual demonstration event intelligible, the police-protest pairing (henceforth the police-protest dichotomy), has a critical function: if the demonstration is the *as such* of the event, then police-protest dynamics are the *as such* of the demonstration event. Like all events, J18 (London) was, and no doubt still is essentially indeterminate, however, it was also a political demonstration, and was basically determinable as such.

This event was widely considered to be an extraordinary event; one that had exceeded many of the familiar routines that were characteristic of demonstration performances in the London context. That excess was most obviously cast in terms of disorder and disruption initially. *The dynamics of police-protest interaction* thus represented the main terms of widespread debate about the apparent novelty of this demonstration event, and what had happened to make it so extraordinary. In this way, the dichotomy becomes an orienting point, a way of addressing and responding to some of the issues that the event raised. And there is perhaps nothing too surprising or complicated in all of this: J18 (London) was a peculiar instance of political demonstration, and its peculiarity was confirmed by the character of police-protest dynamics that rendered it as such – the logical conjunction of *police-protest dynamics* and *the demonstration* is self-evident.

In this case, however, the *police-protest/demonstration explanatory relation* entails certain tensions. On the one hand, any excess, any sense of novelty or contingency is minimised by assumptions about the enduring character of forms of protest and policing. In these terms the police-protest dichotomy is an orienting point – a way of rendering a complex, elusive and somewhat disorienting event more intelligible. Insofar as the event struck observers and participants alike as strange or different this explanatory relation became particularly important. The dichotomy would function as a way of measuring the eventfulness of this episode of demonstration and as

a symbol of what that eventfulness and the causes of that eventfulness resided in. As an explanatory device, the dichotomy would tame the complexity and incalculability of the event, and while doing so, it would also bring about the alterity of the event as demonstration.

On the other hand, ideas about radical change in anticipated patterns of police-protest interaction intensely focused the terms of the debate. This focus was symptomatic of the appearance of fundamental change in familiar forms of protest and policing which became especially visible through the event. The event was indicative of fundamental changes in the timing and spacing of both protest and policing forms. The event site made especially visible the unsettling of many of the structures recognition that rendered *protest* and *policing* both familiar and intelligible. The appearance of the event profoundly challenged expectations about what forms and practices of protest and policing now involved. Consequently, it raised questions about what the terms under which *police-protest relations* operated now were.

Thus, in one respect, the police-protest dichotomy is the as such of the demonstration event and a way of determining *x* or the indeterminacy of the event, while in another, the event made especially visible uncertainty about familiar forms of protest and policing and what they entailed. Despite the police-protest/demonstration explanatory relation, this particular case suggests a mutual unsettling of *the event* by the police-protest dichotomy and of the idea of *police-protest relations* by the event. How then would the

dichotomy continue to retain its explanatory power in this case? How would it nevertheless continue to function as an uninterrupted mode of explanation?

The thesis contends that this tension is worth exploring, not least because J18 (London) was considered to be an exceptional demonstration event. The episode prompted a major review of public order policing in London and throughout the UK, and thus marked a significant moment in the re-evaluation of urban and domestic ordering discourses. Even if this was a moment that has passed by largely unexamined, questions remain about how the event could be explained in the circumstances described above. How, for instance, does this event relate to public, urban and national ordering discourses, and how did they inform each other? And, in more general terms, under what conditions can a political demonstration be said to have exceeded its terms of operation, and how are such judgements made and brought about?

The thesis is most interested in the police-protest/demonstration relation, in the mutual unsettling of one by the other, and in the effect of this on explanations and accounts of J18 (London). *The event* here is defined as an instance of the problem of theorising change and transformation in the political demonstration. *The demonstration* is in turn defined in the broad sense as a site of interaction involving the convergence of a number of forms of agency. This contrasts with the narrower definition which effectively equates 'demonstration' with 'protest'. Demonstration is

certainly a form of action but the definition that is preferred here relates to the demonstration as a historically evolved and region specific site of interaction that revolves around some form of *showing*. The aim ultimately is look at how to address the issue of whether this demonstration was a fundamentally transformative event of its kind.


Accounts of such events are not so much informed by theories, as by ideas of *protest* and *policing* – ideas of the forms and functions in which they inhere, their diametrical opposition, their relation, the dynamics between them, the way they are framed or contextualised, and so on. Following this, a main aim of the thesis will be to examine the function of the police-protest dichotomy as an analytic, explanatory, and evaluative strategy for dealing with such a question. Chapter 2, for instance, will consider how the dichotomy often works as a semi-theoretical device in analysis, and particularly in the field of protest policing studies. Chapter 3 explores how the dichotomy functions as a narrative device in print news accounts of J18 (London), and chapter 4 considers the role of the dichotomy in the production of official, public order policing discourses. These chapters provide three basic angles of approach or three different lenses through which to further examine the dichotomy as an instrument of explanation.

If it is possible to justify why this case deserves closer attention, and to specify what kind of attention this involves, the issue of how designate *J18 (London)* as the empirical site of analysis is rather more problematic. Like its related others, the site has become most meaningful through the *anti-*

globalisation phenomenon. This is especially so within analytic discourse. J18 is most familiar as one instance of counter summit demonstrations that fall under the rubric an *anti-globalisation* event and/or movement type – the term, which emphasises likeness and regularity among a series of events, is invariably dealt with through social movement analytic categories.

The June 1999 London demonstrations occurred prior to the speculation about anti-globalisation that became instrumental in the popularisation of globalisation issues. If *Seattle* marked the beginning of *anti-globalisation* discourse, it did so after *J18* which was not yet an object in discourse as such. Nevertheless, the *anti-globalisation movement* was to become a crucial term in the retrospective canonisation of events like J18. If the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle in November/December 1999 constituted an archetype landmark anti-globalisation site, each previous and subsequent episode continued reinforce the idea of a type event phenomenon. The prevalence of the aggregate case category thus quickly overrides the basic typicality of J18 (London) as a *police-protest/demonstration* site. For instance, from perspectives on the aggregate case, police-protest dynamics and demonstrations turn out to be only the ‘raw material’ or ‘raw data’ of research and analysis that lead to theorisation.

Events like J18 (London) and Seattle (N30)¹ may initially have found their way into the public imagination as police-protest/demonstration issues – both the *Seattle* case and the emerging *anti-globalisation* case with which it coincided, came to the attention of world publics, and therefore also academics, through scenes of police-protest conflict and disorder – but analytic specialisation has perhaps inevitably involved a shift away from these initially grounding terms. In particular, since it brought issues of *globalisation* into such sharp focus, *Seattle* marked a point at which the main lines of debate, based in assumptions about an anti-globalisation type phenomenon, became increasingly polarised between debates about global social movements on the one hand, and global governance on the other. This ‘outward’ movement of attention away from the initial evental sites, can be considered as part of a more general problem, one that Andrew Barry has outlined in terms of social scientists’ and theorists’ stance on ‘events’: ‘social scientists tend to stand aloof from events, preferring to analyse what is common to society as a whole, or understand events in the context of what are thought to be more general social processes’;² and ‘Social theorists have tended to leave the study of events to journalists, or to the more empirically minded political scientists and historians regarding empirical research as somehow merely derivative of theory’.³ With its emphasis on the aggregate case, anti-globalisation renders any case-specific undertaking counterintuitive.



¹ There are some inconsistencies in the way that the different sites were named. This will be discussed in chapter 1.

² Andrew Barry, ‘Events that Matter’, Paper prepared for the workshop on Gabriel Tarde, University of London Senate House, 1 December 2005, p 8.

³ Ibid.

The absorption of a series of like cases into a type phenomenon gives the appearance of a comprehensive category although categorisation as such effectively reduces the space within which questions about the particularities of its constitutive sites can be broached. For instance, as Saskia Sassen puts it: 'The accepted narratives and explanations of globalization have produced the global as a master category that obscures as much as it reveals.'⁴ The category de-localises and de-temporalises all and any of the apparently constitutive sites. Consequently, whilst so much of the focus of analytic attention relates to the aggregate case, comparatively little is known about the peculiarities and particularities each and any of these constitutive sites.

Barry suggests that:

[R]ather than overlooking the significance of particular political events, it may be fruitful to focus on them *more* closely. The appropriate attitude towards such a study would be an empiricist, but not a positivist one. On the other hand, it is not possible simply to describe the reality of an event in isolation, as if an event did not exist in an environment of other (earlier, contemporary and subsequent) events. An empiricist approach does not mean that social scientists need abandon what they already know about the circumstances and conditions within which events happened.⁵

⁴ Saskia Sassen, 'Unsettling Master Categories: Notes on Studying the Global in C. W. Mill's Footsteps', *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, (Vol. 20, 2008), p 69.

⁵ Andrew Barry, 'Political events', paper presented at a workshop on 'The Governmental and the Political', School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy, Keele University, June 2002, pp 10-11.

J18 (London) is suggestive precisely because it is only one event. However, since it derives most of its import as a site within a site (J18) within a site (anti-globalisation), the business of the first chapter will be to attend to the details of how to locate the position of *J18 (London)* within the *anti-globalisation movement*.⁶ This chapter will especially focus on how the categories *political demonstration*, *social movement* and *protest* converge in analysis and to what effect. *Protest* for instance will be considered in terms of its function as a mediating category between the first two, albeit one that eventually gives way to the category of social movement, which in turn gives way to the idea of a global or even an anti-global movement. This chapter will be especially concerned with how the initially grounding police-protest/demonstration relation branches out into a range of analytic specialisms, and will examine how that develops around a primary focus on the protest/movement relation. To some extent, this enables a reconstruction of some of the processes that were involved in the formation of the anti-globalisation case and the concomitant de temporalisation and de localisation of its sites.

Following that, chapter 2 will review case-specific studies on 'protest policing' and police-protest dynamics so as to look at what is involved in the reframing of questions about police-protest dynamics in contemporary demonstration sites. From the late 1990s onwards and certainly 'post-Seattle', this area of research has increasingly focussed on case-specific

⁶ The *global justice movement* has by now become a more commonly used term, but insofar as the focus here is on the development of understandings of the particular site, priority will be given to the initial terms of debate.

sites. *Counter summit demonstrations* in particular have drawn most of this attention. Case specific studies provide a necessarily sharper focus for examining the complexities of contemporary police-protest dynamics in the sites within which they occur.

This case-specific focus initially emerged in response to analytic problems posed by changes in the timing and spacing of event sites. For instance, early research raised questions about the possible effects of new geographies of demonstration sites on the form and function of public order policing. Other early research found that the new geographies contemporary sites highlighted the unfixity and changeability, or ‘the irony and complexity’ of protest and policing forms.

Later, ‘post-Seattle’ studies turned their attention to anti-globalisation counter summit sites. Focussing especially on this later trend, the chapter will review how police-protest research methods have been adapted in the move from general empirical sites to case-specific sites. Whether in nation-specific or case-specific research, there is a fairly consistent interest in police-protest reciprocal change and adaptation. There is no set methodology for examining the dis/continuities of police-protest dynamics as such. Rather, observations are structured through various pairings: state/society (or in some cases state/movement), order/change, and so on. These pairings map onto the police/protest pairing as equivalences, for example: protest-society-movement-change, and police-state-order. *Protest* and *policing* do not therefore simply indicate specific forms of

agency; they are also ideas that invoke a number of chains of reasoning and reference. This chapter will especially focus on the addition of a further 'post-Seattle' pairing – the global/the national. So as to look at how that translates into case-specific protest policing research, and how it impacts on attempts to re-conceptualise contemporary police-protest relations.

The literature review in chapter 2 finds that within much of this 'post-Seattle' research there is no necessary analytic relation between police-protest dynamics and *the demonstration* as the site within which they take place. This creates some limitations inasmuch as the aim of the thesis is to examine the police-protest/demonstration relation. On the other hand, Chapter 3 is directly concerned with the dynamics/event relation. The aim of this chapter is to look at how the police-protest dichotomy acts as an orienting device and as a way of rendering the site and the peculiarity of the site. Whereas the previous chapter focuses on underlying methods used in the examination of police-protest dynamics, the aim here will be to look at how, and the extent to which the police-protest dichotomy functions as a narrative device in print media accounts of the case.

One advantage of looking at this from news media perspectives is that these provide a clear illustration of the police-protest/demonstration relation problem described above. The exploration of news media accounts provides an opportunity to set out and elaborate on the main aim of the thesis which is to examine the mutual dependence as well as the mutual contingency of the police-protest/demonstration relation in the J18

(London) case. On the one hand, it provides a basis for looking at the role of the dichotomy as orienting device;⁷ on the other, it shows how the event highlights the unifixity and changeability of protest and policing forms. News media accounts provide an opportunity to look at how standard assumptions about police-protest relations bring the event into familiar conventions even while the forms and practices in which protest and policing inhere are seen to have become especially contestable.

The chapter also provides a focus for outlining the way in which accounts of forms of protest and policing interact with understandings of protest and policing as modes of action.⁸ In terms of questions about this interweaving of form/modes, news accounts provide concrete examples of how the dichotomy was used to narrate and explain the event in news media accounts. That also reveals notable patterns of continuities in the structuring of news media accounts and the structuring of the analytic accounts discussed in the previous chapter. Such continuity becomes particularly evident in the presentation of causal explanations. For instance, there is significant continuity in the way in which changes in the site of interaction are primarily attributed to changes in the timing and spacing of *protest*. In other words, the centrality of the protest-change equivalence in causal explanation is constant throughout. The main difference is that print news accounts for protest-change (causality) in

⁷ So as to emphasise the role of the dichotomy in managing the complexity of the event, the chapter employs Jean-Luc Nancy's definition of the 'event-as-surprise'. Even if this is not considered to be an entirely satisfactory or comprehensive definition, it does resonate with the news media reception of J18 (London) which is the main focus of interest here.

⁸ Protest and policing are also generic terms that refer to modes of action: to order or to keep order, to move, to resist, to enforce, and so on.

terms of the impact of technology (on protest forms), whereas analytic discourse accounts for it mostly in terms of the re-spacing of protest and/or social movements.

Chapter 4 investigates the form/mode relation more closely to look at how that translates into evaluations about how this event exceeded expectations in policing discourses. Jacques Derrida's work on the in/determinacy of *the event* is adapted to the terms of this discussion and used to highlight the main problem to be pursued: that the dichotomy manages the complexity of the event, but that it also significantly restricts and even precludes other possible ways of understanding or engaging with the event.

The main aim here is to look at how the dichotomy operates as an overarching framework for determining *the event* within policing discourses. The empirical focus is a post-event police report and examination of the J18 (London) case. This provides a focus for looking at the role and function of the dichotomy as the mode of evaluation and as a way of determining the event. However, that will require further empirical grounding. That is, the report will first be contextualised by the more general decision-making context of public order policing in London. Peter Waddington's work on public order policing in London provides an outline of that context, and will be used as a reference through which to read the initial police examination of the *Carnival Against Global Capitalism*.

Chapter 5 re-examines from another angle questions about the police-protest/demonstration relation. The particular focus here is the demonstration and the problem of how to assess changes in the demonstration as a site of interaction. This question is beset by one apparently intractable problem: in research and analysis, demonstrations are almost always deployed as *markers* of wider (social, cultural, political, economic) change and transformation. In chapter 1 for instance, they are merely derivative of theory. Since demonstrations are deictic or apodictic in character, they are used in analysis to show change and variation ‘elsewhere’. Consequently there is very little literature that might be used to look at how different forms of demonstrations are liable to change.

As a historically evolved form, the demonstration must also be subject to continuing innovation. The first part of the chapter takes a more in depth look at the historical relevance and development of the police-protest/demonstration relation, mainly through Charles Tilly’s work. This shows a conjunction between standardising of forms of protest, forms of policing and the emergence of the political demonstration. In the early nineteenth century, the political demonstration started to become a more or less standardised modular performance, albeit one that encoded ‘local secrets and symbols’.

So as to get some purchase on the historical evolution of London demonstrations, the chapter will highlight and outline a specific six or seven-year period within Rodney Mace’s social history of Trafalgar Square.

This will be considered as a particular point in the history of the police-protest/demonstration relation in London. As a whole, Mace's work on Trafalgar Square is indicative of the role of dynamics (but not necessarily police-protest dynamics) in the formation of place. This new angle of approach underscores the centrality of the site on which dynamics of interaction are enacted. Physical and geographical settings thus also become a critical element in any consideration about what is involved in looking at how, or the extent to which demonstration forms continue to evolve.

Historical research provides insights into the gradual standardisation of demonstrations through time. Even if there is no literature on the question of contemporary change in these forms, some of the patterns that emerge in accounts about the eventual standardisation of demonstrations, can also provide valuable hints, clues or suggestions about how one might go about looking at possible de-standardisation in contemporary forms.

In this regard, even though it accounts for a very different kind of demonstration and a very different period, Steven Shapin's social history on the conditions of the emergence and the eventual standardisation of scientific forms of demonstration, is instructive. Shapin's work will be used to outline the significance of the physical setting of the emergent scientific demonstration two centuries earlier in seventeenth century London. Here, demonstration standards and conventions emerged within the domestic sphere, for instance, within the private residence of a gentleman, who was

also a public figure. In Shapin's account, different kinds of experimental activity were assigned to different kinds of private and public settings. The circulation of this activity through different spaces was emblematic of the early career of scientific knowledge. In this account, the gradual discrimination and separation of spheres of activity and their relevant physical settings was to become a crucial factor in the standardisation and eventual institutionalisation of the scientific demonstration that is most familiar today.

In light of this review of available historical research, questions about contemporary sites of political demonstration will be reconsidered. Andrew Barry's observations about two mid-1990s UK sites of demonstration will be discussed in this regard. While discussions in preceding chapters have centred on the two forms of agency and the relation between them – the oscillation between stabilisation and destabilisation, the effect of this on the explanation of particular sites, and so on – chapter 5 will concentrate on the critical role of the physical and geographical settings of the political demonstration. In that respect, it will focus on a different kind of relation: the relation between the demonstration as the site of an event, and the physical siting of the demonstration. In this way, the last of the main chapters will provide a general exploration of the police-protest/demonstration relation from perspectives on the demonstration as a historically evolved and space-specific site of interaction.

As a whole, the main chapters constitute a multi-perspective survey of the police-protest/demonstration relation, with a particular focus on the problem of event determinacy/indeterminacy. This multi-perspective or multi-scope strategy is partly inspired by Isabelle Stengers' observation that the range and variety of interpretations that an event elicits can be used as a measure of the event:

[The event] has neither a privileged nor legitimate scope. The scope of an event is part of its effects, of the problem posed in the future it creates. Its measure is the object of multiple interpretations, but it can also be measured by the very multiplicity of these interpretations: all those who, in one way or another, refer to it or invent a way of using it to construct their own position, become part of the event's effects.⁹

The strategy used here is an adaptation of this observation. As Stengers sees it, the processes involved in the production of the eventness of an event can also become a way of measuring an event, its impact, effects, and so on. Certainly the event with which this thesis is concerned elicited a broad range and number of interpretations, but the aim here is more specific. The five perspectives that become the focus of each chapter represent five broad positions on the police-protest/demonstration explanatory relation. Each of these perspectives generates distinct patterns in terms of their nomination of the scope of the event and in terms of how *the event* is assessed, measured or evaluated.

⁹ Isabelle Stengers, *The Invention of Modern Science*, trans. Daniel. W. Smith (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp 66-7.

In chapter 1 the globalisation case nominates the scope of the event through the *protest/movement* relation. Chapter 2 looks at case-specific research on police-protest relations. Here the scope of the event appears through the *police-protest/anti-globalisation movement* relation. The *police-protest/news event* relation designates the scope of the event in chapter 3. Chapter 4 focuses on the effects of the protest-change equivalence on the determination of the event, but also considers how or why the dichotomy (as a general mode of explanation) cannot easily cater to or incorporate the available evidence about fundamental changes in policing. The final chapter examines police-protest dynamics and the police-protest dichotomy from perspectives on the demonstration as a site within a site. Overall this multi-perspective method oscillates between viewing the police-protest pairing from perspectives on the event, and viewing the event from perspectives on the protest-police pairing.

Chapter 1

J18 (London) and the anti-globalisation movement

René Thom pleads for a form of “nomadic” mathematics, whose vocation would not be to reduce the multiplicity of sensible phenomena to the unity of a mathematical description that would subject them to the order of resemblance, but to construct the mathematical intelligibility of their qualitative difference.

– Isabelle Stengers, *The Invention of Modern Science*

1. RESITUATING THE SUBJECT

J18 is perhaps most familiar as one instance within a chain of events involving *anti-globalisation protest*. In everyday usage the connection between these two equally contestable terms is best exemplified by a *Wikipedia* entry which defines *J18* as ‘One of the first international anti-globalization protests’.¹⁰ *Anti-globalisation protest* thus implies certain basic features. The term has also acted as an imperative for research and analysis. Here the basic premise that like events cohere to form an overarching anti-globalisation case has become a common analytic starting point. Interest in anti-globalisation protest typically manifests as a renewed interest in the relationship between social movements and globalisation. As

¹⁰ URL <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-globalization#J18>. (Accessed September 2008) In linked entry *anti-globalisation* is defined as ‘a pejorative term used to describe the political stance of people and groups who oppose neoliberal policies of unfettered globalization.’ URL <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-globalization>

such, *events like J18* fall under the rubric of social movement categories even though their use as illustrations for theorisations stretches across a range of disciplines. If *J18*, and the sites within it, has been retrospectively cast as one instance of *anti-globalisation protest*, the overarching term has also become a factor in the displacement or, more optimistically, the deferral of strategies through which a case-specific site can be broached.

Events like J18 continue to be defined less in terms of their specificity(ies) than through varied characterisations of a macro movement that appears in essence to comprise if not condition them. As a convenient, if homogenising term that captures any and all of these instances, however incompletely, it also precludes the possibility of looking at the particularities of specific aspects within specific instances. If the idea of an overarching anti-globalisation case especially derives fixity from a consecutively continuing series of events, the frequency with which *anti-globalisation* has been invoked to illustrate claims about *globalisation* is at least as important. Recurring patterns of explanation appear to exaggerate the coherence of an overarching anti-globalisation phenomenon to the extent that any case-specific analytic undertaking appears counterintuitive.

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The relation between *anti-globalisation protest* and the events that have rendered it visible is often simply assumed. Since so many accounts occur

¹¹ Since many of the case-specific approaches that will be discussed in the following chapter often also take the anti-globalisation movement as a point of departure, its relation to specific sites will be introduced and discussed here.

at a level of generality that accepts the commonality of events like *J18* whilst never taking account of their specificities, the extent to which we may have exaggerated the coherence of an anti-globalisation phenomenon that has become the basis of so much research, speculation and analysis, is unclear. What is perhaps most remarkable and least remarked upon is the lack of attention to the terms by which we have come to understand related *anti-globalisation* events. This is perhaps an inadvertent outcome of theorisation – *anti-globalisation* is an abstraction that has required, and overwhelmingly received general analytic responses. Yet if this prevailing focus has deferred discussion about any of the single instances that presumably go some way toward constituting the overall case, the lack of analytic strategies that are available for examining a specific instance is telling.

If the previous chapter outlines a case for looking at *J18 (London)* as a particularity, the aim here is to outline, from the point of view of social movement oriented anti-globalisation theorisations, some of the problems involved in establishing *J18 (London)* as an empirical site of analysis, and also to consider some possibilities for passing through these problems. *J18 (London)* is a case that simultaneously falls within and escapes general theorisation. So as to explore how to look at the case as a particularity, it will be necessary to consider how, apart from frequent association, it relates to the general case. More precisely, what are the main points of confluence and divergence between descriptions and accounts of a specific temporal episode and the archetypal and/or collective episodes to which

the general anti-globalisation case refers? What is the position of *J18 (London)* in the *anti-globalisation protest* and/or *movement* complex, and how does it nevertheless exceed theorisations of such a complex?

Since events are essentially contestable, the empirical data that are available for interpretation have inevitably led to a range of theorisations. So as to consider how and under what terms it might possible to look at *J18 (London)* as an empirical site of analysis, it will be instructive to first consider the ways in which *anti-globalisation protest* is singularised and further refined as a movement entity. How is such a singularity installed as the *event* or the *x* from which other outcomes, judgements, evaluations, and solutions obtain?

The assumption that there is some relation between these episodes is an 'empirically adequate truth' and is not in question. What is at issue is the tentativeness of connections that are made to support the singularity of this phenomenon. More specifically, what is the relation between the associated terms *anti-globalisation*, *movement*, *protest*, *demonstration* and *event*? In the absence of obvious strategies for examining *J18 (London)* as one aspect of one instance of an *event*, the question of how these terms are deployed to render an overarching singularity provides an important starting point for looking at this problem.

This chapter has four main sections. The first of these provides a number of descriptions of *J18* and *J18 (London)* that provisionally set out 'the case

within the case'. These provide an initial perspective from which to consider the emergence of the idea of a type event phenomenon which then becomes a focus for theorisation. Following descriptions of the case of *J18*, and of *J18 (London)* as one site within that, theorisations of 'globalisation/anti-globalisation' (and variations thereof) will be considered. There are roughly two starting points: the idea of the aggregate case as the sum of a number of events, and the idea of *Seattle* as an exemplary case, (although the distinction is not so clear-cut in practice as will be seen). What patterns emerge in the analytic expansion of *the event*?

Seattle represents an interesting case, and point from which to elaborate on the problem of the relation between a particular site and a singular, overall case. Seattle was of course the site of an *event*, but the event itself rapidly becomes the vital basis of assumptions about an extant anti-globalisation case. Whether by repetition or by association, *Seattle* proves the *anti-globalisation* case. One implies the other. As well as being the site of a 'single case', the case indicates how *anti-globalisation* takes shape. It becomes a 'concentration of the global in the local', not simply in terms of geography and space, but also in terms of the conceptual delineation of the scope of *the event*. In this way, the site/case can also be used to focus the problem in the following section of looking at how, or the extent to which, the analytic strategies that are employed to characterise the general case might also be used to observe 'a single site' within 'a single instance'.

A further section will examine the processes involved in the analytic expansion of *an event*. The aim here will be to consider in further detail the interaction between what Charles Tilly calls ‘two interdependent bodies of theory’: ‘a theory embodying explanations of the phenomenon under investigation, and another theory embodying explanations of the evidence concerning that phenomenon.’¹² Specific questions about the grouping of and connection between the associated ideas of *anti-globalisation*, *movement*, *protest*, *demonstration* and *event* are a particular focus. How are these objects of study reworked alongside explanations of spatial transformations relating to the *globalisation* of (social) movements?

The relation between *demonstration* and *movement* is of particular interest. If *social movement* is the main analytic category through which *globalisation* or *anti-globalisation* events have come to be understood, the overall aim of the thesis is to consider how it might be possible to look at how the particularity of *J18 (London)* was brought about, and assess the extent to which it might be said to have broken new ground as an innovative instance of *political demonstration*. As a situated event *J18 (London)* was most immediately recognised as a demonstration, albeit as one that had exceeded the terms of *demonstration*, that is, of demonstrations in the London context. Given the prevailing framing of questions through movement categories, how do *social movement* analytic strategies accord with as well as conflict with questions about *political demonstration*? To what extent is it possible to make enough space within

¹² Charles Tilly, ‘Event Catalogs as Theories’, *Sociological Theory*, (20:2, 2002), p 249.

a designated globalisation phenomenon, to consider the issue of the particularity of *J18 (London)* as a complex, temporal (spatial) political site? This section will also consider the effect of information and communication technologies on the analysis of *events like J18* as a social movement-related subject. Is there a sense in which new technologies alter the framing as well as the purpose of the study of social movement-related events? The final section of this chapter will conclude with a tentative working definition of the case of *J18 (London)*.

2. J18 AND EVENTS WITHIN EVENTS

Demonstrations, gatherings, carnivals, protests and other events on 18 June 1999 followed the circulation of a proposal calling for an ‘international day of protest, action and carnival aimed at the heart of the global economy: the financial centres and banking districts and multinational corporation power bases’.¹³ The proposal, which was initially put together ‘by various groups and movements of activists from England’, invites a broad range of other groups ‘who recognise that the global capitalist system ... is at the heart of our social and ecological troubles’ to take part in an international day of protest on June 18, the start date of a two-day summit of the G8 in Cologne. The proposal which is modelled on a similar set of demonstration events in 1998 aims to build on international solidarity networks: ‘This proposal is made in the spirit of strengthening our international solidarity networks and follows from the success of co-

¹³ See Appendix 1, p 5 of 10.

ordinated global action during May 16-20th 1998'.¹⁴ The specification of event themes was to be decided locally: 'Each event would be organised autonomously and co-ordinated in each city or financial district by a variety of movements and groups'. Since the diversity of events and event themes presented difficulties in reaching agreement on a suitable name for an overall set of events, UK co-ordination meetings opted for 'J18' as an abbreviation of the event date. Soon after initial circulation, the proposal was adopted by People's Global Action, translated into eight languages, and distributed to thousands of groups and individuals worldwide, in person, by word-of-mouth, post and electronic mail. A J18 email discussion list was set up enabling any message sent from anywhere to be automatically distributed to all who were signed up to the list, and the original proposal was re-worked into an international proposal. The subsequent version elaborates on the importance of international solidarity, reiterates the aim of autonomous organisation and affirms the practical relation between those two aims:

In the spirit of strengthening international networks for equality, freedom and ecological sustainability we encourage all sympathetic movements and groups to organise their own autonomous protests or actions, on the same day - June 18th - in the same locations - financial districts - around the world. Each event would be organised autonomously; could be co-ordinated

¹⁴ Ibid. The five-day period in May 1998 which is often referred to as the first 'global day of action' or GDA, involved demonstrations against multilateral financial institutions in over 70 cities worldwide. The decision to co-ordinate a set of events on this scale to coincide with the G8 meeting in Birmingham, UK and the second ministerial meeting of the WTO in Geneva, Switzerland, emerged as one of the aims of a People's Global Action gathering in Geneva three months earlier. The gathering was made up of 300 delegates from 71 countries to facilitate grassroots dialogue without recourse to the mediation of established NGOs.

in each city by a variety of movements and groups; while linked globally by post, telephone, fax, email and international meetings.¹⁵

The international proposal concludes that:

By taking direct action, people make connections, they talk and communicate with each other, they break down the isolation and fragmentation of this alienated society. These connections are now spreading across the globe as people realise that their particular local struggles are part of a wider problem – the global economy.¹⁶

The events of June 18 took place in the financial districts of over 70 cities in around 40 countries. 10,000 people from a broad spectrum of ostensibly single issue groups from across the UK gathered in London's Square Mile to join the *Carnival Against Global Capitalism*. Connections between 'single issue' campaigns were made, practiced, performed and demonstrated on a unifying platform of *anti-capitalist* opposition to City-based economic practices that are global in reach. The site of the London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) became a particular focus in the aim to 'spotlight the links between economic globalisation, poverty, and the destruction of the Earth's environment'.¹⁷ (As will be discussed in chapter 4 this was a particular focus in many subsequent debates about policing and protest in the event, as well as in statements by police and protesters.)

¹⁵ See Appendix 1, p 8 of 10.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ To view these as well as a chronologically sequenced account of the London events on June 18 see URL <http://bak.spc.org/j18/site/uk.html> (last accessed 13 January 2008). For one of many personal accounts of the June 18 London events 'Dancing at the Edge of Chaos', in Notes From Nowhere, eds., *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*, (London: Verso, 2003), pp 188-95.

In Lagos, Nigeria between 50,000-70,000 people lined the streets to welcome the return of Dr. Owens Wiwa (the brother of Ken Saro-Wiwa executed by the Nigerian government in 1995) who had been forced into exile in North America four years previously by the Komo and Abacha junta, and 10,000 people joined the *Carnival of the Oppressed* which shut down the city's oil capital, Port Harcourt.¹⁸ The *International Day of Action against corporate rule and imperialism* event brought 22 Niger Delta communities and a number of environmental, ethnic nationality, student, youth and women's groups together to demonstrate opposition to alliances between the Nigerian state and oil companies that had blighted Niger Delta communities for four decades. The events marked the re-opening of the MOSOP (Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People) centre, symbolising the re-building of damaged community relations.

In Senegal demonstrations highlighted the exploitation of children and the effects of debt and structural adjustment policies on children's welfare, while large demonstrations in Pakistan highlighted the strength of opposition to basic commodity price rises as well as to nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons testing in Gujerat. In Zurich a Reclaim the Streets (RTS) party was held at a construction site being re-developed on the east London Docklands model, in opposition to the homogenisation of urban space and the simultaneous eradication of metropolitan public commons.

¹⁸ For a personal account of events in Lagos see Notes From Nowhere, eds., *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*, (London: Verso, 2003), p 201.

Events in Sydney, Australia were themed the *J-One-Eight Public Holiday*, and in Madrid, Spain, a week-long *Rompamos el Silencio* (*Break the Silence*) campaign concluded on June 18.¹⁹

June 18 events involved activities that were co-ordinated by long-standing campaigns like *Jubilee 2000*. Jubilee 2000 raises awareness on the issues facing heavily indebted countries. The Jubilee 2000 campaign has been described as a transnational network which evolved into 'a more integrated but still loosely affiliated coalition of groups in the mid- to late 1990s'.²⁰ The campaign has been led by groups such as Christian Aid (UK), Oxfam, EURODAD (the European Network on Debt and Development). Catholic national episcopal conferences and relief agencies have also supported Jubilee 2000 campaigns. These groups 'have argued that heavily indebted countries devote an inordinate portion of their national budgets to making interest payments on the debt, leaving too little available for desperately needed outlays of health, education, housing, and job creation.'²¹ Jubilee 2000 activities on June 18 1999 included the handing over of a petition signed by seventeen million people from over 160 countries to a representative of the G8 summit in Cologne,²² a *Wake Up Crawl* of consulates in Perth, Australia, and a 600-link human chain around the US Treasury Department site in Washington DC.

¹⁹ For a more detailed account of worldwide June 18 events see 'Global Day of Action: June 18th 1999', in Notes From Nowhere, eds., *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*, (London: Verso, 2003), pp 184-7.

²⁰ Elizabeth A. Donnelly, 'Proclaiming Jubilee: The Debt and Structural Adjustment Network', in S. Khagram, J. V. Riker, and K. Sikkink, eds., *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p156.

²¹ Ibid, p156.

²² The petition was presented to the German Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, who accepted it on behalf of the G8 leaders.

The events on June 18 also featured the Intercontinental Caravan of Solidarity and Resistance (ICC), a relatively newly networked mobile campaign involving a 30-day tour of 11 buses travelling 56,000 miles through nine countries, scheduled to reach the G8 summit host city on June 18 for a Laugh Parade.²³ ICC travellers were drawn from various groups and regions including Movimento Sem Terra (Brazil), Indigenous Mapuche (Chile), Process of Black Communities (Colombia), environmentalists from Pakistan, women farmers from Bangladesh, human rights groups from Nepal and support groups from Mexico for Zapatista communities. On its journey, the ICC passed through France, joining the Montpellier farmers' anti-GM direct action, stood on anti-genetics platforms in Pamplona in the Basque Country, joined a peace march outside the NATO headquarters in Brussels, was turned back at the Polish border, marched to the WTO site in Geneva, challenged the Nuffield Foundation's claim that Britain has a moral imperative to develop GM food to feed people in the global South (in London), planted organic vegetables with farmers in Bishop's Stortford, was refused entry to the Czech Republic where a 7,000-strong street reclamation party was taking place (in Prague), and had 'spontaneous laughing fits' in a tram that was held at a station in Cologne by police enforcing a protest ban on the entire city centre on June 18.²⁴

²³ In Mexico City in 1994 100,000 people marched in solidarity with Zapatistas, shouting "First World? Ha! Ha! Ha!" as an expression of solidarity with Zapatista struggles. Laughter is also frequently associated with non-violent protest as in the Gandhian tradition.

²⁴ For a detailed description of the International Caravan of Solidarity and Resistance see Notes From Nowhere, eds., *We Are Everywhere: The Irresistible Rise of Global Anticapitalism*, (London: Verso, 2003).

Looking at *J18* as a temporal site and at a locality within that site requires some attention to how we have come to make sense of one instance which, along with others, has brought *globalisation* and its apparent antithesis into such sharp focus. The term *anti-globalisation protest* initially appeared in media circles²⁵ following the famous Seattle gatherings that took place five months later. The term appears to be an abbreviation or even subversion of the term *anti global capitalist* – the self-defined activity of some of the groups and individuals that took part in or identified with some of the events on June 18.²⁶ *Seattle* coincided with, or was very closely followed by the idea of an emerging anti-globalisation phenomenon. In some accounts, its designation as such was a consequence of the fact that it was preceded by other, similar events. Here, the significance of previous events was underestimated up until the point of *Seattle*, when/where a new pattern of protest emerged:

Previous protests, particularly the J18/"Seize the Streets" [*sic*] protests in London and other cities around the world on June 18, 1999, foreshadowed the N30 demonstrations in Seattle. The J18 protest was ignored, dismissed or misinterpreted. Seattle was where the protests broke through the infosphere and into the notice of the world.²⁷

²⁵ In some accounts the term is specifically attributed to the US media: 'The phrase 'anti-globalization movement' is a coinage of the US media...Insofar as this is a movement against anything, it's against neoliberalism, which can be defined as a kind of market fundamentalism.' David Graeber, 'A Movement of Movements?: The New Anarchists', *New Left Review*, No. 13, 2002, p 62.

²⁶ The tremendously pluralistic forms and activities that occurred as part of J18 cannot be reduced to the term *anti-global capitalist*. It is in this sense that 'J18' was adopted as a more inclusive 'tag' for all the events and activities.

²⁷ Paul de Armond, 'Netwar in the Emerald City: WTO Protest Strategy and Tactics', *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt, eds., RAND National Defense Research Institute, Santa Monica, Calif., pp 201-445.

It is perhaps also significant that UK reactions to *J18*, or *J18 (London)* in particular, had set a precedent for the preparation of and reaction to the Seattle events. Several days before 30 November the City of London police, who were involved in *J18 (London)* events, issued statements warning that violent conflict at the Seattle convergence was inevitable,²⁸ and on November 29 the *Financial Times* ran the headline *WTO prepares for the battle in Seattle*. *Seattle* later came to be widely termed the *Battle in Seattle*, partly as a result of the extraordinary scenes of conflict and chaos between police and protesters. If the case was to become an emblematic anti-globalisation event, this in turn became a critical factor in the retrospective canonisation of *J18*, and also therefore May 16. Moreover, each subsequent, similar episode continued to reinforce a spiralling consensus about the emergence of a new form of *protest* agency.

Whilst it is possible to point to the successive progression of what are at least nominal continuities (for instance between *J18 (London)* and *N30 (Seattle)*, or between May 16, *J18*, *N30*, *S26*, and so on), the opposite is also true. *J18* became a convenient way of referring to the range events and activities that took place on or around one 24-hour period. It was to become a name template for a host of similar events that followed with *N30*, *S26* the following September, *A20*, and so on. *N30* demonstrations occurred in over a hundred cities worldwide. Compared to *J18*, *N30* events involved many more gatherings in considerably more locations around the

²⁸ M. Shumate, et al. quotes a statement by Kieron Sharp of City of London Police in the *Guardian*, November 25. 'Storytelling and Globalization: the complex narratives of netwar', *E:CO*, Vol. 7, Nos. 3-4, 2005, p 80.

world, yet Seattle remained the focus of analytic interest. There are any possible combinations of reasons for this: the overzealous police response to largely peaceful gatherings of US citizens that attracted worldwide attention, the fact that international media were already assembled there to cover the WTO meetings, and perhaps also, as Joseph Stiglitz explains it, because a public political gathering of this scale in Seattle was unexpected:

The protests at the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organization in 1999 were a shock...Riots and protests against the policies of and actions by institutions of globalization are hardly new. For decades, people in the developing world have rioted when the austerity programs imposed on their countries proved to be too harsh, but their protests were largely unheard in the West. What is new is the wave of protests in the developed countries.²⁹

Seattle therefore marks a point at which attention became increasingly focused on events and activities that took place in and around summit sites and the cities that host them. The same cannot be said of *J18*. *J18* (London) was not a summit site although it did attract attention beyond its boundaries, no doubt at least in part because the gatherings occurred at the site of a hub of the global economy. From this point on, event-date abbreviations (e.g. May 16, *J18*, *N30*) were articulated alongside summit sites (e.g. *Seattle*, *Prague*, *Davos*, *Quebec*, *Gothenburg*, *Genoa*, and so on). However defined, the steady build-up of episodes gave the clear impression of an overall emerging pattern of like events, so that any questions about

²⁹ Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its Discontents*, London: Penguin, p 3.

specific instances would soon give way to more pressing issues of the sighting of an unfamiliar landscape of global days of action (GDAs).

Analytic specialisation has perhaps inevitably involved a shift away from the initially grounding terms of *protest* and *policing*. The cause of conflict and chaos that marked some though not all of the episodes was now increasingly attributed to the use and proliferation of communication and information technologies and/or to networked forms of social organisation, to be examined as protest and/or social movement innovations, or as part of changes in the spacing of protest or social movements. *Anti-globalisation* phenomena are often employed as illustrations of networked, decentralised, hyper-mobile, global, transnational, informational protest or social movement activity. These and other descriptions are variously linked, paired and prioritised to re-theorise social movements and their wider relevance. Additionally, to the extent that the analytic category *social movement* entails the state and civil society, *Seattle* and the notional emergence of an *anti-globalisation movement* thus also mark a point at which the main lines of general debate became increasingly polarised between *global social movements* on the one hand and *global governance*

on the other,³⁰ a polarisation that has perhaps reached a point of exaltation through Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Multitude*, and its counter position to *Empire*.³¹ Leaving the latter aside for the moment, a particular point of interest is the apparent speed at which the analytic gaze had moved from the local to the global and from the particular to the general. *Seattle* simultaneously becomes a singularity and a general phenomenon, not so much through a long and sustained process of reflection, but at the very moment of its inception as *Seattle*.

3. FIN DE SIECLE MOVEMENT OR 'COLLECTIVE HALLUCINATION'?

As a temporal (spatial) site, J18 (London) becomes the equivalent of a fractal dot on a vast landscape of the places, spaces, convergences and events that comprise 'J18' as a temporal site. Likewise the unfolding of these and other similarly named sites, and their retrospective mapping eventually render the entire case of J18 infinitesimal. To what extent is it possible to disentangle one particularity from a highly determined *anti-*

³⁰ D. Armstrong et al for instance take as their starting point 'the dichotomy between the politics of governance and the politics of resistance' (D. Armstrong, T. Farrell, and B. Maiguashca. Eds., *Governance and Resistance in World Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). This represents one of many examples of the way in which the polarisation has oriented research. Issues of *global civil society* have often been employed to focus questions about the relation between the two. There are a number of definitions, two of which are noted here: For Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor, 'global civil society' has become a term used to depict 'a supranational sphere of social and political participation.' ('Introducing Global Civil Society', in Anheier et al, eds., *Global Civil Society*, 2001, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). Ronnie Lipschutz provides the following description: *Civil society* includes those political, cultural and social organizations of modern societies that are autonomous of the state, but part of the mutually-constitutive relationship between state and society. *Global civil society* extends this concept into the transnational realm, where it constitutes something along the lines of an 'episteme' composed of local national and global non-governmental organizations. R. Lipschutz, 'Crossing Borders: Global Civil Society and the Reconfiguration of Transnational Political Space', *GeoJournal*, 52, 1, September, 2000, p 18.

³¹ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).

globalisation protest and/or movement phenomenon? To what extent is it possible to provisionally disaggregate one spatiotemporal episode, not necessarily from related others, but from the assumption that there is an essential and irreducible relation between them? One possible solution is that the question can only be partially posed and from certain perspectives: for instance, in terms of the relation between *J18* and *J18 (London)*; or between *J18 (London)* and *J18 (Lagos)*; or between *J18 (Lagos)* and *J18 (Zurich)*; between *J18* and all the *J18* sites; or between *J18 (London)* and *N30 (Seattle)*; between *Seattle* and *N30*, between May 16 1998, *J18 (Cologne)*, *N30 (Seattle)*, *S26 (Prague)*, *Gothenburg*, *Genoa*, and so on. Characterisations and theorisations necessarily start from particular perspectives to be analytically expanded in various directions.

The use of event catalogues for delineating the scope of an event, through which particular forms of action are then highlighted, is particularly significant in this regard. Amory Starr's work on the anti-corporate and anti-globalisation movements is used here as an initial illustration of the role and importance of catalogues. The following abridged passage specifically marks out the year 1998 as an especially important moment in the emergence of the *anti-globalisation movement*:

1998 was the big year in the emergence of the anti-globalization movement. January saw the occupation by 24,000 people of one of the major dams in the Narmada Valley, an escalation of the struggle, which became international and spread to Japan, Germany and the USA in early 1999. February saw the formation of People's Global Action (PGA)...In May, the

first 'human chain to break the chains of debt' of 70,000 people ringed the G8 meeting in Birmingham, England. A few days later, on the 16th (m16), fierce protests greeted the second WTO Ministerial in Geneva, held in the United Nations building...This was the first 'global day of action' during which simultaneous, diverse protests against the WTO were held in thirty countries on five continents. ... In June 1999, the second 'global carnival of resistance' (j18) was held simultaneously in forty-three countries at the time of the G8 summit in Köln and included a surprise insurrection in London's financial centre. November was a tremendous month, and not only because of the Seattle WTO protests. Earlier in the month, at the Jubilee South-South Summit in Gauteng, South Africa, thirty-five countries gathered to devise a common analysis, vision and strategy regarding debt. The significance, then, of the 'n30' Seattle protests was not, as is often mis-stated, 'the beginning of a new global movement' - that was already well underway; what it heralded was the entry of US citizens into that movement...The protest was also special because of the success of the direct action blockade. Using entirely non-violent tactics, protesters locked themselves to one another and sat in the street, preventing all traffic flow and stood photogenically arm in arm surrounding the convention centre, denying entry to delegates. For a time, police did nothing while bemused delegates sat in the streets talking with protesters. The protest message was clear: the meetings are undemocratic. 'If we can't go in, no one does. Go home!'³²

This account forms part of the starting point of 'an accessible introduction to the movement', rather than 'an evaluation or quantification of it'. The passage presents a catalogue of events that retrospectively draws May 1998 and June 1999 into a general trend alongside Seattle. But also, further agencies, processes and practices are added to the catalogue for

³² Amory Starr, *Global Revolt: A Guide to the Movements Against Globalization*, (London: Zed, 2005), pp 26-30.

theorisation; processes like the formation of PGA and the formulation of strategy and analysis at the Jubilee South-South Summit, are also drawn into the catalogue of like events. Moreover, the contrast between the descriptions of J18 detailed above and the single sentence which especially highlights ‘a surprise insurrection in London’s financial centre’, is indicative of the extent to which all and any of the events that comprise a catalogue, must be reduced. Within a detailed description of what clearly amounts to a trend or movement of protest there is a limited space to detail the intricacies of each of the events that render it. Suffice to point to some of them in some way.

By contrast, in another passage, which is part of an earlier, more analytic approach, the author marks late November 1999 as a significant movement in the emergence of an anti-corporate movement. This earlier work constitutes what can be described as one of ‘the first systematic documentation[s] of international resistance to transnational corporations.’ Here, due to ‘its internationalism, its ideological unity, its diversity, its size and its effectiveness’, *Seattle* marks the appearance of a ‘striking new movement ... upon the world stage’³³:

In late November 1999, the awakening movements of the USA came together seventy thousand strong in most extraordinary mobilization in recent memory. Hard-won coalitions between labour, environment, human rights, farmers and youth groups bore fruit as a variety of complementary direct actions (including Reclaim the Streets-style

³³ Amory Starr, *Naming the Enemy: Anti-corporate Movements Confront Globalization*, (London: Zed, 2000).

dance parties) shut down the WTO Ministerial meetings in Seattle for an entire day. Simultaneous protests were held in Geneva, where a march of 2,000 farmers and 3,000 city people (a new alliance) converged on WTO headquarters. Seventy-five thousand French participated in actions in 80 different cities, including 5,000 farmers, who met in Paris along with their farm animals for a protest feast. Other protests were held all over, including Milan, Berlin, Amsterdam, Buenos Aires, Israel and Colombo (Sri Lanka), with small protests in major US and UK cities. In Manila 8,000 people rallied at the US embassy and at the presidential palace to protest against Philippine participation in the WTO. They returned to the embassy a couple of days later to protest against police treatment of Seattle protesters. Many protesters were held in India, including ten districts of the Punjab New Delhi (protest at Gandhi's burial site), Banglor and the Narmada valley. In addition to opposing the WTO, Indian protests emphasized the 'Monsanto Quit India' campaign, a new land rights movement, and opposition to dams and other World Bank projects.³⁴

This catalogue bears greater resemblance to the above descriptions of J18, both in terms of the fact that it depicts activities, forms of action and events that take place around a single day, and in that the problem of reduction of course still persists. In different ways, the catalogues of description delineate the scope of either *the event* as a 24-hour period. The question then becomes: to what object of study does the catalogue refer?

Charles Tilly's exploration of the 'creation of event catalogs as a means of social research' has done much to bring to the fore questions about the

³⁴ Ibid.

relation between definitions and theories of measurement in the use of event catalogues in social science. Tilly considers the event catalogue to be 'a set of descriptions of multiple social interactions collected from a delimited set of sources according to relatively uniform procedures':

*All empirical social research rests, at least implicitly, on not one but two theories: a theory explaining the phenomenon under study, another theory explaining the generation of evidence concerning the phenomenon. The two theories necessarily interact...*The two theories inevitably have implications for each other; a theory concerning effects of associational participation of democracy necessarily interacts with a theory concerning how evidence of associational participation, democracy, and their connections comes into being. Each assertion about the effects of associational participation has implications for how and where we could detect those effects, but each assertion about how we might recognize such effects also has implications for the nature of the effects. Since social scientists have a habit of treating the first issue, but not the second, as Theory, let me concentrate on theories that embody explanation of the evidence concerning the phenomenon under investigation.³⁵

For Tilly, 'The very definition of contentious episodes' raises a number of conceptual and theoretical issues. From his perspective a contentious episode can be identified as 'an interaction between at least two parties in the course of which at least one party makes claims that, if realized, would affect another party's welfare':

³⁵ Charles Tilly, 'Event Catalogs as Theories', *Sociological Theory*, (Vol.20, No.2, 2002), pp 248 -9.

Following standard practice in the study of contentious episodes, let us narrow the focus to public, discontinuous, collective claims-making where at least one government official figures as a participant or a third party – for example, as an absent object of claims. The narrowing spotlights politically relevant contentious episodes.

Although these sorts of episodes mark out certain kinds of happening, ‘a minor industry has grown up around the cataloguing and analysis of political demonstrations’ in particular. One reason for this is that demonstrations readily lend themselves to uniform cataloguing. This is a consequence of how ‘within democratic polities they have acquired strikingly standard forms’. As Tilly points out, catalogues of demonstrations have often been used as evidence for change and variation in the study of democratic polities and transitions from socialism. Their use as such can be traced back to George Rudé’s *Crowd in the French Revolution* which has provided ‘the possibility of organizing reports of popular struggles into systematic accounts of change and variation.’

In the cases being observed in Starr’s research, catalogues are not so much used to account for variation through a substantial period of time, as to outline variation in space. Here catalogues provide a means of organising descriptions of relatively recent events that occur within shorter periods. Thus the question of variation is more often a question of multiplicity, or the frequency of multiplicity. This is what then provides the main point of departure for an equally diverse range of theoretical activities. How then is x claimed, and for what theoretical purpose?

For Starr the N30 catalogue represents a point from which to begin to look at groups and social movements, which are classified according to 'three modes of resistance to corporate globalization'. These include the contestation and reform of corporate power through democratic institutions and direct action; an alternative globalization 'from below' which involves the democratic reshaping of corporations; and movements that can be defined by the intention of delinking localities and communities from the global economy, or re localization.

Events, actions and systems of social relationships

Catalogues not only provide an ideographic representation or measure of incidence or frequency (and now also of the multiplicity) of some thing, they also then require definition of the said thing. Issues of definition are often resolved through categories of *collective action* or *social movement*. For Alberto Melucci social movement is not so much 'an empirical categorization of certain types of behaviour but as an *analytical concept*'. From this perspective the approach to movements must be based on a theory of collective action, one that must 'break down its subject' in terms of the relation between the type of action and 'the system of social relationships':

understood this way, it addresses a *particular level* of collective action that should be distinguished from other levels present in the empirical collective phenomena. No phenomenon of collective action can be taken as a global whole since the language it speaks is not univocal. An analytic approach to those phenomena currently called 'movements' must be firmly placed within a theory of collective action, and it must break down its subject according to *orientations of action* on the one hand and the *system of social relationships affected by the action* on the other. For example, campaigning for functional changes in an organization is not the same thing as challenging its power structure; fighting for increased participation in decision-making is different from rejecting the rules of the political game...Thus conceived, the concept of social movement, along with other concepts to be presented for analytical purposes in the following section, are always objects of knowledge constructed by the analyst; they do not coincide with the empirical complexity of the action.³⁶

Part of what made Seattle and like events a compelling theoretical challenge is their apparent complication of the framing of questions about the orientation of action on the one hand – catalogues invariably detail a very broad spectrum of orientations – and, as a consequence of the multiplicity of sites that can be catalogued under 'one instance', they also complicate questions about the systems to which the former might possibly relate. Certainly issues that have been framed in terms of movement and globalisation were ongoing throughout the 1990s, but they came into particularly sharp focus towards the end of that decade that, and specifically as a consequence of *Seattle* (and like events):

³⁶ Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective action in the information age*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 21.

Since the latter half of the 1990s there has been a surge in books and articles tackling the relationship between globalization and social movements. In the light of the dramatic expansion of globalization and related studies in the social sciences from the early 1990s this development seems somewhat delayed; an impression that is only confirmed when looking at the empirical reality of the 1980s and 1990s (and even long before then). But the relevance of the budding academic attention to these questions was made evident for everyone with the Battle of Seattle in 1999 and the string of worldwide protests against international institutions that followed. The events in Seattle and other cities after the turn of the millennium also sparked renewed interest in the issue and a second generation of work on globalization and social movements.³⁷

Interest in these developments has stretched across a range of disciplines leading to, or hastening new or existing interdisciplinary projects, notably between social movement studies and international relations perspectives. For instance, *Restructuring World Politics* develops from a research agenda that is based on social constructionist approaches to international relations. It is concerned with highlighting the creation and role of 'soft' or communicative power by social movements and how this forges and changes norms in world politics. It covers a variety of cases 'from Santiago to Seattle' to illustrate this.³⁸ The authors show that, 'Together these cases highlight the changing dynamics, policy arenas, and possibilities for

³⁷ Thomas Olesen, 'Globalization in Movement(s)', *Social Movement Studies*, (Vol. 2, No. 2, 2003), p 229.

³⁸ S. Khagram, J. V. Riker, and K. Sikkink, eds., *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks and Norms*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), p 3.

restructuring world politics through transnational collective action.’³⁹ This volume integrates international relations concepts *norms* and *regimes* with political social movement approaches such as *frames*, *resources* and *political opportunities*. Part of what makes this integration possible is that ‘Where international relations theorists talk of norms, social movement theorists tend to talk of collective or shared beliefs’.⁴⁰ A distinction between international norms (defined as ‘standards of appropriate behaviour held by a critical mass of states’), and collective beliefs (defined as ‘transnational norms’) thus carves out a space for a field of enquiry concerning the relationship between ‘the collective beliefs of NGOs and movements, and international norms.’⁴¹

The approach developed here extends Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow’s three-dimensional approach to the *Europeanization of contentious politics*, which is adapted and applied to *the transnational*, a heuristic device that links chapters in the volume. All the cases described have a transnational dimension in that they ‘involve transnational *sources* of problems, transnational *processes* of collective action, and/or transnational *outcomes*.⁴² That is, all chapters involve descriptions of ‘transnational *processes* of collective action’ and some also involve descriptions of ‘transnational *sources* of problems’ and/or ‘transnational *outcomes*’.

³⁹ Ibid, p 22.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p 15

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² cited in Khagram et al., 2002, p 10.

One of the two chapters that relates to all three dimensions is an account of the development of *Jubilee 2000*, one of the projects that participated in awareness-raising projects on June 18 to campaign for policy reforms. This essay is not concerned with the J18 *per se*, but explores *Jubilee 2000* as a specific project that is organised by specific groups around a specific issue. The account begins with the handing over of a petition signed by seventeen million people to the then German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, in Cologne, and concludes with an appreciation of the role of different *Jubilee 2000* actions, events and activities in promoting the issue of debt relief, in networking that issue, and in securing a number of outcomes towards debt relief. It charts the way in which myriad groups and individuals coalesced around the issue, how they then acted in unison, and with what outcomes. It maps the emergence of an intra-movement process and then considers the relationship between that and policy outcomes. The object of study is not a one-day event but the development over a couple of decades of a social project, one that also participated in J18 along with other more or less organised and more or less enduring campaigns. Donnelly's account fits into the volume's aim to examine how different movements are 'able to help shape a new norm, or modify an existing one, to influence the global norms structure to some degree.'⁴³

Khagram et al. mention specific events although the primary aim is here to look at the role of transnational advocacy groups within them. Thus 'what links episodes in Santiago and Seattle, and the many other cases explored

⁴³ Kathryn Sikkink, 'Restructuring World Politics', in Khagram et al., 2002, p 306

here, is that all are forms of transnational collective action involving nongovernmental organizations interacting with international norms to restructure world politics.’⁴⁴ As such, the volume consists of a catalogue of episodes that are very different to those detailed above.

In setting out the aims, *Seattle* provides both a point of departure as well as final summary point. In the opening statements it is invoked as a manifestation of the power of ‘transnational advocacy groups’:

At the close of the twentieth century, transnational advocacy groups gave a visible and startling manifestation of their power in the massive demonstrations against the World Trade Organization (WTO) meetings in Seattle, Washington, where they contributed to shutting down global negotiations and captured world attention for their cause. The protest in Seattle was not an isolated, spontaneous event but rather a conscious tactic of an increasingly coordinated and powerful movement against globalization that often targets international organizations such as the WTO, the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁴⁵

And in the closing statement it is invoked as a case that highlights existing debates about the relation between actors and policy-making arenas:

International nongovernmental organizations increasingly play an advocacy role in a wide range of global public policy networks that define and shape global policy and practice from human rights to human development and security. The derailing of the World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle

⁴⁴ Khagram et al., 2002, p 3.

⁴⁵ Kathryn Sikkink, 2002, p 306

in November 1999 has prompted much debate about whether and how such nonstate actors should have a voice and participate in these forums. These fundamental issues are highlighted and addressed in the volume's conclusions.

As such *Seattle* is used to outline two main issues. On the one hand, as a massive set of anti-WTO demonstrations it evinces the efficacy of a reconceptualised form of action, of transnational advocacy groups; on the other, as a continuous 'protest...event' it reveals an increasingly coordinated and powerful movement against globalization'. Here the idea of strategy ('conscious tactic') facilitates a link between this form of *protest event* and that form of *movement*. In this way, the basic definitions *demonstration* and *protest event* become the vital basis of a simultaneously de temporalised and re spatialised object of study. Khagram et al outline a new object of study, a reconceptualised form of action, through recourse to the conflation of episodes from *Seattle* to *Santiago*, which are then located within a system of networked movements principally geared to lobbying activity in policy-making arenas.

The network idea that is invoked by social scientists and political sociologists focuses on how the coordinated actions of non state actors seek to elicit policy responses or outcomes, for instance, through 'issue networks'⁴⁶, and through 'trans national social movement organizations' or TSMOs.⁴⁷ This has built on research on the consolidation of a transnational

⁴⁶ Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

community of professional activists and campaigners,⁴⁸ on the growth of voluntary and/or political organisations that mobilise on transnational issues,⁴⁹ and so on. While the approach adopts broad categories into which a variety of forms, processes and events can be incorporated, it provides a necessarily narrow or partial, albeit dominant perspective of temporal events like *J18*. For instance the gatherings on June 18 can only be partly explained by the activity of groups that can be defined instrumentally by activity in or through links with policy-making arenas.

Movements, networks and technology

A particular area of interest is how accounts of *eventness* rapidly give way to more specialised debates. A great majority of other accounts that break the subject down in terms of the relation between action-type and the system of social relationships likewise have similar starting points. Within social movement approaches, themes of diversity and interconnection, for which *Seattle* and like episodes were especially noted, have also provided opportunities to formalise and rework ideas about ‘networks’ and ‘flows’. Again, a number of theorisations take events as a starting point. For instance: ‘The December 1999 protest against the World Trade Organization in Seattle [as] a paradigmatic example of [a] new kind of social movement.’⁵⁰ Manuel Castells uses the example of the Seattle

⁴⁷ Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco, *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997)

⁴⁸ Keck and Sikkink, 1998.

⁴⁹ Jackie Smith, ‘Characteristics of Modern Transnational Social Movements’, in J. Smith, C. Chatfield and R. Pagnucco, eds., 1997.

⁵⁰ Manuel Castells, *The Internet Galaxy: Reflections of the Internet, Business, and Society*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

protests to initiate an account of twenty-first century, networked social movements. This builds on prior work on *The Network Society*, in which networks are invoked as the central organising principle of the information age, a point in time that can be characterised by ‘the pre-eminence of social morphology over social action.’⁵¹ Within this, social movements thus use the dominant logic of networking. The account draws on a catalogue of some of the multiplicities that comprise *Seattle* so as to highlight particular areas of interest:

[The protest] brought together a vast coalition of extremely different, and even contradictory, interests and values, from the battalions of the American labor movement to the swarms of eco-pacifists, environmentalists, women’s groups, and a myriad of alternative groups, including the pagan community. ... the movement was based on the exchange of information, on previous months of heated political debate over the Internet, that preceded the individual and collective decisions to go to Seattle and to try to block the meeting of what was perceived as an institution enforcing “globalization without representation.”⁵²

The protest highlights some of the more prominent aspects of networked, social movements in the *Information Age*. These movements organise and mobilise around cultural claims and around ‘struggles to transform the categories of our existence’. Their participation in the restructuring of their world from bottom up is especially facilitated by the material basis of the Internet but also by networks that spring from ‘the resistance of local

⁵¹ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1996), p 469.

⁵² Castells, 2001, p 141.

societies [and] aim at overcoming the power of global networks' that bypass the institutions of the nation-state.⁵³

However, for Castells the *anti-globalisation movement* is 'pure movement' rather than the precursor of new institutions:

This is not new in history, by any means. In fact, this informality and relative spontaneity are what have usually characterized the most productive social movements. The novelty is their networking via the Internet, because it allows the movement to be diverse and coordinated at the same time, to engage in a continuing debate, and yet not be paralyzed by it, since each one of its nodes can reconfigure a network of its affinities and objectives, with partial overlappings and multiple connections. The anti-globalization movement is not simply a network, it is an electronic network, it is an Internet-based movement. And because the Internet is its home it cannot be disorganised or captured. It swims like a fish in the net.⁵⁴

The scope of Seattle

Seattle especially intensifies debates about the role and significance of global social movements, global governance and global civil society. In particular, the complexities of the site draw attention to the way in which conventional categories of domestic and international politics are exceeded. For example the following three post-Seattle event reflections indicate how readings of the case and its complexities were invariably expressed in terms of the problems of delimiting the usual parameters of

⁵³ Ibid, p 143.

⁵⁴ Castells, 2001, p 142.

institutional and non institutional politics on the one hand and domestic and international politics on the other:

The Third Ministerial conference of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which took place in Seattle between 30 November and 3 December 1999, broke up without agreement on a new Millennium Round of talks to further liberalise world trade. There was conflict within the official meeting among the representatives of governments especially between the rich and the poor countries, who felt excluded from the key decision-making bodies. And there was conflict with non-governmental groups, both those that were officially registered and participated in a symposium with official delegates the day before and those who were only able to protest in the streets outside.⁵⁵

Two questions [were] embodied in the Seattle events: one concerned the issues in debate themselves within the WTO, on the streets, and in the contacts between the two; the other concerned the debate on how to run the world in an era of rapid economic, technological, and social change, what is conventionally, and not inaccurately, referred to as 'global governance'.⁵⁶

The battle in Seattle took place both inside and outside the conference centre in which the meetings took place; the collapse of the discussions was partly caused by the greater visibility of trade issues in the everyday lives of citizens and the increasing concern over how international trade and investment agreements are undermining aspects of national sovereignty and policy autonomy, especially in ways that strengthen corporate power.

⁵⁵ Mary Kaldor, "Civilising' Globalisation? The Implications of the 'Battle in Seattle'", *Millennium* (Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000), p 105.

⁵⁶ Fred Halliday, 'Getting Real About Seattle', *Millennium* (Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000), p 124.

These concerns – expressed through various forms of political mobilisation – have put pressure upon political leaders throughout the world to re-examine some of the premises and contradictions of neoliberal globalisation.⁵⁷

The accounts show a reworking, recombining and overall complication of the dichotomies that could be relied upon to structure explanations. As both a ‘single case’ and an exemplification of a ‘general case’ *Seattle* contests the boundaries that separate conventional categories; or at least, it renders especially visible the contestability of those boundaries. In addition, *Seattle* simultaneously heralds the advent of other similar cases (through previous cases) that likewise threaten to destabilise conventional categories. These issues undoubtedly form part of the context in which the appeal of apparently encompassing categories (including global social movement, global civil society and global governance) become especially compelling.

Seattle is ambiguous for a number of other reasons. In terms of the questions being explored here, it is especially interesting because it marks a moment in the emergence of the general case even as a single instance. The idea of an *anti-globalisation movement* emerged around *Seattle* itself. *Seattle* is a specific case, as well as an event archetype and therefore also a basis upon which to make or set out the impending general case.

⁵⁷ Stephen Gill, ‘Towards a Postmodern Prince? The Battle in Seattle as a Moment in the New Politics of Globalisation’, *Millennium* (Vol. 29, No. 1, 2000), p 131-2

The observation of general patterns of networked groups, campaigns and movements which prior to *Seattle* were often referred to as *the direct action movement* often provoked a range of engaging responses to logistical puzzles and problems about diversity and interconnection. For instance the *direct action movement* had previously been characterised 'as a series of overlapping and biodegradable networks that continuously change and adapt.'⁵⁸ Since *Seattle*, other characterisations have additionally incorporated analogies with technology, the Internet, ecology and so on into descriptions. In one of many examples, Naomi Klein observes that 'What emerged on the streets of Seattle and Washington was an activist model that mirrors the organic, interlinked pathways of the Internet.'⁵⁹

The Seattle event drew attention to some *ad hoc* thing that manifests in strange ways, for instance, 'closely shadowing the periodic landing of global flows of wealth and power in their meeting places;'⁶⁰ and which disperses in equally unfamiliar ways, for instance, 'leav[ing] virtually no trace behind, save for an archived website.'⁶¹ However, as well as inspiring more elaborate theorisations, real-time, worldwide events, and the analytic responses to them have sometimes raised questions about the immediate relevance of movement categories. For instance, Klein's observations of

⁵⁸ Benjamin Seel and Alex Plows, 'Coming Live and Direct: Strategies of Earth First!', in B. Seel, M. Patterson, and B. Doherty, eds., *Direct Action in British Environmentalism*, (London: Routledge, 2000), p 113.

⁵⁹ Naomi Klein, 'Reclaiming the Commons', Paper presented at the Centre for Social Theory & Comparative History, UCLA, (April 2001). See <http://ethicalpolitics.org/blackwood/klein.htm>

⁶⁰ Manuel Castells, 2001, p 142

⁶¹ Naomi Klein, 2001.

Seattle, and its relation to other events, have been less reliant on a formal concept of *social movement*, and more focused on the contrasts and discrepancies, rather than just the similarities, that one might expect to find within an event of this kind, and its related others:

What is 'the anti-globalization movement'? I put the phrase in quote-marks because I immediately have two doubts about it. Is it really a movement? If it is a movement, is it anti-globalization? ... We can easily convince ourselves it is a movement by talking it into existence ... acting as if we can see it, hold it in our hands. Of course, we have seen it – and we know it's come to Quebec, and on in the US-Mexican border during the Summit of the Americas and the discussion for a hemispheric Free Trade Area. But then we leave rooms like this, go home, watch some TV, do a little shopping and any sense that it exists disappears, and we feel like we're going nuts. Seattle – was that a movement or a collective hallucination? To most of us here, Seattle meant a coming-out party for a global resistance movement, or the 'globalization of hope', as someone described it during the World Social Forum at Porto Alegre. But to everyone else Seattle still means limitless frothy coffee, Asian-fusion cuisine, e-commerce billionaires and sappy Meg Ryan movies. Or perhaps it is both, and one Seattle bred the other Seattle – and now they awkwardly co-exist.⁶²

From this point of view *Seattle* does not refer simply to a form of agency or to a movement narrowly defined, *global* or otherwise, but more broadly to a *moment* in the life and identity of Seattle as a site, as a place, as a city. Whatever *Seattle* 1999 was, it was a situated context.

⁶² Ibid.

4. IN THE EVENT OF MOVEMENT

The *anti-globalisation-movement* pairing is almost always installed as the main empirical focus. Because *events like J18* are broached through the *anti globalisation-movement* conflation, explanation occurs at a level of abstraction that is removed from the particularity of each event and one that also occurs through specifically movement oriented research strategies. Much of this work has provided perspectives on changes in the spacing of protest or protest movements through social movement analytic approaches. Dominant readings of series of counter summit demonstrations and gatherings as an *anti-globalisation* type phenomenon are facilitated by generalist categories that are less accommodating of questions about specific cases. How, despite their broadness, is the explanatory potential of prevailing analytic categories limited when it comes to accounting for spatiotemporally distinct but related episodes?

While *anti-globalisation* (*events, forums, movements, protest, resistance, demonstrations, etc*) implies certain basic features it also arranges them into a hierarchy of explanation. Movement studies frequently combines political demonstrations with other gatherings and convergences like social forums, and with other forms like protest, resistance, associated movements, networks, projects or campaigns. In order to look at how to evaluate a situated episode, it is necessary to locate the strategies through which different spatial as well as spatiotemporal elements, activities and sites of activity are combined and conflated.

For Melucci, *movement* is not simply a definition or a metaphor but also a broad research strategy which encapsulates a variety of approaches:

Here, more than in any other field of sociology, misunderstandings reign supreme. Terms such as 'collective violence', 'collective behaviour', 'protest', 'social movements', or 'revolution' often denote diverse phenomena and generate ambiguities, if not outright contradictions.⁶³

What in particular is the analytic relation between *protest*, *demonstration* and *social movement*? It will be recalled that demonstrations in particular 'lend themselves to uniform cataloguing because within democratic politics they have acquired strikingly standard forms.'⁶⁴ Evidence of demonstration event incidence calls for and becomes the basis for more specific characterisations and theorisations concerning the internal regularities, the causes or effects, of the phenomenon in question.

The search for internal regularities such as recurrent sequences or causal links among apparently separate events requires more sophisticated events catalogs than the simple counts that have often characterized political event analysis. For this purpose, it does not suffice to determine that more rebellions, sit-ins, strikes, assaults, assassinations, marches, petitions, or looting occurred in one time, place, or setting than another. Analysts have no choice but to break down and recombine narratives of episodes and descriptions of their settings into elements that analysts can then

⁶³ Alberto Melucci, *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 2-3.

⁶⁴ Charles Tilly, 'Event Catalogs as Theories', *Sociological Theory*, (Vol. 20, No. 2, 2002), p250.

reassemble into representations of the associations or causal connections they have theorized.

The literatures reviewed above have likewise been based on a cataloguing process of sorts; albeit one that especially highlights variation in space: a catalogue of events from 1998 to N30 focuses an introduction to the *anti-globalisation movement*; a further catalogue of N30 events helps focus the *anti-corporate movement* as an object of study; episodes ‘from Seattle to Santiago’ and/or the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle reveal the ‘startling manifestation’ of *transnational advocacy groups*; and anti-WTO protests in Seattle become a ‘paradigmatic example’ of *a new kind of social movement*. Various starting points are singularised in various ways. These few examples indicate how analysis has not so much insisted on as implied equivalence between ephemeral *event* and social *movement*. It highlights a prevailing tendency to it singularise forms of *protest* through an *event*. Castells for instance moves straight from *protest* to *movement*; the move from *demonstration* to *movement* in Khagram et al’s account is mediated by ‘tactic’; and for Starr, catalogues that show the confluence of variation in space point to movements of various kinds. In all cases, ‘events’ are parenthesised so that ostensibly more concrete processes can be accounted for.

Ron Eyerman’s examination of ‘how social movements move’, illustrates this pattern of explanation most clearly. In this account initial distinctions between *demonstration* and *movement* eventually give way to an

expanded concept of *demonstration* and a simultaneously narrower version of *movement*:

Demonstrations have always been occasions for communicating ideas, as well as forming and displaying new identities. In part because of the distances involved and the crossing of national boundaries, with all this implies in terms of language, law and traditions, demonstrations have lasted longer than usual, requiring that activists remain over night in temporary collective dwellings. This has provided additional space for education and political and social interaction between activists and with the local community. Demonstrations in other words have become extended periods of intensive political socializations, which is now even more significant because of the young age of the majority of activists. Demonstrations, especially in the current context, can also be occasions, where the performance of an identity, the expression and representation of self appears as important to many participants as the attempt to move others. Anti globalization demonstrations have taken on this character and created a tension between aims and the groups which represent them. They have also made outcomes, and, in turn, the reception of the part of the viewing public, more unpredictable. The creative tension between expressive and more instrumental aims of the demonstration is here intensified, making each demonstration a unique event or happening, yet still part of a chain of protest events, a movement, where the previous occasion provides a point of reference for the next.⁶⁵

Eyerman's position appears to be based on at least five contiguous points. It begins with a by now familiar observation that anti-globalisation

⁶⁵ Ron Eyerman, 'Performing Opposition or, How Social Movements Move', http://research.yale.edu/ccs/wpapers/re_opposition.pdf (last accessed, September 2007).

demonstrations involve the crossing of national boundaries. This in turn contributes to the prolongation of the usual duration of a demonstration. That is, pre-event processes cover greater distances and therefore take more time. Consequently 'Demonstrations ... have become extended periods of intensive political socializations'. Thirdly the demonstration process now takes on the mantle of *movement* since it acts 'to move others' (in an earlier definition Eyerman states that 'Social movements move by transforming identities and emotions, by focusing attention and by directing and coordinating actions'). And since 'anti globalization demonstrations have taken on' that characteristic of social movements, they have 'created a tension between aims and the groups which represent them', one that also perplexes 'the viewing public'. This therefore signifies a 'creative tension between expressive and more instrumental aims of the demonstration'; hence, each demonstration is 'a unique event or happening, yet still part of a chain of protest events, a movement.'

From a different perspective Jesus Casquette's survey of *The Power of Demonstrations* finds that the frequency of 'protest demonstrations' is in itself insufficient to identify 'a movement'.⁶⁶ In the site being observed here for instance, the fact that the Basque Country has experienced a 'long-standing wave of protest activities in general, and of demonstrations in particular ... merely highlights the volume of protest.' Casquette is keen to emphasise the distinctions between demonstration and social movement (between which 'protest' designates a 'meso-level'), since although the

⁶⁶ Jesus Casquette, 'The Power of Demonstrations', *Social Movement Studies*, (Vol. 5, No. 1, 2006), p 48.

demonstration-movement conflation makes for a convenient focus, it also restricts the field of enquiry. The conflation perhaps reflects the way in which contemporary political events exacerbate the necessary tension between 'theories of the phenomenon at hand' and 'theories of measurement.'

Moving from questions about demonstrations and regionalisation back to the issue of *movements and globalisation*, while the latter combination initially seems to solve the problem of how to deal with the apparently boundless variation within and between each episode, what are some of the assumptions that one is required to make so as to invoke the idea of *the anti-globalisation movement*? First, a series of like events are cast as an *anti-globalisation* type action within a type event that renders it as such. The relevance and significance of protest and/or event thus defined is then explored through social movement categories, hence *anti-globalisation movement*. Such an entity is often then presumed to constitute a unified actor, a purposive, rational player in the realm of institutional politics, hence, *the anti-globalisation movement*. One is required to make at least three moves. And since event catalogues seem to emphasise variation in space rather than variation through time, one is also petitioned to make these moves in relation to phenomena that can be observed within shorter periods of time. The resulting picture is one of *global-movement-events*.

Nevertheless, if conventional ideas of globalisation function as a guide for explaining the relevance of a specifically spaced form of agency, their use

as a guide for understanding specific spatiotemporal event sites remains problematic. While it initially seems to solve the problem of how to manage the considerable variation within and between different but temporally proximate episodes, it simultaneously weakens the capacity to substantially engage with the particularities and peculiarities of a specific site in a specific instance. To illustrate, while there are entire volumes of examples in which *Seattle* becomes the theoretical point of departure, there are almost no sustained accounts of *Seattle* as an eventful demonstration.⁶⁷

Michael Freeden's observations of the ways in which 'globalism aspires to be a holism' are instructive:

First, and obviously, because it is an offspring of the macro system previously referred to philosophically as universalism and politically as internationalism. Second, because it assumes the form of an integrated and encompassing ideological position, through which the main political questions are re-addressed. If many of the key concepts of globalism are liberal, many also have their origins in what used to be known as the new social movements, mainly in the form of eco-radicalism. Environmentalist rhetoric is not necessarily enamoured of globalism, or globalization.⁶⁸

Indeed, *globalisation* itself appears to be the main *event*, both to the extent that it provides a basis for re-reading the main political questions, and

⁶⁷ One exception is Patrick Gillham and Gary Marx's paper 'Complexity and Irony in Policing and Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle', *Social Justice* (Vol. 27, No. 2, 2000), pp 212-236.

⁶⁸ Michael Freeden, 'Ideological Boundaries and Ideological Systems', *Journal of Political Ideologies* (Vol. 8, No.1, 2003).

particularly in that many of the events thus noted have been employed or adapted so as to sharpen that focus. The point is not so much that globalism is inclined to capture a general incidence by compressing a series of episodes, which, in any case appear to be as dissimilar as they are similar; rather, it is that globalism, combined with movement approaches, vastly reduces the conceptual space within which questions about the elusive 'single case' might be posed.

The account put forward by Eyerman most clearly articulates what is implicit in many accounts. It provides a clear instance, not only of the speed at which analytic accounts are compelled to move from event incidence and/or variation to a new object of study, but of the consequent blurring of the terms *demonstration* and *movement*.⁶⁹ If demonstrations readily lend themselves to uniform cataloguing because 'they have acquired strikingly standard forms' within democratic politics, catalogues of such events have been used to explain developments in social movements. By extension, social movements are often held to be agents of *social change*. The political demonstration thus has a particular resonance in social movement studies. In many ways, *movement* is synonymous with *change* as well as an indication of it.⁷⁰

⁶⁹ Charles Tilly's work shows that public political gatherings and political demonstrations have played a significant part in separating social movements from other sorts of politics. The same work makes it reasonably clear that while the *political demonstration* is a form of action that some aspects of some social movements perform some of the time, the one is by no means reducible to the other.

⁷⁰ For Nick Crossley for instance, *movement* 'is simply a metaphorical way of talking about change in the social sciences ... To say that something 'moves' is to say that it changes'. From such a perspective, 'The concept of 'movement' ... is clearly an appropriate usage in relationship to social movements, which often seek to bring about and/or manifest within themselves social changes.' N. Crossley, *Making Sense of Social Movements* (Buckingham: Open University

The broad and diverse range of forms that are identified with *protest* derive homology by association with notions of transition, transformation, novelty or change. This is why the social movement theorist Alberto Melucci argues that, 'more than in any other area of sociology, misunderstandings reign supreme in the field of social movement studies: 'Terms such as 'collective violence', 'collective behaviour', 'protest', 'social movements', or 'revolution', often denote diverse phenomena and generate ambiguities, if not outright contradictions'.⁷¹ For Melucci, since these terms relate to processes of change, the misunderstandings are not coincidental. The confusion, he suggests, is amplified by a frequently overriding interest in broader social transformations: 'It is not by chance that this confusion rotates around phenomena that closely involve the fundamental processes whereby a society maintains and changes its structure.'⁷²

Concentrated *spaces* of protest, which become especially visible through eventful demonstrations, suggest apparently new forms of movement or signal developments or changes in social movements. Observations about developments in social movements in turn serve as signals from which patterns of *social change* may be discerned.

Similarly, and from another social movement perspective, Charles Tilly indicates that a consequence of the singularisation of a range of forms as a

Press, 2002), p 21.

⁷¹ Alberto Melucci, 1996, pp 2-3.

⁷² Ibid, p3.

social movement has resulted in the simultaneous narrowing and widening of the various objects of study:

Inflation of the term [social movement] to include all sorts of popular collective action past and present, conflation of the movement with its supporting population, networks, or organizations, and treatment of movements as unitary actors do little harm in casual political discussion. In fact, within social movements they often aid recruitment, mobilization, and morale. But they badly handicap any effort to describe and explain how social movements actually work – especially when the point is to place social movements in history.⁷³

The simultaneous inflation/conflation of *social movement* and *demonstration* is a seemingly crucial process in the invocation of an anti-globalisation movement. The concomitant simplification/amplification of movement/event is not necessarily the result of an assumed equivalence between various forms and events (like *social movements* and *political demonstrations*), but it especially issues from cataloguing processes that spotlight variation in space and within shorter periods of time.

Event catalogues and technology

The issue of information technologies became central to claims about innovations in contemporary protest. As will be seen in chapters 3 and 4 the issue of the Internet was crucial to a significant number of claims about

⁷³ Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (London: Paradigm, 2004), p7.

what *J18 (London)* was, what it meant, or what it could mean. By the same token, it will be useful to consider at the outset how the Internet⁷⁴ and information technology more broadly might also affect the research methods and approaches to the forms and practices being considered here.

Tilly notes that the event catalogue 'became a means of gathering evidence concerning the ideas and feelings of people who left few written records'.⁷⁵ For instance, one effect of George Rudé's *The Crowd in History* was to blaze a trail for populist scholars who would 'organize reports of popular struggles into systematic accounts of change and variation. They would amplify the voices of inarticulate masses.'⁷⁶ In the intervening period a great deal of 'invention and adaptation of contentious event catalogs' has occurred, particularly with 'the expansion and acceleration of computers.'⁷⁷ In terms of what has been discussed so far, this raises a number of pertinent issues.

First, if 'Event catalogues became a means of gathering evidence concerning the ideas and feelings of people who left few written records

⁷⁴ 'In the late 1990s, the communication power of the Internet, together with new developments in telecommunications and computing, induced another major technological shift, from decentralized, stand-alone microcomputers and mainframes to pervasive computing by interconnected information-processing devices ... Although the system was still in the process of formation at the time of writing, users were accessing the network from a variety of single-purpose, specialized devices distributed in all spheres of life and activity, at home, at work, at shopping, at entertainment places, in transportation vehicles, and ultimately everywhere.' Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996, p 52.

⁷⁵ Charles Tilly, 2002.

⁷⁶ Ibid, p 250.

⁷⁷ But partly also because: 'collaboration and criticism among people who were drawing their information chiefly from archival material, chiefly from periodicals, and chiefly from interviews and observations raised the standards of detail and precision prevailing in the study of contentious episodes.' (Ibid, p 250.)

and fewer public declarations of their shared understandings', does the relatively recent surge of Internet postings – by demonstration participants, observers, witnesses, and the wide range of actors who participate in, identify with, or else have some interest in a 'politically relevant contentious episode' – somehow alter that function? Does the situation also lead to a blurring of expert and non-expert methods of navigating through and re-presenting this information? Does it imply a blurring of data and information?

Second, the proliferation of event-specific information within a perennially changing information-technological landscape will almost certainly have some bearing on how the two theories of definition and measurement (described above) continue to interact as well as inform each other. What is the possible effect of this on the work of social science (as it relates to the issues being discussed here)? Third, the expansion and relative accessibility of information technology resources compounds the difficulty of assigning a cut-off point to an *event*. Traditionally much of the responsibility for assigning such a point fell to mass news media in particular. The newsworthiness of such events would provide a clear enough indication of the duration of an eventful demonstration. News media would thus provisionally resolve the main problem of delineating the scope of *the event*. In any case, since the main news media groups now also have instantly accessible networked information archives, print news is no longer necessarily ephemeral or in print. The archived event is, or at least appears to be, always 'there'.

In their study of the use of search engines in scholarly research, Iina Hellsten et al for instance note that 'search engines can be considered 'clocks' of the internet that tick with different frequencies':

...search engines generate a particular user experience of 'the present' in the web, by generating links to information that seems to be presently available at the time of the search. We suggest considering the result as a multitude of possible different presents...Our focus is neither on general users nor on search engine performance, but on the theoretical and practical implications of search engine use for scholarly research. The way in which engines rewrite the past by updating their indexes in the present has received little attention hitherto...The question of how temporal representations change over time is an urgent one. In every social reality, temporality is central to the network of relationships. Societies reconstruct themselves by reconstructing their histories. This can be considered as a constant process of mutual adaptation between historical traditions and institutions and between emerging expectations about the future and appreciations of the past.⁷⁸

It is perhaps unrealistic to assume that the task of interpreting events is not somehow influenced by the existence of always present, easy to access, networked information. For instance, like many surveys, Starr's *Naming the Enemy* is heavily reliant on 'organizational web sites' as a primary source of data. It follows that there will be some relation between this and the

⁷⁸ Iina Hellsten, Loet Leydersdorff, and Paul Wouters, 'Multiple Presents: how search engines rewrite the past', *New Media & Society*, (Vol. 8, No. 6, 2006), p 902.

attempt to 'evaluate the movement's size, scope, practices or chances for success' ⁷⁹.

It is worth briefly reviewing the notion of a *movement-demonstration* phenomenon in this context. What evidence is there to prove the extended periods of socialisation that are held to be indicative of a *movement-demonstration* phenomenon? The evidence for this is of course everywhere. Any number of search engine searches on any number of 'like cases' is liable to yield a significant range 'results' from which relevant information might be retrieved. Even after a demonstration has run its course, many of the details, event processes, thoughts, ideas, exchanges and opinions that relate to an episode, become part of a self-perpetuating, self-organising archive that endures in cyberspace, especially since many counter summit demonstrations often end 'leav[ing] virtually no trace behind, save for an archived website'.⁸⁰ From a research perspective, at least, these event traces can be crucial.

Proof by comparison however is another matter. After all, what evidence is there to suggest that pre-Internet demonstration events did not involve extended periods of socialisation? The extent to which Eyerman's observations rely on networked computer archives is incidental. Theorisation exists within this information landscape. Even while technology can facilitate precise breakdowns of contentious episodes 'into single, observable actions and interactions', as Tilly suggests, the

⁷⁹ Ibid, p xi.

⁸⁰ Naomi Klein, 2001.

adaptation and innovation of catalogues also inevitably reanimates tensions between 'theories of the phenomenon at hand and theories of measurement.' It recalls an ontological divide: 'choices among alternative units of observations become assertions about what exists.'⁸¹

Multitudes and multiplicities

Many of the literatures described so far have used catalogues of gatherings, demonstrations and like events to map out a new form of agency or new sphere of action and/or used observations about an exemplary site as a starting point on which to base theorisation. Assumptions about closely related events emphasise flatly networked forms of action. In many cases this has also entailed a flattening out of various conceptual categories – demonstration, protest, collective action, social movement – and a simultaneous prioritisation of social movement as an all inclusive category. In most movement-oriented accounts *the social* is superseded by *the global*. In this way, global movements become the main theoretical focus.

Moreover, this pattern of theorisation need not start at *Seattle* or stop at the idea of an anti-globalisation movement. For Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Seattle* represents just one phase in a 'cycle of struggle'. Again the account takes familiar claims about how the Seattle 1999 protests 'most surprised and puzzled observers' as one starting point:

⁸¹ Charles Tilly, 2002, p 252

groups previously thought to be in opposition to each other – trade unionists and environmentalists, church groups and anarchists, and so forth – acted together without any central, unifying structure that subordinates or sets aside their differences.⁸²

The Seattle protests initiated a further series of summit meeting protests which were ‘all revealed to be elements of a common cycle of struggles’.⁸³ This is then ‘consolidated...at the annual meetings of the World Social Forum and the various regional social forums’.⁸⁴ In this regard it repeats the pattern of Starr’s catalogue, but what distinguishes this method of catalogue creation is that Hardt and Negri fast-forward from social forums to the 15 February 2003 worldwide anti-war demonstrations, ‘the first properly global demonstrations’,⁸⁵ which are then drawn into the same catalogue.

Hardt and Negri’s *multitude* can be singularised as a set of singularities because: ‘The component parts of the people are indifferent in their unity’, and also because ‘although it remains multiple, [it] is not fragmented, anarchical or incoherent.’⁸⁶ ‘[B]y singularity, [the authors] mean a social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to a sameness, a difference that remains different.’⁸⁷ To observe this multitude it becomes necessary to

⁸² Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, (New York: Penguin, 2004), p 217.

⁸³ Ibid, p 215.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p 215.

⁸⁵ In Jamie Morgan ‘Interview with Michael Hardt’, *Theory, Culture & Society*, (Vol. 23, No. 5, 2006), pp 93-113.

⁸⁶ Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, 2004, p 99.

⁸⁷ Ibid, p 99.

replace the old difference-identity set with a new commonality-singularity pairing.

Hardt and Negri claim *x* as a singularity that is composed of singularities, or as *multitude*. The issue here is not the coherence of the multitude but the coherence of the decision of the multitude: how it decides, what it can be seen to have decided and even what *it* ought to decide. It is a prescriptive theory of *multiplicity* as 'an active social subject'. Given a familiar collapsing of distinctions between *demonstration* and *movement* that facilitate the emphasis on a purposive actor, the account can be considered part of the inexorable flow of a 'post-Seattle' literature for which *globalisation* (or variations thereof) is the main event in question. Catalogues of certain aspects of *events* in a range of political spheres are drawn into a homogenising space along with a broad range of processes.

A number of similarities between this approach and the literatures described can be noted. The first similarity relates to the speed and frequency with which what have been cast as like events are drawn together. The second is the way in which these are connected to other related but also dissimilar processes like social forums.⁸⁸ Based on the literature that has been reviewed so far, the main issue it seems, is that the apparently crucial analytic relation between *demonstration* and *movement*, a pairing that has become the basis of so much post-Seattle theorisation,

⁸⁸ There are certain similarities between social forums and demonstrations, particularly with traditional strands of demonstrations that occur as public meetings, nevertheless, the possible connections are simply assumed or never made explicit.

has remained under theorised. This use of catalogues suggests the limits, or limitations, of using observations about series of demonstrations as the main basis for a theory of action.

One of the reasons that *Seattle*, as a singular and exemplary site, becomes the basis of such a broad range of theorisations is that basic descriptions of that case are invariably composed of catalogues that emphasise the convergence of various types of *movement* – the labour movement, the environmental movement and so on. The category of movement is already inscribed into the demonstration as such, so that the transferability from *event* to *movement* seems less problematic, even though many questions about an apparent shift from theorising *social movements* to global movements remain.

It seems that demonstrations are better at providing illustrations for social movement-related theories, than they have been as a subject for sustained enquiry about demonstrations. A possible contributory factor is that demonstrations are somehow deemed to be an inappropriate area of enquiry, especially if, like ‘crowds’, they sometimes still evoke ideas of the archaic or the pre modern.⁸⁹ In this regard, it is worth noting that the definition of *multitude* that Hardt and Negri propose is explicitly developed in contrast to *the crowd*, or at least, in contrast to certain definitions of the crowd. The authors state that if ‘the crowd, or the mob, or the rabble’ ‘appear as one indifferent aggregate’, ‘are fundamentally passive’, ‘must

⁸⁹ See Chantal Mouffe, 1993, p 5; 2005, pp 21-4.

be led' and are 'susceptible to external manipulation', the *multitude* on the contrary:

designates *an active social subject*, which acts as the basis of what the singularities share in common. The multitude is an internally different, multiple social subject whose constitution and action is based not on identity or unity (or, much less, indifference) but on what it has in common.⁹⁰

This idea of the multitude as a civilised, purposeful actor is developed through the juxtaposition with Gustave Le Bon's definition of the crowd as heterogeneity 'swamped' by homogeneity. It is this idea of the crowd, and its contrast to the multitude that is invoked in two critical stages of the authors' main thesis.

Despite the apparent centrality of the term, the authors do not appear to consider other relevant definitions, or readings of definitions of the 'crowd'. For instance, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's reading of Elias Canetti's *Crowds and Power* recognises two types of 'multiplicity', which are at times opposed, but which at other times interpenetrate: 'mass ("crowd") multiplicities and pack multiplicities.'⁹¹ Alternatively, Chantal Mouffe's reading of the same highlights two sorts of drive: 'On one side there is what one could describe as a drive towards individuality and distinctiveness. But there is another drive that makes them want to become part of a crowd to lose themselves in a *moment* of fusion with the masses.'⁹²

⁹⁰ Ibid, p 100. Emphasis added.

⁹¹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, (London: Continuum, 1987), pp 33-4.

⁹² Chantal Mouffe, *On the Political*, (London: Routledge, 2005), pp 23-4.

What Mouffe finds compelling about this definition is that it provides an alternative to a prevailing emphasis either on 'the rational calculation of interests (aggregative model), or on moral deliberation (deliberative model)'.⁹³ For Mouffe, 'current democratic political theory is unable to acknowledge the role of 'passions' as one of the main moving forces in the field of politics and finds itself disarmed when faced with its diverse manifestations.'⁹⁴ For Deleuze and Guattari, the different types of multiplicity in their reading of Cennet's crowd represent a 'schizo position', that is, one that can be contrasted to 'the paranoid position of the mass subject'.⁹⁵ In either case, 'multiplicity' or 'drive' do not refer to a form of action; rather they point to the dynamics that might focus accounts of inter/action.

Even if the old difference-identity set can be replaced by a new commonality-singularity pairing, it remains that demonstrations, as public political gatherings, involve a far greater variety of convergences of actors, actor groups and agencies than movement-centred accounts allow for. Even where political demonstration involves large public gatherings, as it did in the case of J18 (London), those gatherings cannot simply or easily be reduced to one form agency, such as *protest*, much less to a multiple *protest* for which *J18 (London)* and like events were especially noted. What many of the approaches discussed so far have in common, is the assumption that *the demonstration* suggests a particular form of

⁹³ Ibid, p 24.

⁹⁴ Ibid, p 24.

⁹⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, pp 33-34.

oppositional political action. The collapsing of *demonstration* and *movement* highlights or emphasises only one form of oppositional agency, that is, a form that is one among a number of others.

Political demonstration

The political demonstration can be defined in historical terms as ‘a form of action that crystallized in Western Europe and North America between 1780 and 1850’. It might be further described as ‘consist[ing] of gathering deliberately in a visible, symbolically important place, displaying signs of shared commitment to some claim on authorities, then dispersing.’⁹⁶ By the same token, in all their variants demonstrations involve at least four main actor groups: ‘demonstrators, objects of their claims, specialists in official control of public space (usually police), and spectators.’⁹⁷ The four basic actor-groups merely hint at the actual complexities of the historical street demonstration. This definition of the demonstration, as a zone of interaction, can be usefully extended to include:

reporters for mass media; counterdemonstrators; allies such as dissident members of the ruling class; spies; operators of nearby establishments that crowd action might engage or endanger; pickpockets; gangs itching for a fight; political scientists eager to observe street politics, and so on.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ IBID, P 30.

⁹⁷ Charles Tilly, ‘Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834’, in M. Traugott, ed., *Repertoires & Cycles of Collective Action*, (London: Duke University Press, 1995), p 31.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

In Tilly's work, discussions about the street demonstration often serve to highlight the concept of the *repertoire*. The concept, for him, designates a 'means of *interaction*' between multiple actors and actor groups. Tilly points out that it is the weaker version of the metaphor that has found its way into most academic discussions.⁹⁹

Certainly, there is a close and obvious connection between this idea of repertoires and 'collective action'. Repertoires, after all, are:

learned cultural creations [which] do not descend from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda; they emerge from struggle. People learn to break windows in protest, attack pilloried prisoners, tear down dishonored houses, stage public marches, petition, hold formal meetings, organize special-interest associations.¹⁰⁰

However, as Tilly points out, whilst repertoires indicate a set of means available for collective action, these means also 'articulate with and help shape a number of social arrangements that are not part of the collective action itself'.¹⁰¹ This range of social arrangements includes 'police practices, laws of assembly, routines for informal gatherings, ways of displaying symbols of affiliation, opposition, or protest, means of reporting news, and so on.'¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Tilly recommends that empirical application of *the repertoire* should 'go beyond the post factum labeling of contention's varieties' (ibid, p 38).

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p 26.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, p 26.

¹⁰² Ibid, pp 26-7.

Attention to this apparently sidelined aspect of the repertoire will provide a basic, alternative to the more conventional starting point described above. Rather than trying to theorise an apparently novel form of action (or its wider significance), what is to be considered here is the issue of how to look at patterns of interaction within one site, and how to look at how to consider whether these patterns of interaction can be said to be particularly novel.

It is not possible to refer to events, but only to 'events under a description'.

¹⁰³ In principle no one definition of *the event* has primacy over another, although analytic discourse highlights a predilection towards event-type, catalogue-based research. Consequently, the dominant analytic movement-globalisation perspective has generated most of what can be explained and understood by these events. While *the demonstration*, which especially lends itself to 'uniform cataloguing',¹⁰⁴ appears as the basic, initial unit of analysis, it almost immediately disappears in the inexorable flow of research and theorisation around the 'aggregate' case. A *movement*-based perspective on 'events like J18' is also necessarily the 'vanishing point' of *the event as demonstration*. One reasons for this may be that *the demonstration* implies event singularity. The *demonstration* effectively disappears off the analytic radar. As Andrew Barry notes, there is an

¹⁰³ Louis O. Mink, 'Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument', in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki, eds., *The Writing of History*, (Madison, WI, 1978), pp 145-6.

¹⁰⁴ Charles Tilly, 'Event Catalogs as Theories', *Sociological Theory*, (Vol. 20, No. 2, 2002), p 250.

imperative in social science 'to avoid the dangers of empiricism that might be associated with a fixation on political events themselves.'¹⁰⁵

Consequently, events like J18 are most often examined alongside like episodes, processes and events and thus function as elements of variously arranged event catalogues which basically consist of lists of event-dates and/or event-sites (e.g. J18, Seattle, Prague, Gothenburg, Genoa etc), and in which other processes, practices and events are sometimes also included. The literature reviewed in this chapter is based on a certain aspect of *the event*, of an event phenomenon that appears through a loosely defined cataloguing process. The literature abstracts from *the event* as such, searching for underlying patterns and regularities, in a sense, moving 'outward' to make connections with patterns and phenomena in social, political and/or economic spheres. With this description of the event a multiplicity of issues and questions move into a number of areas that converge on issues of 'global social movements', 'global governance' (both highly contested terms), or on the relation between the two through the idea of 'global civil society', a concept that has also generated some controversy, particularly in the field of international relations. In this way event catalogues (and/or event archetypes such as 'Seattle') that support ideas of an event-type case become the basis for initiating research and theorisation across a range of disciplines.

¹⁰⁵ Andrew Barry, 'Political Events', Paper on a workshop entitled 'The Governmental and the Political' at the School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy, Keele University, June 2002, p2.

Much of the literature that has been generated around *events like J18* is particularly based on the cataloguing of summit/counter summit gatherings, catalogues which form the illustrative 'core' of assumptions about a globalisation/anti-globalisation *form of agency*. This aim of looking more closely at the issue of police-protest interaction in the context of a demonstration, rather than on the basis of ideas about a new protest form or protest movement, affirms with Tilly that different forms and practices articulate and interact with each other.

Attendance to the neglected aspect of the repertoire provides a starting point for exploring alternative approaches to the question of how to broach one case-specific site. Nevertheless, the focus here relates to a specific moment and a specific setting whereas Tilly's interest in this aspect of the repertoire relates to his interests in contentious gatherings in different eras and settings. Rather than go over well-rehearsed questions about the relation between globalisation and social movements which, in any case, limit the extent to which it is possible to engage with an evental site like J18 (London), an alternative approach might enquire after the possibility of a shift in the timing and spacing of the political demonstration. For instance, does this event represent a shift towards the partial

denationalisation of political demonstrations (in London),¹⁰⁶ that is, demonstration as a complex site of interaction involving a number of forms and practices?

This chapter begins on the problem of how to locate the position of *J18 (London)* within *the anti-globalisation protest and/or movement* complex. Setting out the problem in these terms reveals certain, basic disparities. For instance, *J18 (London)* refers to spatiality within a primarily temporal site whereas *anti-globalisation protest/movement* implies a de-temporalised, primarily spatial *form of agency*. Whereas the initial definition of 'single cases' refers to temporality, for instance, to a 24-hour period, the 'general case' refers to broad spatialities, for instance *the global* or *the transnational*.

Since the late 1990s anti-capitalist, anti-globalisation, or other like episodes, have been used to supply a by now significant body of literature concerning developments in social movements. This literature often then becomes an important basis for theorising social change more broadly. This theoretical activity exemplifies the frequency with which demonstrations have been taken as markers of change or transformation. It also shows the infrequency with demonstrations which they have been considered as

¹⁰⁶ The terms de-nationalisation or re-nationalisation are more accommodating of site-specific questions. For instance, Sassen's work has shown that attention to the various inter-relations between 'the national' and 'the global' assist with more detailed accounting for processes that are both site-specific and global. For instance: 'The epochal transformation we call globalization is taking place inside the national to a far larger extent than is usually recognized. It is here that the most complex meanings of the global are being constituted, and the national is also often one of the key enablers and enactors of the emergent global scale.' Saskia Sassen, Response, *European Journal of Political Theory*, (Vol. 6, No. 4, 2009), p 435.

forms of inter/action that are subject to, and not just indicative of, transformation. Insofar as it leaves unattended the issue of how demonstrations change, that omission is significant. The demonstration appears as a basic, seemingly unchanging, unit of analysis. This will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.

5. THE CONTESTABILITY OF J18 (LONDON)

A number of accounts use J18, J18 (Cologne), J18 (London), Seattle (N30), Prague (S26) and so on, to designate particular points that join up to theorise a space of interconnected action. On the other hand, a single exemplary event like *Seattle* is often used to theorise a new kind of movement, opposition, a new system of social relationships or a new relation between such action and such a system. Consequently we know far more about the wider relevance and significance of the general case than we do about the specificities of its constitutive manifestations or about how to broach a situated single case.

In contrast to the trend of anti-globalisation literature noted above, more recently there has been a growing sense that even if these episodes and events were felt and experienced as *global*, each was embedded within particular orientations in specific communities. For Francois Polet, for instance, even specific types of action like counter-summits and political demonstrations exhibit a range and diversity that general characterisations cannot contain: 'Mobilizations against neoliberal hegemony have their own

peculiarities, in range, social composition and political culture, according to different regions.’¹⁰⁷

The above descriptions of *J18* provide some sense of the vastness and variation of one temporal episode. While the catalogue seems neutral, it is necessarily selective, necessarily compiled from a particular perspective and, like *events*, it still requires explanation. What further possibilities might the description of *J18* above suggest? A basic initial explanation might be that *J18* represents a multiplicity of geographically disparate events that relate to each other in real-time. It represents a set of events that differ in type, range, locality, duration, mobility; a set of events that differ as well as relate to each other in various ways. If one prominent feature of *J18* (London) was the practical re-connection of UK groups and campaigns that had been classified as disparate, single issues throughout the 1990s, a feature of *J18* (Lagos) was the symbolic and practical coming together of Niger Delta communities. In Argentina, events were symbolised by the convergence of different faith groups to demonstrate against debt and global capitalism. *J18* can perhaps be distinguished by the practice of making, witnessing and demonstrating connections, including drawing attention to the barriers that obstruct or otherwise encumber such a practice. If a practice of making connections (between issues, communities, beliefs) occurred at particular moment in time that is not to say that it occurred in any particular way. In some cases (or in some cases within some cases) gatherings or events occurred in solidarity with each other, or

¹⁰⁷ Francois Polet, Introduction, *Globalizing Resistance: The State of Struggle*, F. Polet, ed., (London: Pluto, 2004), p vii.

simply in recognition of each other. In other cases they made and demonstrated connections between issues, conflicts and practices that were held to be unrelated or at least unrelatable at the time. There is no necessary or essential connection perhaps apart from a temporal relation. They all referred to June 18 1999.

The J18 (London), or City of London *Carnival Against Global Capitalism* convergence, was one of a number of same-day gatherings and events. It occurred simultaneously alongside a significant number of worldwide gatherings, carnivals, demonstrations, protests and other events that took place in view of the human and environmental costs of transnational capital. It was staged in a hub of the global economy and in the financial capital of a country that was at the time described as having an 'over-internationalized economy in an under-globalized world'.¹⁰⁸ There is a sense in which both the gathering and the site can be described as global, or more specifically in 'overlapping domains of the national and the global'.¹⁰⁹ Saskia Sassen observes that contemporary social actors as well as entities are likely to live and operate in such domains. The *Carnival Against Global Capitalism* occurred amid and as part of growing concerns in different quarters, albeit in embedded contexts, about the material re-shaping of society, the environment, and economic and technological restructuring. The J18 (London) convergence was only one, albeit one prominent kind of

¹⁰⁸ Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, 'Globalization in One Country? The Peculiarities of the British', *Economy and Society*, (Vol. 29, No. 3, 2000), p 335. The authors note that: 'Globalization was policy in the UK before the word was used in its current meanings.'

¹⁰⁹ Saskia Sassen, 'Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization', *Public Culture*, (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000), p 221.

participation in a period of intense speculation and debate about changing worlds.

While de-contested ideas of an anti-globalisation phenomenon have become something of a barrier to case-specific analysis, the converse, an equally valid case might be made about the explanatory potential of a 'single' episode, which is after all still essentially contestable. For instance, within the context outlined above, *J18 (London)* was designated as a specific kind of event, that is, as a demonstration event. Moreover it was broadly, and from a wide range of perspectives recognised as a demonstration event that had exceeded its own terms. Of particular significance was the mass assembly of individuals, groups and campaigns previously understood to be disparate and unrelated, and the joining-up of ostensibly single issues:

June 18th was providing a common focus for groups up and down the country. New groups were forming and existing groups were coalescing and expanding ... June 18th ... acted as a focussing agent, bringing together diverse people from different 'single issue' campaigns, and getting them to think about one question – the question of capital. ¹¹⁰

The event was also seen to be novel because it confounded public order expectations revealing among other things 'a level and sophistication of planning not previously seen at similar demonstrations before' according to a post-event police review,¹¹¹ and prompting a major review of public order

¹¹⁰ *Do or Die: Voices from the Ecological Resistance*, Vol. 8, p 9.

¹¹¹ See point 15.1 in Appendix 2.

policing across the UK. Newspaper and other mass news media reports were remarkably unanimous in ascribing the novelty of the event to the Internet and the idea that it had played a crucial role in the co-ordination of an eventful gathering. In most cases this led to speculation about the future direction and role of demonstrations:

Now, the fact that the billed Carnival Against Capitalism recruited its demonstrators via a ring of websites, rather than more traditional sources, like political parties and pressure groups, is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it means that the demonstration appealed to a wider number of people, not just the politically active; and secondly, the demonstration could be arranged without the consent of the relevant authorities. This threatens to change the politics of dissent irrevocably.¹¹²

It will be recalled that the *demonstration* does not refer exclusively a form of action, but that it also designates a means of interaction and thus presupposes a range of other agencies including but not limited to protest, resistance or movement.

The case is especially interesting, not simply because of its singularity, or because its retrospective mapping in a landscape of anti-globalisation, but because of the attention it drew to new forms of political protest, public order policing and to the relation between the two, as well as to a resulting sense of a crisis of interpretation. It is not the intention here to suggest that *J18 (London)* is somehow exceptional, as a case that stands out from the

¹¹² Sean Dodson, 'A Riot From Cyberspace' *Guardian*, June 24, 1999.

rest, whether in terms of other J18 gatherings and events or in their collective relation to other temporal episodes. J18 (London) clearly does bear a significant relation to other sites. Nevertheless in the UK context the case was overwhelmingly defined as an exception. How can these claims be examined? How does *the event* derive coherence as a singularity in this context? In order to examine this, the next chapter will look at how the police-protest dichotomy nominates the scope of event-specific sites.

Chapter 2

Police-protest studies and changing empirical sites

1. SITES OF ANALYSIS

The previous chapter examined a range of accounts all of which build on and develop ideas about a certain aspect of 'the event'. Series of such events form the basis of assumptions about an event phenomenon, one that is abstracted from and informed by a cataloguing process of sorts. *Events like J18* are most often examined alongside other, like episodes, processes and events and thus function as elements of loosely defined event catalogues. At their simplest these catalogues consist of lists of event-dates and/or event-sites (for example J18, Seattle, Prague, Gothenburg, Genoa etc.).

Thus while the dominant analytic *movement-globalisation* perspective (or variations thereof) has generated most of what can be explained and understood by these events, strategies for explaining any of the 'single' or specific instances that make up the founding catalogue remain marginal by comparison. Police-protest studies represent one of the few analytic contexts within which questions about particular sites can be posed and examined. This chapter explores how the field of police-protest studies can contribute to a fuller, more detailed understanding of just one of the episodes that make up the catalogue that has become the main basis of so much *post-Seattle* academic research.

It should be noted from the outset that *police-protest studies* is not a formal definition. It is used here to refer to an area of research that takes a specific interest in the relational attributes of *protest* and *policing*. Much of the literature on contention and collective action that is focused through protest and policing is historical work that sometimes supplements work on social movements. For instance: 'The reflecting mirrors of an abundant historical literature on policing, surveillance, and repression often capture social movements at unusual angles.'¹¹³ The *police-protest studies* field that is considered here can be distinguished by its relative contemporaneity. Here the substantive focus has usually been confined to no more than two or three decades.

From the mid to late 1990s police-protest studies emphasised the emergence of patterns in police and protest dynamics as well as their standardisation within national political or political systemic contexts. Social movements were generally considered to have become institutionalised, and protest muted. The policing of protest was considered to have become standardised, and interest centred on the features that characterise the policing of protest in different contexts.

¹¹³ Charles Tilly, *Social Movements, 1768-2004* (London: Paradigm, 2004), p 8. In addition there are significant number of social histories on the subject. This includes research on 'the ambiguous everyday relationship existing between the people and public authority' in mid-eighteenth century France that gradually led to the development of informal or unwritten codes of conduct between protesters and police (Farge and Revel, 1991, pp 66, 72); Thomas Lindenberger's Berlin 'street politics' between 1900 and 1914, and the "little everyday war between police and public"; and Rodney Mace's *Trafalgar Square: Emblem of Empire* (1976) which considers how the history, character and development of place is inextricably linked to the dynamics of protest and policing.

Explanatory models that were developed around this have been reviewed in later police-protest studies, particularly in new contexts of the transnational, the global, the international and the post-national. With a specific interest in 'post-Seattle' events, later studies have examined more specific sites and been conducted in far shorter time periods. Among sites that have drawn most attention in later collections are counter summit demonstrations. The shift to case specific sites constitutes an important response to the need to address the complex sites of contemporary political demonstrations. Case specific studies often seem to provide a necessarily sharper focus for addressing some of the intricacies of contemporary episodes, and for allowing for more nuanced accounts.

As a consequence of empirically observable complexities of contemporary political demonstrations recent studies have begun to explore police-protest dynamics within global, transnational, international or post-national contexts. This development has necessitated or at least coincided with a pronounced yet little discussed shift from nation-specific to case-specific sites of analysis. In this regard shifts in empirical sites will be an especially important consideration. This chapter will examine some of the issues involved in re-conceptualising of the dynamics of contemporary police-protest relations so as to consider how a single case study might be conducted through contemporary police-protest studies research. How might a combined police-protest approach contribute to a more detailed understanding of this case as one of the episodes that make up the catalogue that has become the main basis of academic research? The

overall aim of this chapter is to explore *police-protest relations* as a strategy for delineating the specificity of the site, for conducting a case-specific enquiry, and in particular, as an analytic strategy through which to examine the claim that J18 (London) represents a novel instance of political demonstration. What police-protest studies methods might be used to address this question?

The police-protest dichotomy acts as a basic position from which to describe as well as to explain one such instance. Like all *events* the case of J18 (London) is essentially contestable, although as an event of a certain kind, that is as a demonstration event, this contestability is initially essentially rendered through the police-protest dichotomy. This is true of everyday discourse (as will be seen in the next chapter and the news media representation of the particular case) as well as analytic discourses as will be seen here. In both specialised discourse and everyday discourse explanatory or discursive priority is given to the dynamics of police-protest interaction rather than the site. What does it mean that the dichotomy initially comes to ground attempts to explain or understand J18 (London) as a single case, one that at the time appears to be extraordinary, unfamiliar and unprecedented? Such a starting point invokes a set of more basic questions about the relation between protest and policing as the focus of enquiry and one instance of demonstration as the empirical site of analysis. What is the relation between J18 (London) as the empirical site of analysis and police-protest dynamics as way of explaining it? The current chapter will consider this specifically in relation to recent developments in police-

protest studies in terms of the shift from nation-specific to case-specific empirical sites.

Issues of public political gatherings and police-protest dynamics continue to attract attention to the extent that 'The conditions under which democracies can accept nonelectoral political challenges and yet remain democracies is an issue of enduring importance.'¹¹⁴ Thus a common point of reference in police-protest studies is the context of the nation-state and in particular the liberal-democratic state:

There is some considerable diversity in theories regarding the policing of political protest, but it is probably safe to say that they all usually maintain background assumptions about the presence of liberal democracy embedded in nationally bounded states.¹¹⁵

In common with the wider field of social and political sciences, interdisciplinary police-protest studies have been both heavily reliant on, and unsettled by assumptions of the state as the main an analytic organising principle. How does the partial decentring of the state as an overarching theoretical container affect the categories and analytic strategies that have come to underpin descriptions and explanations of police-protest action and interaction? Among other things, this requires a consideration of the dichotomies, dualisms, associations and equivalences

¹¹⁴ Gary T. Marx, Afterword, *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, D. della Port and H. Reiter, eds., (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1998), p 254.

¹¹⁵ James Sheptycki, 'Policing Political Protest When Politics go Global: Comparing Public Order Policing in Canada and Bolivia', in *Policing & Society*, (Vol. 15, No. 3, 2005), pp 329-30.

that structure accounts of transformations in the dynamics of police-protest action and interaction. Within the last decade a number of instances of public political gathering, most obviously those that take place during or alongside international summits have tested the explanatory capacity of the twin nation-state/liberty-order focus.

Current research will also be reviewed so as to provide an outline of how different police-protest dualisms are brought to bear on various investigative aspects of single, or cross comparative, case studies. Of particular interest here is the role of structuring dualisms in research on relatively contemporary cases. A central concern is the relation between the spatiotemporal reframing of questions about police-protest dynamics and the associative categories and dualisms that help bolster standard assumptions about the police/protest dialectical opposition. The relaxation of relatively fixed ideas about conceptual containers or frameworks appears in some cases to have loosened up the way that dualisms are applied to questions and solutions about these dynamics but simultaneously tightened up certain equivalences, for instance: *protest/change/the global* and *policing/fixity/the national*.

The categories that underpin explanations of police-protest dynamics became difficult to sustain in the analysis of more recent episodes. For example, these events often highlight forms of police and protest action that could not be simply or easily reduced to an association with a singular state or a singular civil society. Changes in forms of protest and policing,

particularly changes in their spacing has become an especially important focus. The unsettling of the nation-state as an overarching theoretical container entails an attendant unsettling of basic referential liberty-order models or conceptual frameworks that are used in accounting for, evaluating or even making basic sense of the dynamics of police-protest interaction.

Given the unsettling of categories on which conceptual frameworks of police-protest dynamics are based, how does it nevertheless remain possible to observe, explain and understand a single episode like J18 (London)? What are the effects of contextual distortions on the police and protest dichotomy, as well as on the associated categories of state and society, liberty and order, continuity and discontinuity, the dichotomies, dualisms, associations and equivalences that structure accounts of transformations in the dynamics of police-protest action and interaction? How do explanations rearrange and recombine the dichotomies that structure descriptive-empirical accounts of the dynamics of police-protest interaction in the move from case-general or nation-specific to case-specific sites, and what is the effect of this on explanations of causality? Ultimately these questions not only involve a consideration of how police-protest dynamics can be explained but more generally of how the police-protest dichotomy *explains*. This question will be carried through and posed in different ways in the next three chapters. A focusing issue in this chapter relates to the continuities and discontinuities in the way in which case-

general themes and issues re-emerge in later case-specific, *post-Seattle* research.

The current chapter examines this issue in four main sections. The first of these outlines some of the main recurring themes, issues and characteristics of earlier case-general studies of police-protest dynamics. This provides background against which to examine how analytic methods have adjusted to accommodate observable shifts in contemporary demonstrations and forms of protest and policing, and to consider in more detail what is involved in the move to case-specific sites. So as to consider how this development might be relevant to questions about the specific case of J18 (London) it examines what is involved in re-conceptualising the dynamics of police-protest relations, to what extent patterns of explanation that appear in case-general approaches are carried through to case-specific sites, and with what implications. The final section considers specific issues concerning the relation between empirical site and subject.

2. THEMES AND ISSUES IN POLICE-PROTEST STUDIES

The aim in what follows is to outline the themes, questions and strategies that recur in general research so as to provide a reference for examining the ways in which police-protest studies issues have moved from general to specific empirical sites. Police-protest studies enquiries around general as well as particular sites centre on questions about reciprocal change – how changes in protest effect changes in policing, or vice versa. This usually

involves issues of tactical and strategic innovation, and reciprocal adaptation within particular contexts. Studies are mostly conducted through political process approaches that draw protest and policing into broader questions about the relationship between 'the state' and 'society'. In Donatella della Porta's characterisation: 'Protesters and the police, social movements and the state, influence each other in the strategic choices they make, in a process involving innovation and adaptation on both sides.'

¹¹⁶ In some accounts, change and adaptation in policing styles and practices affect change and adaptation in protest practices to the same extent that changes in protest can effect changes in policing, or that 'the relationship between protesters and police does not have a unique causal determination.'¹¹⁷ In practice though, assumptions about developments in protest styles and trends are almost always used as the starting point for explaining adaptations in policing trends and styles. For instance, the ideas of 'cycles' or 'waves' of protest, have been central to efforts to account for tactical innovation and adaptation which then affect the overall character of observable patterns of dynamic and interaction.

Standard political process approaches posit police-protest relations as a microcosm of state-society relations, one that is further qualified through referential liberty-order models. In this way, research is organised around various combinations of macro and the micro elements. Donatella Della Porta's *Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of*

¹¹⁶ Donatella della Porta, 'Social Movements and the State', in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 81.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, p 90.

Protest and Peter Waddington's *Public Order Policing: Citizenship and Moral Ambiguity*¹¹⁸ are two examples of macro/micro combinations, as the titles suggest. In this way, general combined studies assume a basic distinction between *police* and *protest* that builds on a basic distinction between *state* and *civil society*. Protest groups associated with social movements are considered as forming in the realm of civil society and as acting on behalf of a singular civil society, and police are considered as forming in the realm of the state in the defence of a given territorial order. The police/protest distinction is based on assumptions about the points at which non-institutionalised and institutional politics interact.

Della Porta's article appears in a collection of essays on police organisation and policing contexts and is designed as a focus for examining for instance looks at the relationship between movements and the state via 'protest policing' which she uses as an 'intermediate variable'. In this essay della Porta conducts a cross-national comparison of the development of public order policing (or *protest policing*) in the post-war Federal Republic of Germany and post-war Italy. This survey is then used as a basis upon which to look at 'the effects of protest policing on social movements, and in particular on protest tactics.'¹¹⁹

Waddington's chapter appears in a volume that specialises in issues of policing and police organisation. It accounts for public order policing as 'a

¹¹⁸ P. A. J. Waddington, 'Public Order Policing: Citizenship and Moral Ambiguity', in F. Leishman, B. Loveday and S. Savage, eds., *Core Issues in Policing* (Longman, 2000).

¹¹⁹ della Porta, 1996, p 89

highly visible representation of the relationship between state and citizen',¹²⁰ and outlines how and why oscillating functions of public order police assist in mediating 'state-citizen' relations in the UK. Standard or standardising processes and reciprocal change are central to both accounts. Police-protest studies can be distinguished by a particular interest in the reciprocal actions of protest and policing, as well as by the fact that the field deals with relatively contemporary sites. There are a number of intersections with other established, that is, more commonly recognised specialist fields.

One way of outlining this first phase of police-protest studies is to chart the development of the field itself as well as to consider some of the issues around the expansion of this field. As defined by the above two basic features, the specific field has only emerged in the last ten years or so, beginning with a seminal essay by della Porta.¹²¹ della Porta initially developed the idea of *protest policing* in order to provide a more focussed way of examine the relation between social movements and the state. *Protest policing* is defined as "'the police handling of protest events" – a more neutral description for what protesters usually refer to as "repression" and the state as "law and order."'¹²² della Porta employs the term as an intermediate analytic variable that is situated between *the state* and *social movements*. This idea helped to address and partly resolve

¹²⁰ P. A. J. Waddington, 2000, p 171.

¹²¹ Donatella della Porta, 'Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest', in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

¹²² Della Porta, 1996, p 62.

problems that beset political process approaches in the study of social movements. In particular it addressed the problem of the increasing loss of specificity of *the political opportunity structure* (POS), a conceptual framework and staple political process method. Along with *cycles*, and *frames*, the POS constitutes a basic political process method.

The POS approach itself developed in 1960s studies of social movements in US cities. Throughout the 1980s it was increasingly adopted in scholarship on European cases, in addition to existing *liberty* and *order* modelled explanations. The idea of *opportunities* and *constraints* is analogous to *liberty* and *order*. The former set was initially used in explanations of the dynamics that occur within political systemic contexts, whereas the latter have been most frequently applied to explanations of dynamics within national political contexts.¹²³

POS-based explanatory models had come under strain due to the growing number of variables that have been included in it, and the diverse situations it had been called upon to explain. William Gamson and David Meyer were among those who took issue with this:

The concept of political opportunity structure is in trouble, in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up virtually every aspect of the social

¹²³ The difference might also be understood in terms of regional variations in conceptual models. For instance, “In American political science especially [the notion of a political system] quickly displaced the dominant idea of the state as the most comprehensive orienting concept for political research, even though the state concept remained very much alive in Europe and has even undergone a renaissance in the United States since the 1970s.’ Vernon Bogdanor, *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Science*, (Oxford: Blackwell), 1991, p 478.

movement environment – political institutions and culture, crises of various sorts, political alliances, and policy shifts ... It threatens to become an all-encompassing fudge factory for all the conditions and circumstances that form the context for collective action. Used to explain so much, it may ultimately explain nothing at all. Part of the problem is that analysts use political opportunity structure to serve a wide variety of functions, and define it accordingly.¹²⁴

The political opportunity structure

As a category of analysis *protest policing* emerged in response to emerging conceptual problems within the political process approach to social movement studies.¹²⁵ It developed as a partial solution to the loss of specificity of the concept of the *political opportunity structure* (POS) which, along with *cycles*, *repertoires* and *frames*, is a basic political process method of researching social movements. In this regard police-protest studies can be initially identified as a subset of the political process approach to social movements. Given the centrality of the concept for combined police-protest research it will be useful to provide a brief outline of the emergence, application and eventual redefinition of the term.

The concept of a POS emerged as a response to questions about protest, protest movements and social movements in late 1960s US urban contexts.

¹²⁴ William A. Gamson and David. S. Meyer, 'Framing Political Opportunity', in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p275.

¹²⁵ Donatella della Porta, 'Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest', in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

The works of Michael Lipsky and/or Peter Eisinger are most frequently cited as the precursors of political process models of *collective action*. Lipsky's *Protest as a Political Resource* served both as a rejoinder to the then dominant behavioural or social-psychological approaches to civil rights politics,¹²⁶ and as a contribution to pluralist debates and in particular to Robert Dahl's (1956) work on pluralism. Lipsky's paper seeks on the one hand to offer a comprehensive alternative to existing behavioural or social-psychological perspectives, based on the belief that these lacked a theoretical formulation that was capable of conceptualising the interaction between civil rights political activity and the political process.¹²⁷ Lipsky's alternative proposed 'a theoretical perspective on protest activity as a political resource' by *relatively powerless* groups.¹²⁸ This term is qualified in the following: 'if one conceives of a continuum on which political groups are placed according to their relative command of [conventional political] resources, the focus of this essay is on those groups which are near, but not at, the pole of powerlessness'.¹²⁹ As such, Lipsky established the rational choice technique, one that simultaneously broadened the notion of *protest* (which was, at the time, used exclusively to refer to groups, public gatherings and collective actions associated with the civil rights

¹²⁶ These assumed that grievances were sufficient to explain the occurrence of protest events and actions. For instance, Ted Gurr's classic study of the causes of political protest, or what he termed civil strife, relies on the simple causal proposition that people resort to political violence because they are *relatively deprived*. Thus, other things being equal, the more relatively deprived an individual is, the greater will be his/her propensity to participate in violent political activity (1968a, 1968b). There are some elements of behaviouralism in Lipsky's political process alternative, although this perhaps evinces the prevalence of that approach at the time.

¹²⁷ Michael Lipsky, 'Protest as a Political Resource', *American Political Science Review* (Vol. 62, No. 4, 1968), p 1145.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, p 1144.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, p 1144.

movement), as an alternative to prevailing approaches of the time. On the other hand, the essay is intended as a contribution to prominent pluralist claims that all 'active and legitimate group[s] in the population' can access a political system that will be responsive to their claims. Lipsky's own research and observations of protest organisations in New York City, Washington DC, Chicago, San Francisco and Mississippi, showed that a) groups could only engage with political systems indirectly via 'communications media' and 'reference publics' and b) groups' access to both intermediaries are complex political processes in themselves that were not always successful.

If Lipsky's explanation of micro-systems and micro-processes refers itself to a political process within the spatial framework of *the city*, Eisinger's subsequent essay moved to formalise a *structure of political opportunities* of a particular community within the context of *urban politics*. Whereas Lipsky elaborated a *city politics* broad political process by focussing on a specifically rational-choice oriented definition of protest, that is, as protest as rational political activity, Eisinger's work, which sought answers to questions about what *protest* was and to what it referred, elaborated on constraint-opportunity dynamics. Eisinger found some solutions to these problems by looking for the conditions of the emergence of *protest* in the context of urban *political systems*.

For Eisinger, although previous work had established links between various types of political system and various types of political behaviour,¹³⁰ these links remained under theorised. He proposed that such work might take on 'theoretical coherence ... if it is understood in the first instance that the environmental variables are related to one another in the sense that they establish a *context* within which politics takes place'.¹³¹ Thus reformed municipal institutions, reform government, local authorities and councilmanic institutions, voter turnout, spending and tax policies, urban renewal programmes and race riots are variables that exist within the same environment. If the linkages between them can be clarified, the relationships between them might be better understood. To this end, Eisinger suggests that they are placed within the context of 'the particular *structure of political opportunities* of a community':

The manner in which individuals and groups in the political system behave, then, is not simply a function of the resources they command but of the openings, weak spots, barriers, and resources of the political system itself. There is, in this sense, interaction, or linkage, between the environment, understood in terms of the notion of a structure of political opportunities [SPO], and political behaviour. By measuring these environmental factors,

¹³⁰ Including studies that showed relationships 'between reformed municipal institutions and low voting turnout (R. Alford and E. Lee 'Voting Turnout in American Cities', *American Political Science Review*, 62 (September, 1968), 796-813); reform government and high spending and low tax policies (E. L. Sherbenou, 'Class Participation, and the Council Manager Plan', *Public Administration Review*, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131-135.); centralization of local power and urban renewal success (A. H. Hawley, 'Community Power and Urban Renewal Success', *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (January, 1963), 422-431.); and less representative councilmanic institutions and the incidence of race riots (S. Lieberman and A. R. Silverman, 'The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots', *American Sociological Review*, 30 (December, 1965), 887-898.). Cited in P. Eisinger, 1973, p 11.

¹³¹ Peter Eisinger, 'The Conditions of Protest Behaviour in American Cities', *American Political Science Review*, (Vol. 67, No. 1, 1973), p 11.

the analyst develops a means to judge the nature of biases which groups in a political system must confront. Such judgements lead to conclusions about the ease with which people can get what they want from the political system through collective action.¹³²

Eisinger rearticulates *political behaviour* as something that must be understood, not simply in terms of availability of resources, as Lipsky suggests, but in terms of the enabling-constraining context within which it operates. Eisinger thus highlights a link or interaction between the *SPO* and *political behaviour*. To make that case Eisinger posits differences in the nature of *political systems* (on the one hand), and differences in the nature of *collective action* (on the other). The variations in a form of politics bifurcated thus exemplifies as well as explains variations in the linkages and interactions within it. Following directly from the above quote, Eisinger continues:

Where the structure of government is potentially more responsive to an electorate by providing opportunities of formal representation for distinct segments of the population (blacks, for example) or where the government is demonstrably responsive to citizen needs and demands, the structure of opportunities is relatively open. There exist chances for diverse groups to exercise influence through delegates on representative bodies and influence appears to elicit government action. Where formal or informal power appears to be concentrated and where government is not responsive, the opportunities for people to get what they want or need through political action are limited. The opportunity structure is relatively closed.

¹³² Ibid, pp 11-12.

Eisinger expressly uses *protest* as a focus for elaborating on the relation (or the linkage and interaction) between the *SPO* and *political behaviour* although *voter turnout* might equally have been used as a focal point for the same investigation. In effect, Eisinger reworks Lipsky's perhaps equally asymmetric model – his assumption that political activity is always inclined towards formalised and/or institutionalised, but politically distant systems – into a SPO-oriented study which then becomes the basis for examining *the conditions of protest behaviour*.

Liberty and order, opportunities and constraints, protest and policing

This early idea of the SPO was more recently reworked by Doug McAdam (1982) and followed by a number of contributions all of which, according to McAdam, 'saw the timing and fate of [social] movements as largely dependent upon the opportunities afforded insurgents by the shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition of those in power'.¹³³ Among those who immediately followed in and developed this tradition, are Jenkins and Perow (1977), Tilly (1978), and Tarrow (1983). McAdam notes that 'Since [these contributions] this central assumption and the concept of "political opportunities" has become a staple in social movement inquiry'.

¹³⁴ Whereas McAdam's work has consistently focussed on the conditions of emergence of particular movements, others like Jenkins and Perow have

¹³³ Doug McAdam, 'Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions', *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, in D. McAdam et al, 1996, p 23.

¹³⁴ Ibid, p 23.

looked at how the opportunities for particular movements change over time, and Tilly elaborated a system of opportunities and constraints within which movements operate. The latter explicitly links *collective action* to *the state*. In addition to Lipsky and Eisinger's influence, Sidney Tarrow credits Tilly as one of the founders of the political process approach to collective action, albeit, he argues, one that stands out from what he describes as the *Americanist* tradition of the first two.¹³⁵ *Opportunities* and *constraints* can be considered as something like a parallel to the *liberty* and *order* conceptual pair that is often applied to *state-society relations*. The main, initial difference is that while the latter are tailored to the dynamics of the *national state* the former are geared to the *political system*.

Throughout the 1980s the idea of the POS was increasingly used in European scholarship (or in research on European sites) as a supplement to existing *liberty-order* modelled explanations. Nevertheless, for many, as for William Gamson and David Meyer, the growing number of variables that had been included within that concept, and the diverse situations it had been called upon to explain – had begun to place the idea of a POS under considerable strain.

della Porta proposed *protest policing* as one solution to this problem in a 1996 essay on *movements and the state*. For della Porta the term could be employed as an intermediate variable situated between *the state* and *social movements*, and therefore as a category would re-focus the study of

¹³⁵ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement*, second edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p 18.

the relation between the social movements and the state. As a variable that can be identified as subject to *opportunities and constraints*, *protest policing* thus provided a way of passing through the conceptual problems that beset this particular approach to the study of social movements:

Focussing on an in-depth analysis of one single variable can be a promising alternative to the dangerous trend of increasing the number of variables in the definition of the POS. In his introduction to this part of the volume, McAdam expresses concern for the lack of consensus regarding the relevant dimensions of the POS. I believe this lack of consensus resulted in an accelerating growth in the number of dimensions considered part of the POS. While the first studies in the 1980s on political opportunities focused on a few variables, several scholars have referred to the concept of political opportunity structure in a number of case studies and cross-national comparisons, often adding new variables to the original set...These theoretical efforts have enlarged the explanatory capacity of the concept but reduced its specificity. The result is a complex but nonparsimonious model...Indeed, protest policing is a barometer of the available POS. As part of the state response to social movements, it should be very sensitive to the relevant opportunities and constraints, and therefore represent a general expression of the state's degree of openness or receptivity. By studying protest policing, we can better understand the effect of the numerous indicators of the POS ... By focusing on a single characteristic of social movements I hope to overcome another problem of POS studies, the lack of clarity about the *explanandum*.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ Donatella della Porta, 'Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest', in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 63-4.

This essay generated sufficient interest to result in a first volume of police-protest studies, hence establishing a field of interdisciplinary police-protest studies. In this volume, della Porta and Herbert Reiter define *the policing of protest* or *the police handling of protest events* as 'One specific aspect of state response to political dissent.'¹³⁷ Here again, *protest policing* represents a way of 'understanding ... the relationship between social movements and the state',¹³⁸ but with a number of further contributions to this new field of interest, the focus was further refined. Whereas *protest policing* in the 1996 article is defined as an 'intermediate variable' between the state and society, in the 1998 collaboration the definition of protest policing more broadly represents 'the main intervening variable between structure and action.'¹³⁹

The authors suggest that 'protest policing styles are influenced by the political system [and] in particular, 'by what researchers of social movements have defined as the Political Opportunity Structure (POS).'¹⁴⁰ Within this are two or three analytic levels of political opportunities: a set of stable opportunities and a set of more volatile opportunities. 'A first analytic level refers to the stable opportunities in which a certain style of policing develops. This includes institutional features 'such as police organization, the nature of the judiciary, law codes, and constitutional rights' which 'may play an important role in defining the opportunities for

¹³⁷ Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, 'The Policing of Protest in Western Democracies', in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p 1.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid, p 9.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

and constraints on protest policing' since they also 'set the conditions for' this form of action. Policing styles also depend on 'a second, more "volatile" set of political opportunities'. These include government guidelines 'on how protest should be handled' as well as social movement intervention 'on issues relating to citizens' rights and police tasks'.¹⁴¹ It is the impact of the first on the second that results in particular 'protest policing styles', and it is in this regard that della Porta and Reiter put *protest policing* forward as 'the main intervening variable between structure and action.'¹⁴²

In practice, the concept of *protest policing* can sometimes also act as something like a third level, depending on the perspective being developed or questions being pursued. In their introduction to the 1998 volume, della Porta and Reiter consider *the interaction between police and protesters* as an additional factor on *protest policing styles*, or as 'another variable that undoubtedly influences [those] styles'. The police perception of their role and of external reality, or of what they term *police knowledge* is emphasised as the primary basis of police intervention, which is to say that 'their appreciation of the situation [is] only secondarily [based on] rules and regulations',¹⁴³ or on 'stable opportunities'.

¹⁴¹ The authors include the media in the role of volatile opportunities: 'The media are part of this picture, partially as a "spokesperson" of one or the other coalition' with 'law-and-order coalitions on the one hand, and on the other, civil rights coalitions', although the media also partly follow 'an "autonomous" logic'.

¹⁴² Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, 'The Policing of Protest in Western Democracies', in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p 9.

¹⁴³ Ibid, p 22.

The police's perception of external reality serves as the equivalent of the specialized knowledge of other parts of the bureaucracy. It is not subordinate to rules and regulations contained in written manuals, but is equally important for the carrying out of police duty, and is not restricted to certain shortcuts and tricks of the trade taught by experience.¹⁴⁴

Furthermore the interaction between protesters and police is a 'dynamic is not restricted to single protest events'. That is:

The police, in fact, seem to be equipped with an elephant's memory: the history of previous interactions with protesters is an important element shaping today's protest policing...the effects of police-protester interactions are not restricted to the dynamics of a single encounter. Individual incidents may have long-term repercussions on police attitudes towards protest...The history of interactions between protesters and police is of great importance in explaining protest policing dynamics. Such interactions are the concrete expression of the national strategies developed to deal with challengers.'¹⁴⁵

In addition to having developed through the refinement of political process approaches to social movements, the police-protest studies field also emerged alongside calls for greater analytic attention in social movement studies and protest research on the role of policing. For instance Peter Waddington's *Liberty and Order* (1994) objects to the centrality of social movement perspectives¹⁴⁶ on the issue of *protest*, and their subsequent

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, pp 22-3.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid, pp 20-22.

¹⁴⁶ Specifically in relation to the resource mobilisation theoretical (RMT) approach to the study of social movements. This is a subset of the political process approach which has featured in some (usually North American) scholarship. Waddington's early work has explored the police both as an organisation and as a rational actor (group).

failure to account for the role of police and policing as organisation and an actor-group:

In so far as the police are included among the *dramatis personae* of protest episodes, they are restricted to an occasional walk-on part, usually swinging clubs ... Just as it is necessary that we take protest seriously in order to understand it, so too it is essential that we take policing seriously in order to understand its response to it.¹⁴⁷

Police-protest studies are in effect organised around variously defined ideas of *state-movement* relations. della Porta's *Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest*¹⁴⁸ and Peter Waddington's *Public Order Policing: Citizenship and Moral Ambiguity*¹⁴⁹ represent two examples of such combinations as the titles suggest. The former conducts a cross-national comparison of the development of police-protest (state-society) relations in post-war Italy and West Germany. The latter provides an account of public order policing as 'a highly visible representation of the relationship between state and citizen',¹⁵⁰ and explores some of the ways in which the oscillating role of the police officer (as police officer/citizen) can assist in mediating *state-citizen* relations. Combined studies thus assume a basic

¹⁴⁷ PAJ Waddington, *Liberty and Order*, (1994: 8-9) *Liberty & Order* is detailed survey of public order policing in London in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In particular, the study offers a nuanced assessment of public order policing as an alternative perspective to a prevailing focus on riot and riot control analysis.

¹⁴⁸ Donatella della Porta, 'Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest', in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp 62-92.

¹⁴⁹ P. A. J. Waddington, 'Public Order Policing: Citizenship and Moral Ambiguity', in F. Leishman, B. Loveday and S. Savage, eds., *Core Issues in Policing* (Longman, 2000), pp 156-175.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p 171.

distinction between *police* and *protest* that builds on a distinction between the *state* and *civil society*. Protest groups, and their association with social movements are considered as forming in and as acting on behalf of a singular civil society, and the police are considered as forming in the realm of the state in and acting in the defence of a given territorial order. In this way, the police/protest distinction is often used to explore the points at which intra national institutionalised and non-institutional politics intersect. The police-protest dichotomy thus acts as a microcosm of *state-society* relations (or vice versa), which is often further qualified through *liberty-order* models. Like contributions to the 1998 volume, both accounts emphasise the standard or standardising processes involved in the dynamics of police-protest interaction.

In these earlier studies especially, public order policing and public assembly staging practices can be seen to derive their (relational) identity from the national political contexts within which they act and inter-act. As such, police-protest relations can be used to supplement accounts of the national character, formation and development of different political process systems. Territorially limited states with liberal democratic traditions have acted as the main conceptual framework within police-protest dynamics could be documented and assessed. Explanation takes the form of national-statist, liberty-order models or conceptual frameworks. These form the basis of accounts of how police-protest dynamics operate, as well as how they develop through time and/or across different contexts. Evaluations of the dynamics of police-protest interaction can therefore be said to be based

on representations of stylised and, for explanatory purposes, necessarily simplified pictures of the mechanisms and processes that balance to sustain liberal democratic states.

The field of analysis is descriptive-empirical; accounts draw together sets of data to establish general patterns, and causal relationships between different variables and conceptual frameworks are reworked around this. In terms of research methods the main approach can be defined as a combination approach that especially draws on institutional studies and rational choice theory. On the one hand, police-protest studies deals with the rules, procedures and formal organisation of certain aspects of the political system, and their impact on political practice; and on the other, the idea of *reciprocal change*, which is the central issue of police-protest studies, is framed in terms of ideas about the strategic adaptation and innovation of both forms of action, that is, on the basis of questions about of purposive, rational action.

Accounts that are more inclined to rational choice explanations tend to provide sharper, necessarily more simplified descriptions of reciprocal change, whereas institutional analysis explanations tend to offer more detailed descriptions. Nevertheless, the differences are perhaps only marginal given that the combination approach often works to explain police-protest dynamics in the following way: 'Protesters and the police, social movements and the state, influence each other in the strategic

choices they make, in a process involving innovation and adaptation on both sides.’¹⁵¹

National Cycles and Reciprocal Change

In the 1998 volume the conceptual focus of protest policing is also refined so as to accommodate a new focus on the (usually) national specificity of *protest policing styles*, that is, of their development and variation over time within nation-specific contexts. Early police-protest studies are typified by their attention to national characteristics of police-protest relations.¹⁵² The volume thus also serves as a cross-national comparison of the similarities and differences between these styles. The fact that the dynamics of police-protest interactions are contingent on specific sites and situations does not preclude the construction of broadly representative explanatory models.

Throughout the 1998 volume there is particular emphasis on the development and standardisation of patterns of police-protest interaction

¹⁵¹ Donatella della Porta, ‘Social Movements and the State’, in D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p 81.

¹⁵² For instance, P. A. J. Waddington has examined the UK context (‘Controlling Protest in Contemporary Historical and Comparative Perspective’, in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp117-140); Oliveri Fillieule and Fabien Jobard have looked at police-protest relations in the context of France (‘The Policing of Protest in France: Toward a Model of Protest Policing’, in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., 1998, pp70-90); Martin Winter analyses the German context (‘Police Philosophy and Protest Policing in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1960-1990’, in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., 1998, pp188-212); Clark McPhail, David Schweingruber and John McCarthy, the US context (‘Policing Protest in the United States: 1960-1995’, in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., 1998, pp49-69.); Oscar Jaimes-Jiménez and Fernando Reinares the Spanish context (‘The Policing of Mass Demonstrations in Spain: From Dictatorship to Democracy’, in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., 1998, pp166-187.) and so on.

following intense periods of public political protest, or following *cycles* or *waves* of protest. If the years 1789 and 1848 are recognised as two historical *waves* of collective action and protest, the study of standardised police-protest relations has as its main starting point the relatively more recent *wave* of protest of the late 1960s. This provides a platform upon which to account for the “‘post-68” standard’¹⁵³ or standardisation of police-protest repertoires of interaction.

The significance of the concept of *cycles* is explained in the following:

According to della Porta, protest policing is a “barometer” of the POS, and police styles can be explained in terms of political institutions, political culture, and the distribution of power between coalitions of law and order and those of civil rights. Police style also results from the process of interaction with social movements during protest cycles, a phenomenon that has been illustrated by McCarthy, McPhail, and Christ (1995) for the American case. Protest cycles are particularly relevant to protest policing not only because there is an especially intense interaction between police and protest movements during such cycles, but more importantly because, according to Tarrow’s analysis (1989b), it is precisely during protest cycles that the police confront changing repertoires of collective action.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, ‘The Policing of Global Protest: the G8 at Genoa and its Aftermath’, trans., Iain L. Fraser, paper presented at the International Conference on Protest Policing and Globalization, Gothenburg, May 1-4 2004, p 6.

¹⁵⁴ Dominique Wisler and Hanspeter Kriesi, ‘Public Order, Protest Cycles, and Political Process: Two Swiss Cities Compared’, in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp 91-2.

Waves or cycles of protest are particularly important in the shaping and subsequent development of the character of a set of police-protest repertoires of interaction. Periods of concentrated protest activity especially highlight the points at which patterns of police-protest relations are unsettled, as well as formed, or reformed. Earlier combined studies explanatory models are primarily designed to address the question of how changes in one form of activity effects changes in the other in an ongoing process of reciprocal adaptation. As the following passage shows, sharper, more pronounced, and necessarily also more simplified characterisations posit waves as the main cause of disequilibrium in the existing balance of relations, which consequently sets in motion a process of further mobilising imperatives:

Contemporary analyses of the emergence and diffusion of repertoires of protest...have shown them to vary dramatically over time and place, partly as a result of protesters' attempts to finesse circumvent or offset social control efforts by agents of the state...When there are sustained and novel waves of public order disruption, established strategies and tactics of social control may be called into question when they are insufficient to re-establish the states quo ante. New forms of disruption may require new forms of social control. Repeated confrontations with novel forms of disruption provide opportunities for the development and refinement of new solutions to those problems.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵ John D. McCarthy, Clark McPhail and John Crist, ' The Diffusion and Adoption of Public Order Management Systems', in D. della Porta, H. Kriesi and D. Rucht, eds., *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp 71-2.

In principle, protest and policing mutually modify each other in their encounter, especially during periods at which encounters become intensified. Thus in practice the starting point and the main emphasis on the onset of change is signified by the idea of a protest wave, a wave which, if it signifies *change*, must have or entail a certain *effect*. Here various inflections of the notion of *change* become interchangeable and are also often conflated. Change (whether it refers to *change* in the intensity of *protest*, or whether it refers to the presumed intended outcome of *protest*, and/or both) can be seen here as the precipitating cause of alteration in an ostensibly characteristic or standardised set of *police-protest* dynamics.

Additionally, within political process explanation a *wave of protest* can itself be considered as the purposive action of what, in such a formulation, must also be articulated as a single actor or a single actor-group. In some accounts the idea of *repertoires* is likewise articulated as the strategic action of one actor group, and therefore entails a similar pattern of explanation. The ideas of *repertoires* and *reciprocal change* take on a causal association which, as the following passage shows, can build on the *opportunities-constraints* model as well as on the idea of cycles:

Students of collective action have given great attention to the sources, processes, and consequences of changing repertoires of collective action across space and time. One important focus of this scholarship has been the integral role of interaction between protesters and the police...The actions of each modify the environments of the other, creating intermittent

opportunities and obstacles that result in ongoing reciprocal adjustments of each party's purposive efforts. As the agents of the state devise ways of blunting, blocking, or finessing the actions of the protesters, the latter devise variations and innovations in the collective actions to circumvent the control efforts of the former.¹⁵⁶

In his summary of the 1998 volume Gary Marx notes that 'Of course, there is an element of reciprocity and interaction here (and it is difficult to say which came first)'. Nevertheless, where the central focus of enquiry concerns reciprocal change, it always already appears to entail a particular pattern of causality. This may suggest that the very idea of *the relational* that is central to the police-protest dichotomy (not just within academic discourse), is subject to a particular framing. This is a subject of sustained interest that will be developed further in this as well as subsequent chapters.

The national has been the most comprehensive or at least familiar concept through which to organise data on series or catalogues of episodes and events over time. Accounts often discern patterns of change over periods of no less than several decades and in relation to changes in the character of the national or domestic political process. On the other hand, it is not uncommon for accounts of national police-protest relations to be based on research of specific sites, notably capital cities. Examples of this include

¹⁵⁶ Clark McPhail, D. Schweingruber, and J. McCarthy, 'Policing Protest in the United States: 1960-1995', in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies* (University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p 49.

Clark McPhail et al's US study (just cited) which builds on an earlier survey of demonstrations in Washington DC, and Waddington's general portrayal of public order policing in the UK context which especially focuses on the policing of protest in London.

An exception to that pattern can be found in Dominique Wisler and Hanspeter Kriesi's study of the Swiss case which has a decentralised policing system: 'Unlike centralized states like France and Italy, where the central government, through the prefect system, is responsible for protest policing, in Switzerland local-level authorities have retained sovereignty in this respect.'¹⁵⁷ Since policing in Switzerland is not unitary, Wisler and Kriesi conduct a comparison of two cities within the Swiss national context. In their case study, which is based on the causality idea of cycles, the authors' intra national comparison reveals two different sets of patterns.

The two cities under consideration in this study have been the theater of very different kinds of mobilization in terms of protest movements and cycles. In French-speaking Switzerland, new social movements have been generated to a much smaller degree than in the German-speaking region (Giugni, 1991, 91). On the other hand, the labor movement has been comparatively weaker in the latter region. Furthermore, while Zurich and many other Swiss cities experienced the strongest protest cycle in their postwar history in 1980-1, with the radicalization of the Autonomien

¹⁵⁷ Dominique Wisler and Hanspeter Kriesi, 'Public Order, Protest Cycles, and Political Process: Two Swiss Cities Compared', in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p 93.

movement, Geneva was almost completely insulated from this protest wave at that time.¹⁵⁸

Thus, in some cases at least, the evaluative coherence of *the national* may be overstated.

In any event, with the idea of cycles as a common starting point, contributions to the 1998 volume converge on the consensus of a gradual shift from escalated force to negotiated management policing tactics. The former is indicative of a coercive, repressive style policing and the latter is characterised by greater communication, negotiation and accommodation between both actor groups. A characteristic of this public order policing style is the higher degree of negotiation that takes place around demonstration events. This entails mutual accommodation between police and protesters.

The changes reported in this book relate to broad changes in social control and to a degree of convergence across national police systems in which there has been a general softening of social control, as the velvet glove increasingly comes to replace, or at least cover, the iron fist.¹⁵⁹

Accounts in this volume therefore emphasise patterns of standardised channels of negotiation between police and protesters, as well as standard, patterns of interaction, and the partly institutional contexts within which they develop and take place.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, pp 93-4.

¹⁵⁹ Gary T. Marx, Afterword, in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., 1998, p255.

3. THE POST-SEATTLE SHIFT TO CASE-SPECIFIC SITES

Negotiated management

Most of the chapters in the 1998 volume converge on a consensus that sustained periods of social instability and public political protest, have been followed by the development of softer, more tolerant public order policing styles. *Escalated force* and *negotiated management* define two main types as well as phases of 'protest policing'. Most articles affirm a general historical trend from the former, which is characterised by conflict and confrontation, to the latter, which is characterised by the availability and use of channels of communication between policing and protest (for instance, by greater negotiation around demonstration events). It also assumes or entails mutual accommodation between police and protesters. The shift in policing styles from what is described as *escalated force* to *negotiated management* techniques is discussed in an Afterword to the 1998 volume in the following:

A central argument of most of the articles in this book is that there has been a leavening of police response to protest, regardless of the country. Rather than taking an adversarial and intentionally violent approach, police seek a more neutral stance. The policing of protest has become more normalized. Although police hardly welcome mass demonstrations, in general they no longer arouse the degree of hostility or fear they previously did.

By the same token, Marx points to some issues that escape general characterisation:

To be sure, there are many exceptions to this trend ... and it may not continue in the face of wrenching social changes or grave provocations. Nor is it unilinear across dimensions, groups, time periods, or contexts – as any venture into marginalized, ethnically diverse, lower-income areas, or discussions with those who have been injured in demonstrations will attest. But viewed in comparative and historical terms in which the standard police response was, and in many countries still is, to prohibit demonstrations or to fire on or charge into crowds, the trends noted in these articles are worthy of note.¹⁶⁰

While the Seattle case has become a focal point for questions about *globalisation*, as well as the starting point of ideas about its apparent antithesis *anti-globalisation*, it also became a familiar marker of apparent changes in police-protest dynamics in liberal democratic states. If *Seattle* signified a new kind of demonstration event, as it did for many, it was equally clear that it was not going to be the kind of event that authorities could use to display their democratic qualities.

In any case, general consensus that police-protest interactions in western democracies had normalised, with protest having become more institutionalised, and the policing of protest having become progressively geared towards negotiated management techniques, was disrupted by the events of Seattle in 1999 and the overzealous police response to largely

¹⁶⁰ Ibid, p255.

peaceful gatherings of US citizens. The Seattle case was to become an important factor in reanimating research on contemporary police-protest dynamics, and is often cited as the starting point for re conceptualising political protest, public order policing, and the interaction between them. The case prompted a shift from questions about the policing of mass demonstrations to new round of questions about *the policing of transnational protest*: 'After Seattle, with the frequent escalation of interactions between protesters and police during transnational protests, attention to the policing of demonstrations has re-emerged also in the social sciences'.¹⁶¹

The first volume on *protest policing*, which was dedicated to research on the characteristics, standardisation and normalisation of police-protest dynamics, or the development of discernable normative patterns of interaction, within primarily national contexts, has been followed by additional articles and volumes, including a 2005 and 2006 collection,¹⁶² which instead revise existing methods in order to explain the changes in anticipated patterns of police-protest dynamics. The main challenge was now to assess the: 'continuities and changes in police strategies, the persisting differences in national approaches as well as the transnationalization in the response to political protest',¹⁶³ an endeavour that requires research to 'reflect upon the validity of previous models in

¹⁶¹ Donatella della Porta and Abby Peterson, *Policing & Society*, (Vol. 15, No. 3, 2005), p 234.

¹⁶² *Policing & Society* (Vol. 15, No. 3), September 2005; and D. della Porta, A. Peterson and H. Reiter, eds., *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

¹⁶³ Donatella Della Porta and Abby Peterson, Editorial, *Policing & Society*, (Vol. 15, No.3), September 2005, p 234.

explaining police strategies', and to examine 'the role of factors internal to the police such as their organizational structure and knowledge, the role of political opportunities, and the strategic adaptation to new protest repertoires.'¹⁶⁴ Questions about whether or not a definitive shift in negotiated management techniques had occurred remained particularly high on the agenda of this new wave of research:

One of the main sets of questions addressed by the contributions collected in this volume is: are we witnessing the re-emergence of the escalated force model, or the development of a new repressive protest policing style? Can we observe a definite break with the de-escalating, negotiated model of protest policing that dominated in the 1980s and well into the 1990s? Or is the control of transnational counter-summits an exception in a policing of protest that remains mainly negotiated? Or is the escalation in Seattle and afterwards proof that the de-escalating strategies were only applied in some spaces (for instance, in Washington, DC) and to some political groups (for example, the more 'civilized' new social movements?), while more repressive strategies dominated elsewhere? ¹⁶⁵

Essays in later collections develop earlier ideas of a shift in the last few decades from 'escalated force' to 'negotiated management', some of which note exceptions that reveal a partly cyclical dynamic.¹⁶⁶ Alternative characterisations of new police responses develop the idea of 'strategic incapacitation' which acts as a barrier to participation in counter summit

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, p 234.

¹⁶⁵ Donatella della Porta, Abby Peterson and Herbert Reiter, 'Policing Transnational Protest', in D. della Porta, A. Peterson, and H. Reiter, eds., *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p 5-6.

¹⁶⁶ Della Porta and Reiter, 2006.

demonstrations.¹⁶⁷ Other contributions examine the issue of balance between civil and political liberties and public order within new contexts, for instance, in 'territorial place, temporarily transformed into transnational political spaces'.¹⁶⁸

Complexity, global protest and transnational policing

Other initial studies include a paper on protest and policing in the Seattle case which finds conventional police-protest explanation 'too sweeping to account for the variation over time and place within a large set of events' like the Seattle demonstrations,¹⁶⁹ a paper on the *Policing Political Protest* at the Gothenburg EU summit gatherings which examines how changes in protest, including the use of technology and increased mobility, affect changes in the policing of protest;¹⁷⁰ and two articles co-authored by della Porta and Reiter *The Policing of Global Protest* at the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001. One examines 'what special challenges ... the movement improperly termed "no-global" present[s] to police forces and Governments [and] what internal features of police forces, or external features, have

¹⁶⁷ John Noakes and Patrick Gillham, 'Aspects of the 'New Penology' in the Police Response to Major Political Protests in the United States, 1999-2000', in D. della Porta, A. Peterson, and H. Reiter, eds., *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).

¹⁶⁸ Abby Peterson, 'Policing Contentious Politics at Transnational Summits: Darth Vader or the Keystone Cops?', in D. della Porta, A. Peterson, and H. Reiter, eds., 2006, p 43.

¹⁶⁹ Patrick F. Gillham and Gary T. Marx, 'Complexity & Irony in Policing and Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle', *Social Justice* (Vol. 27, No. 2., 2000).

¹⁷⁰ Mikael Oskarsson and Abby Peterson, 'Policing Political Protest: A Study of the Policed Handling of Protest Events in Conjunction with the EU Summit Meeting in Göteborg, June 2001', paper presented at the 5th Congress of the European Sociological Association in Helsinki, 28 August - September 1, 2001.

facilitated the escalation' in police-protest relations,¹⁷¹ while the other refers the trend of 'clashes between police and demonstrators' that has occurred in the short 'history of the 'globalization from below'' to a broader set of dislocations in state-society relations. Here, police-protest dynamics evince a disjunction or a growing 'reciprocal distrust ... between the political and institutional class and the activists of the movement.'¹⁷²

In the case Gillham and Marx set out, conventional police-protest studies methods, or methods developed for conventional empirical sites, are found lacking in at least three respects: they are time-general whereas the Seattle events are time-specific; they are geared towards 'closed system' explanation whereas the Seattle events were more fluid; and they are predictive in inclination, and therefore necessarily downplay the contingencies and complexities that characterised police-protest interaction during these events.

Gillham and Marx are mainly concerned with the last of the three problems they raise regarding the role of the concept of 'reciprocal change' in police-protest studies and some of the problems involving its application to this particular demonstration case. They find that the application of conventional explanations to the time-specific case of Seattle has tended to

¹⁷¹ Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, 'The Policing of Global Protest: the G8 at Genoa and its Aftermath', trans., Iain L. Fraser, paper presented at the International Conference on Protest Policing and Globalization; Gothenburg, May 1-4 2004, p 3.

¹⁷² D. della Porta and H. Reiter, 'Police Measures Against the New Global Protest', in F. Polet and Cetri, eds., *Globalizing Resistance*, (London: Pluto: 2004), p 273.

elicit a series of highly charged but simplistic blame stories with limited explanatory power.

Regardless of how blame was apportioned, in the final analysis it was together that 'protesters and police paralyzed the business district for 3 days, shut down the WTO ministerials, and called international attention to the issues raised by the WTO meetings'. The paper elaborates on how the contingent activities and inter-activities of participant police and protest groups effectively produced the event and its characteristic complexities:

We have sought documentation for our description of events but our basic point is not to offer a history as such. Rather we view the Seattle WTO protests as a window into broader phenomena. We seek to go beyond simplistic blaming (of which there is plenty – whether involving inappropriate police behavior or irresponsible protest behavior), to noting how the conditions of such protest situations and the choices actors make may have multiple, conflicting, and unintended consequences. The search for heroes and villains may be emotionally gratifying but all too often it is self-serving and ideological, rather than reflective of careful empirical evidence.¹⁷³

It is particularly noteworthy that while police-protest relations account for, or are used in accounting for/describing the event-ness of episodes like 'Seattle', the same episodes also highlight the unfixedity or changeability of these forms. The authors find that although *protest* and *policing* are the

¹⁷³ Patrick F. Gillham and Gary T. Marx, 'Complexity & Irony in Policing and Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle', *Social Justice* (Vol. 27, No. 2., 2000).

main forms through which the event is evaluated, the episode renders these forms especially contestable.

In another paper which examines the case of the Gothenburg 2001 summit demonstrations, Mikael Oskarsson and Abby Peterson find it necessary to provisionally avoid models which emphasise broader relational processes in order to offer a more focussed analysis of protest-police dynamics in this case:

While we recognise the interplay between what della Porta (1995) has called the political opportunity structure, which takes into consideration the legal and political environment for public order policy and ultimately, police tactics in the field...and the interplay with media and its influence upon public policy...we focus here on direct activist-police interaction. While these interactions are enmeshed in a complicated context of wider interactions between the government, the media, political action networks, and the police as relatively autonomous actors, we will highlight the latter two actors.¹⁷⁴

Both papers draw attention to the problems of how to look at police-protest dynamics in a specific demonstration event. Both find it necessary to either deviate from or defer the application of conventional approaches. These studies appear to be the first initial post-Seattle police-protest studies. Initial contributions by della Porta and Reiter which followed several years later develop the theme of the policing of global protest which will be examined in detail shortly.

¹⁷⁴ Mikael Oskarsson and Abby Peterson, 'Policing Political Protest: A Study of the Policed Handling of Protest Events in Conjunction with the EU Summit Meeting in Göteborg, June 2001', paper presented at the 5th Congress of the European Sociological Association in Helsinki, 28 August - September 1, 2001, p 2.

Case-specific enquiry has not been confined to *Seattle* or *post-Seattle* sites, nor have the questions been exclusively framed in terms of *the policing of transnational protest*. In one of the earliest, if not the earliest single case studies, Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle introduce questions about *the policing of protest at international events* on the occasion of a final meeting for heads of state for the fifth Asia Pacific Economic Conference in 1997 in Vancouver, BC. Citing the 1998 police-protest studies volume, this paper shifts the empirical focus to look at 'protest at an international occasion involving many nations'.

We examine, in particular, the policing of protest at an international event celebrating economic globalization and involving nations with very different policing and political cultures. How much is policing such an event simply shaped by the political and police culture of the host nation? How much is such policing itself changing in the context of economic globalization?¹⁷⁵

In this formulation, issues of political culture and police culture, what are sometimes termed *stable opportunities* and *police perceptions*, are considered alongside the political and policing cultures of the visiting representatives of other nations. The paper finds that representatives of the governments of visiting nations can sometimes assume a more direct role in directing protest at this type of occasion. Here, the case represents a new or different kind of event insofar as it involves discussions between various heads of state on matters of global economic co-operation. At the

¹⁷⁵ Richard Ericson and Aaron Doyle, 'Globalization and the policing of protest: the case of APEC 1997', *British Journal of Sociology* (Vol. 50, No. 4, December 1999), pp 589-590.

time of the publication of this paper protests at international events were, as the authors state, 'relatively infrequent', although over a decade later there can be little doubt about the significance of the idea that these events 'may be of political and cultural importance'.¹⁷⁶

There is some contrast between the framing of questions about *the policing of protest at international events* and the later focus on *the policing of transnational protest* which was to become the prevailing analytic focus of questions about changes in police-protest dynamics. Regardless of the way in which questions are framed a common issue is the partial unsettling of the liberal democratic state as the main basis of explanatory models. Familiar analytic categories that are built around this became difficult to sustain in the analysis of contemporary police-protest relations.

The policing of transnational protest

What is the role of methods and approaches like cycles and opportunities that are used in accounting for apparently new empirical sites and situations, and how do the dichotomies and binary sets that have been used to structure general characterisations of police-protest dynamics feature in case-specific explanations? How do interpretations arrange and recombine structuring dichotomies in case specific empirical sites? The following excerpt which introduces the first collection of post-Seattle research can be used as a reference to consider the effects of these

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

contextual distortions on the framing of new questions about protest and policing:

Since Seattle, a new cycle of protest is in fact again challenging not only specific policy choices, but also the very conception of law and order as well as civil liberties. A specific characteristic of this wave of protest is a high degree of transnationalization: the most visible forms of protest are organized around (or against) summits of institutions ... If the counter summits represent strategic adaptation by social movements to the perceived shift of decision-making power from nation-states to supranational institutions, police counterstrategies to control this form of protest have also adapted to the (perceived) nature of the challenge: “red zones” have been set in order to close access to obvious targets for protesters, police forces have become more and more equipped with “less-lethal” arms, data banks of “travelling protesters” have been constructed, special anti-insurgent branches have been created and the military has been deployed for law and order tasks. These strategic interactions challenge social scientists’ approaches to the issues of protest and policing.

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So as to focus an examination of the questions raised above the passage can be read as a series of separate as well as interlinked propositions. Here, *Seattle* is the locus of a number of starting points. First and foremost it is indicative of a new cycle of protest which itself signifies a new kind of protest. Since this kind of protest especially forms around summits its novelty is its transnationality. Hence this cycle of protest cannot be defined in terms of *the national*. This is also the starting point of a further set of

¹⁷⁷ Donatella della Porta and Abby Peterson, Editorial, *Policing & Society*, (Vol. 15, No. 3, 2005), p 233.

propositions. Since this new cycle of protest is not territorially limited it renders especially visible concerns about the unfixedness of the internal ordering through which police-protest relations are generally explained and/or understood. The new cycle thus complicates the conventional framework and unsettles the twin *nation-state* and *liberty-order* reference, the structuring ideal through which *policing* and *protest*, interactions could be explained, through which it was possible to discern, explain and respond to patterns of protest, and through which (everyday, analytic as well as policing) decisions about such actions or events could be expected to be made.

This leads to the second point. The cycle of protest can be identified by changes in its spacing as evinced by forms of protest that form 'around (or against) summits of institutions.' Counter-summits and/or the forms of protest that appear therein are a consequence of social movement innovations which are themselves the result of a *perceived shift of decision-making power from nation-states to supranational institutions*. These innovations – the transnationalisation of protest and social movements' perceptions about shifts in the realm of decision-making contexts – can therefore also then be identified as 'strategic adaptations'. Changes in the spacing of a movement of protest are identified as a purposive, strategic action, albeit apparently only insofar as this relates to policing reactions. Changes in the spacing of protest, a cycle of protest or a social movement, are defined as a purposive or strategic action, albeit only insofar as this relates to policing reactions. Thus in a closely linked third

point, it follows that changes in spacing of protest becomes a mobilising imperative for further police actions. Changes in *protest*, thus defined, are linked to consequent *police counterstrategies to control this form of protest*. This repeats a by now familiar and apparently continuing pattern of explanation about police-protest reciprocal change.

Whilst della Porta and Peterson suggest empirically observable changes become most apparent through escalated policing styles, they are ultimately explained as policing responses to changes in protest, that is, to changes in the spacing of protest. Police perceptions about the nature of this challenge then set in motion a series of counterstrategies in response to counter summit events and/or to this 'strategic innovation' by a social movement actor. Finally the relation between these changes – between social movement adaptation to a perceived shift and policing adaptations in response to their own perceptions of such a shift – or between 'these strategic interactions', is primarily what represents a new challenge for the analysis of contemporary police-protest relations.

4. DICHOTOMIES AND EXPLANATION

The global and the national

The della Porta/Peterson excerpt above indicates a particular kind of framing which builds on earlier accounts of police-protest, reciprocal, strategic innovation and adaptation. It raises a number of issues about the

framing of questions, and perhaps most importantly about the framing of an exacerbated disjunction in police-protest relations. Some of the main analytical problems indicated in the della Porta/Peterson excerpt stem from the sense of a loss or absence of an environment, conceptual or otherwise, that is common to both forms. Or rather, the juxtaposition of what is defined as a primarily transnational form of protest, with essentially statist forms of policing implies a primarily spatial disjuncture.¹⁷⁸

The spatial characteristics of new, post-national sites of interaction are almost entirely inferred through the assumed characteristics of 'protest' and 'policing'. The juxtaposition of protest forms seen as fundamentally 'global' and policing forms that are seen to be fundamentally statist and/or as nation-specific can be seen to exceed the explanatory capacity of the proposition that 'protesters and the police, social movements and the state, influence each other in the strategic choices they make'. The exacerbation of a disjunction between both forms is primarily considered a consequence of a divergence in the way that both forms of action are (seen to be) spaced. These are the main, general terms through which questions about contemporary police-protest relations are perhaps inevitably phrased.

What is especially interesting here is the way in which the binary sets that are an essential part of police-protest explanation become rearranged in

¹⁷⁸ The issue is not always presented as such. For instance, much of the emphasis is on the post-Seattle erosion of standardised connective, interlocutory processes and procedures like police-protest communication and negotiation before, during and after events. However, if the cause of the exacerbation of police-protest antagonisms is assigned to the weakening either of instruments of negotiation or the propensity for negotiation, this is ultimately accounted for in terms of spatial dislocation.

case-specific sites. Whereas police-protest relations in case general sites are rendered through the binary concepts of liberty and order, state and society, case-specific sites involve the additional factor of the interaction between two distinct and separate kinds of space: the global and the national. Combined together with the subject of enquiry, the eventness of a putatively new set of sites is designated as a spatial rupture between *global protest* and *state police*.

One of the difficulties is that this assumes a clear distinction between *the global* and *the national* that oversimplifies the reality. Saskia Sassen has shown that even though 'Much of social science has operated with the assumption of the nation-state as a container, representing a unified spatiotemporality',¹⁷⁹ 'much of history has failed to confirm this assumption'. For Sassen the global and the national are not necessarily 'discrete conditions that mutually exclude each other', rather they 'significantly overlap and interact in ways that distinguish our contemporary moment.'¹⁸⁰

Given the complexity and specificity of both the global and the national, their interlacing suggests the existence of frontier zones - from the perspective of research and theorization, these analytic borderlands are sure to require independent theoretical and methodological specificity.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Saskia Sassen, 'Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization', *Public Culture*, (Vol. 12, No. 1, 2000), p 215.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Ibid, p 216.

There is a tendency in protest policing studies to counterpose the global to the national in a way that overstates the coherence of both. This is symptomatic of the complication of the binary order/change opposition that is so crucial to the field. For instance, if the national state is a master albeit deteriorating spatiotemporality 'the global is a spatiotemporal (dis)order in the making.'¹⁸²

Where the issues are cast in terms of how domestic orders respond to processes or events that are considered as global or external, they recall, and perhaps also reanimate classical tensions between ideas of safe, domestic, civil space, and the dangerous, external and anarchic.¹⁸³ This is an apparently new framing, although the only substantive novelty is the addition of the global/national distinction in which these spaces are thought to be mutually exclusive. From this perspective the increasing complexities or rather the increasing problems of contemporary police-protest dynamics are compounded by their respective situations in spaces that are deemed to be incommensurable. This all but does away with any grounds there might be for theorising police-protest reciprocity.

¹⁸² Ibid, p 229.

¹⁸³ In her discussion of the emergence of the notion of civil society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Mary Kaldor has noted that: 'The distinction between domestic and international or internal and external corresponded to the distinction between civil society and barbarism.' Kaldor, 'Transnational Civil Society', in T. Dunne and N. J. Wheeler, eds., *Human Rights in Global Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p 196.

State and society

Post-Seattle studies address themselves to fragmented sites of police-protest interaction that are partially national and/or statist and partially global and/or transnational. The clear separation of the nation and the global is perhaps endemic to a field of explanation that is generally dependent on the state/society distinction, one that simplifies a more complicated reality chiefly for explanatory purposes. The modern state and society are highly ambiguous terms, yet it is often necessary to isolate them especially for analytic purposes:

The problem is that the state is enmeshed in society; in a sense, it is constituted by society, and society in turn is shaped by the state. But the fact that 'state' and 'society' are inextricably bound together does not mean of course that we cannot for analytical purposes distinguish particular aspects for attention.¹⁸⁴

Similarly Marsh and Stoker suggest that: 'The state, in the abstract, stands apart from civil society, but through the processes of politics and the practice of government the state and civil society have a complex, controversial and disputed relationship.'¹⁸⁵ Certainly the state-society / police-protest relational equivalence has for some time been used as an illustrative tool, acting as a useful way of organising some observations of infinitely complex interactions, forms, processes, events and so on. But while the pairings, their referential, relational and inter relationality creates

¹⁸⁴ Held, D. et al. eds., *States and Societies* (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1983), p ix.

¹⁸⁵ David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, eds., *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, (London: Macmillan, 1995), p 6.

a framework of symmetry through which to organise information, the dependence on the correspondence between the state-society pair and the police-protest pair in substantive explanation is considerably more problematic, not least where the empirical focus concerns counter summit demonstrations.

The review of literature has shown that the police-protest and state-society dichotomies are combined in various ways. A common orienting strategy is the interconnection between social movements (one element of *the social* or of society) is relationally linked to the state through policing:

Social movements have been seen as challengers directing their demands to institutions, chiefly through forms of protest. Their very use of unconventional forms of action involves the State, not just as a counterpart in negotiating the movement's objectives, but also as the guarantor of public order. Accordingly, one important aspect of the institutional response to protest is the strategies for controlling it.¹⁸⁶

Indeed, 'The debate about the role of the state in promoting liberty while ensuring order is as old as politics itself.'¹⁸⁷ Nevertheless, in combined police-protest studies, or in research that examines the relational character of protest and policing, binary pairs are not simply reference explanatory terms, they built into or somehow embedded within the concepts of *protest* on the one hand and *policing* on the other. *Protest* invokes an adjacency

¹⁸⁶ Donatella della Porta, Abby Peterson, and Herbert Reiter, 'Policing Transnational Protest: an Introduction', in D. della Porta, A. Peterson, and H. Reiter, eds., *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), p 3.

¹⁸⁷ Wright. A, *Policing: An Introduction to Concepts and Practice* (London: Willan Publishing, 2002), p 51.

with social movements, and therefore with *society* and *movement, change*, and in this case *change* that is designated as *global*, while policing presupposes a form of *order*, an aspect of *the state* or *stasis* and therefore *continuity*, and *the national*. In this way, *protest* and *policing* function as a standardised relational pair, and it is through that relational contrast that the adjacent or associated meanings invoked by each form, become especially pronounced.

How far do these assumptions structure explanation, and is the influence of these assumptions consistent despite the overall unsettling of the conventional conceptual framework? This can be briefly considered in terms of the framing of issues and questions of an early paper on the Gothenburg case. Here there are a number of assumptions about what is going on as exemplified by the following research question: 'How have changes in political protest – their increasingly decentralised nature, the development of new tactics and styles of protest, and their use of new technologies – led to new challenges for police forces that bear the responsibility of maintaining public order?'¹⁸⁸ Later accounts of the new dynamics of interaction are no doubt informed by the emergence of a *global movement* (and its relation to the nation-state), hence the main emphasis of a shift from case-general to case-specific, descriptive-empirical police-protest studies is the re-articulation of nation-specific police-protest interaction to the dynamics between *globalised protest* and *statist policing*.

¹⁸⁸ Mikael Oskarsson and Abby Peterson, 'Policing Political Protest: A Study of the Policed Handling of Protest Events in Conjunction with the EU Summit Meeting in Göteborg, June 2001', paper presented at the 5th Congress of the European Sociological Association in Helsinki, 28 August – September 1, 2001, p 1.

Whereas new categories are adopted they are then seemingly drawn back and re-fixed along the lines of the classical cartographies that informed previous research. While standard applications of associative dualisms appear more flexible or unfixed, there is a sense in which the structuring cause/effect, order/change and continuity/discontinuity (and other) oppositions for which the main organising principle was the national liberal democratic conceptual order, appear to become especially fixed. There is a sense in which the dichotomies that support explanations of police-protest dynamics continues to explain, or to provide a framework for explanation even while the stability of the overall conceptual framework appears unsettled.

One consequence of this is that as a combined studies subject *protest and policing* cannot easily incorporate findings about fundamental changes in policing that cannot be reduced to the reciprocal relation with public assembly staging practices. Over the last decade specialist literatures have documented and discussed changes in the spacing of policing and the transnational policing¹⁸⁹ and also changes relating to the partial decoupling of the state-police pairing.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁹ For instance: Sheptycki, J. (1998) 'The Global Cops Cometh: Reflections on Transnationalisation, Knowledge Work and Policing Subculture', *British Journal of Sociology*, 49, 1: 57-74; Walker, N. (2000) 'Transnational Contexts' in F. Leishman, B. Loveday and B. Savage, eds., *Core Issues in Policing* 2nd edition (Harlow: Longman); Bigo, D. (2000) 'When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe' in M. Kelstrup and M. Williams, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, Community* (London: Routledge).

Within the combined studies field, and particularly within approaches that emphasise purposive, rational, police-protest action and interaction, not only are distinctions between *the national* and *the global* invoked as explanations of exacerbated police-protest antagonisms, but questions about the dynamics of police-protest interaction often become interchangeable with assumptions about the dynamics of national-global interaction. The severity of the distinction forms that appear as *global/protest* and *local-police*, vastly oversimplifies the reality. There is a sense that some of the weaknesses of conventional police-protest approaches become amplified when conventional methods are called upon to examine case-specific sites.

Gillham and Marx have considered the extent to which questions about rational choice and strategic response or adaptation, can account for the empirically observable complexities of police-protest dynamics within such sites. The 'complexity and irony' of actions and interactions simultaneously draws attention to the problematic centrality of cause and effect and strategic actions in explanations of police-protest dynamics, as well as the simplification of multiple forms of activity into either of the two basic block actor groups, 'protest' or 'policing'.

¹⁹⁰ Neil Walker examines the spread of forms of policing that go beyond the individual state, that are not reducible to co-operation between actors whose main reference point is their state of origin, and which involve networks that are relatively autonomous of these states of origin 'or which owe allegiance to other non-state 'polities' or political communities.' N. Walker, 'The Pattern of Transnational Policing' in T. Newburn, ed., *Handbook of Policing* (London: Willian Publishing, 2003), p 111.

The central focus on reciprocal change is perhaps too restrictive to comprehensively account for contemporary changes in both protest and policing, and the possible effects of this on police-protest interaction and sites of interaction. Pre-Seattle cases for instance sometimes portray sharp separations between the environments of protest and policing, whereas the apparent separation of the spaces and spacing of protest and policing of so many later, case specific characterisations, are precisely the source of the problem of how to conceptualise contemporary episodes.

5. THE VANISHING DEMONSTRATION

The causal relation between *changing repertoires* and (*agents of*) *the state* provides a further angle from which to consider recurring patterns in the framing of spatial disjuncture and its associated effects. The fragmentary architecture of sites that are rendered by contemporary police-protest interactions explodes conventional notions of contextual relations and relational contexts. Part of this relates to the dissociation between policing on the one hand and ‘repertoires of action’ on the other. The function and utility of the concept of repertoires in combined studies is clear. For instance: ‘it is precisely during protest cycles that police confront changing repertoires of collective action’. Nevertheless some accounts place inordinate emphasis on *repertoires* as a category that pertains only to protest forms or social movements. This is a general problem.

By contrast, in the Tillyan sense, *repertoire* does not simply designate a form of action, but a form of interaction: 'Each routine within an established repertoire actually consists of an *interaction* among two or more parties. Repertoires belong to contending actors, not to single actors.'¹⁹¹ In this formulation the demonstration as a site of interaction exemplifies what Tilly means by repertoire.

The category of *the demonstration* is particularly prominent in case-specific police-protest studies, albeit only insofar as it provides a means for delineating an empirical site. It is perhaps also conspicuous by its absence, that is, given its re conceptualisation as a *transnational counter-summit*. Whereas the first combined studies volume examines *the control of mass demonstrations in western democracies*, the most recent volume looks at *the control of transnational counter-summits*. The last volume deals with *the policing of the mass demonstrations of an emerging transnational movement*.

In the absence of a stable contextual reference, the transnational counter summit and/or the mass demonstrations of an emerging transnational movement, which on the face of it is not unlike an anti-globalisation type event, frequently provides a surrogate setting in which to examine the dynamics of interaction. Thus, as well as designating a context of interaction it also points to a form of protest, a protest cycle and/or a movement, or even represents a combination of all of these. This has a

¹⁹¹ Charles Tilly, 'Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834', in M. Traugott, ed., *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action* (Duke University Press, 1995), p 30.

crucial effect on the framing of questions about contemporary police-protest relations. The police-protest distinction here also entails a distinction in their contexts of action.

Here the demonstration belongs to a single actor or actor group: protest. Police manage this site as a consequence of the state's role as a public order guarantor. Thus police are not considered to be part of the make-up or of the architecture of the demonstration event but rather as allo-spaced agents who intervene in on the site. Moreover, given that the main focus of enquiry is the character, role and function of police-protest dynamics within the political process, or within political systems and sets of state-society relations, there appears to be no necessary relation between police-protest dynamics and the demonstration as a site of interaction. To all intents and purposes the demonstration is effectively parenthesised and once again consigned to the margins of analysis. The basis of observations about the relation between protest and policing is not the demonstration per se but the conceptual division between state and society, and now also, between the global and the national.

Charles Tilly's insistence on the demonstration as a repertoire, as a form of interaction involving at least two types of contending actors, is important in a number of respects. Most importantly, as an organising principle, the concept of dichotomous interaction, and in particular of police-protest interaction, goes some considerable way towards explaining how it is that demonstrations in western democracies 'have acquired strikingly standard

forms' (and how they then 'lend themselves to uniform cataloguing'). The demonstration can of course be defined as a form of action that some social movements perform some of the time, but this is perhaps a consequence of the way in which the police-protest dichotomy provides a basic structure of recognition of the demonstration both the site of an *event* and as a historically evolved and situated form. Political demonstrations appear as standard forms not simply because they designate a certain kind of contestation, but because they do so primarily through the police-protest dichotomy.

The sustained focus of case specific studies on the dis/continuities in police-protest has provided a number of valuable insights, not least in describing emergent patterns of public order policing. This is necessarily a question of how changes in the dynamics of police-protest interaction 'move through' different sites of interaction. In both case-general and case-specific accounts, reciprocal change becomes especially manifest through the successive progression of events.

The event in question here relates to the way in which the dynamics of police-protest relations 'produce' or define the demonstration as the site of a 'single', 24-hour *event*. What kinds of explanation result when the dichotomy is called upon to make sense of a site that appears to be without precedent, at a time when the idea of an 'anti-globalisation' type event has not yet come into existence, and in which patterns of public order policing

that emerged through subsequent series of sites were not yet visible? The main orienting terms of J18 (London) was the police-protest dichotomy. What is the basis of this relation between the event site and the dichotomy that renders it?

Chapter 3

Narrative and event: (De) contested police-protest relations

1. DIALECTIC OF MEANING AND EVENT

The previous chapter considered explanations of how reciprocal change and innovation in the dynamics of police-protest relations are discerned in and through the successive progression of different sites. The aim here is to examine more closely the relation between the police-protest dichotomy and the demonstration as the site *the event*. There is a corresponding shift in focus from how the dynamics of police-protest interaction can be explained, to questions about how the police-protest dichotomy 'explains'. The central focus of this chapter relates to the main thesis question: while 'policing' and 'protest' promote narrative, descriptive and analytic structures through which it is possible to account for demonstration events, the case of June 18 (London) also became a focus for the radical instability, unfixity or the contestability of 'protest' and 'policing'.

While it can be argued that 'empirical ['protest policing'] studies do in fact have theoretical relevance',¹⁹² there is no theory of police-protest relations as such. However, the repetition of prevailing patterns of explanation (in chapter 2) is such that this in itself suggests the possibility of some underlying theory. For instance, the police-protest dichotomy repeatedly

¹⁹² Donatella della Porta, Abby Peterson and Herbert Reiter, 'Policing Transnational Protest: an Introduction', *The Policing of Transnational Protest*, D. Della Porta, A. Peterson, and H. Reiter, eds., (Aldeshot: Ashgate, 2006), p 6.

becomes a focus through which to read questions about continuities and discontinuities, orders and disorders, causes and effects. Prominent themes and questions relating to police-protest interaction are implied by the juxtaposition of 'protest' and 'policing', or even embedded within it. These themes are perhaps unavoidable - within analytic discourse, these and other binary pairs and oppositions are immanent. Nevertheless, their apparent fixity is indicative of how the dichotomy structures observations, and how it therefore explains.

The aim here is to consider the extent to which this dichotomous counter position activates certain meanings and understandings around the particular case of J18 (London). One way of broaching this is to look at the extent to which the dichotomy functions as a narrative device within non analytic discourse. There are two related points. Firstly, if the dichotomy does act in this capacity then it can be said to have what Louis Mink describes as a 'cognitive' function. More specifically, to say that the dichotomy does function as a narrative device is to say that it 'inter-subjectively 'makes understandable'/'makes plain'/'explains' its subject matter.'¹⁹³ Secondly, the subject matter here is the demonstration as the site of an *event*.

"Events" (or more precisely, descriptions of events) are not the raw material out of which narratives are constructed; rather an event is an abstraction from a narrative. An event may take five seconds or five months, but in either case whether it is one event or many depends not on a definition of

¹⁹³ Hidemi Suganami, 'Stories of War Origins: A Narrativist Theory of the Causes of War', *Review of International Studies*, (No. 23, 1997), p 404.

“event” but on a particular narrative construction which generates the event’s appropriate description.¹⁹⁴

In contrast to the literature examined in chapter 1 in which accounts of the event are generated by descriptions of action, accounts of the-event-as-demonstration are based on descriptions of interaction and in particular on the interaction of protest and policing.

Approaching *the event* from this perspective involves something like what Paul Ricoeur calls ‘dialectic of the event and meaning in discourse’.¹⁹⁵ The ‘event-meaning’ dialectic might here translate as a dialectic of *the demonstration* and the *police-protest dichotomy*. This dialectic is an important basis for research (reviewed in chapter 2) even though its ultimate focus is political process.

There is an obvious, basic relation between the event and the specific mode of interpretation that pertains to it as such. This relation is perhaps too obvious to warrant recognition. The dichotomy simply functions as a way of making sense of the event as demonstration. Nevertheless that event-dichotomy relation is essentially political, both insofar as the demonstration can be a site within which meanings can be contested (by a range of actors and actor groups), and also because the dichotomy can function as a way of de-contesting the demonstration as a site, or limiting the possible range of interpretations. It represents a mode of interpretation,

¹⁹⁴ Louis O. Mink, ‘Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument’, in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki, eds., *The Writing of History*, (Madison, WI, 1978), p 147.

¹⁹⁵ Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*, (Fort Worth: Christian University Press, 1976), p 8.

a way of deciding the event as such. This is the tacit point from which many police-protest studies proceed to examine the dynamics of dichotomous interaction (albeit in relation to political process or political systems). If that is a prevailing approach to the study of police-protest dynamics, this chapter shifts the focus to explore the relation between the event and the dichotomy.

Ricoeur posits the 'event pole' (opposite a 'meaning pole') as a *concrete polarity*, and in contrast to *the virtuality of the system* so as to emphasise that 'An act of discourse is not merely transitory and vanishing', but on the contrary, 'It may be identified and re identified as the same so that we may say it again or in other words.' For example, 'We may even say it in another language or translate it from one language into another'; yet 'In all these transformations it preserves an identity of its own which can be called the proposition content, the "said as such."'"¹⁹⁶

If the demonstration is the *as such* of 'the event', the police-protest dichotomy is the *as such* of the demonstration. For Ricoeur discourse is the trace that the event leaves behind. And since events only leave traces, or since 'Events vanish while systems remain', part of the role of a semantics of discourse is to:

rectify this epistemological weakness of *parole* proceeding from the fleeting character of the event as opposed to the stability of the system by relating it

¹⁹⁶ Ibid, p 9.

to the ontological priority of discourse resulting from the actuality of the event as opposed to the mere virtuality of the system.¹⁹⁷

The ontological priority of discourse that results from the actuality of *the event* is the police-protest dichotomy and the systemic context in which dichotomous interaction can be understood to take place. Yet by the same token the demonstration can also be understood as the site of *the event*.

The surprise of the event

By most accounts J18 (London) appeared to be an errant demonstration, one that exceeded many of the terms and standards by which 'such events' can usually be understood. Given the unusual character of this event in that sense, the police-protest dichotomy becomes especially important as an anchoring device. By the same token, J18 (London) represents a point at which fundamental changes in protest and policing, and changes in their relation, become especially visible. How is the dichotomy brought to bear on accounts of an eventful, apparently new, unexpected or unfamiliar kind of demonstration (which in turn leads to speculation about the wider condition of London in June 1999)?

The event can be defined as the sudden and unexpected arrival of *x* or some thing that interrupts the usual sequence or order of things, and it is precisely the sense of unexpected and sudden interruption of the usual sequence of things that generates a pressing need for reliable, definitive accounts and explanations of what this event was, what it was about or

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p 9.

what it meant or could mean. The surprise of *x* is coterminous with the imperative to comprehensively account for *x*. It is perhaps as impossible as it is necessary to tell an event – necessary because events require interpretation or compel their telling, and impossible being purely and simply, as Jean-Luc Nancy explains it, ‘the passing of time itself’. For Nancy surprise is the definition of ‘the event’: ‘If the event were fundamental and unique in the ordinary – or “metaphysical” – sense of these words, it would be given, and this giving would also be the originary dissolution of all event-ness. There would be no surprise.’¹⁹⁸

If the police-protest dichotomy represents a way of tempering and managing the complexities of *the event*, of explaining or determining it, this is not exclusive to analytic perspectives. So as to consider the issue of police-protest interaction from this perspective of narrative and event, the current chapter will provide an in depth assessment of the print news rendering of *J18 (London)*. A central aim here is to explore how *J18 (London)*, as an eventful and essentially unfamiliar demonstration, is brought into familiar conventions through the dichotomy. How is the particularity of *the event* or how is ‘eventness’ brought about?

In terms of presentation, what distinguishes analytic and non analytic perspectives is that whereas the former follows changes in the dynamics of pp relations from site to site (and/or through time), news media are primarily interested in (news) events. While demonstrations can be

¹⁹⁸ Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Surprise of the Event’, *Being Singular Plural*, (California: Stanford University Press, 1993), p 175.

identified as events of a certain kind, not all demonstrations are or have to be particularly eventful. Indeed, in terms of news production, there is no compulsion to tell an uneventful demonstration.

Since *surprise* is the definition of *event* “‘the surprise of the event’ is a tautology’; and as such, ‘it is precisely this tautology that must first be expressed.’

What makes the event an event is not only that it happens, but that it surprises – and maybe even that it surprises itself (diverting it from its own “happening” [“arrivée”], not allowing it be an event, surprising the being in it, allowing it to be only by way of surprise) ... There is, then, something to be thought – the event – the very nature of which – event-ness – can only be a matter of surprise, can only take thinking by surprise. We need to think about how thought can and must be surprised – and how it may be exactly this that makes it think. Or then again, we need to think about how there would be no thought without the event of thinking.¹⁹⁹

‘The event surprises or else it is not an event; so it is all a matter of knowing what “surprise” is.’²⁰⁰ If the police-protest dichotomy is the main vehicle through which the surprise of *J18 (London)* is initially gauged, it seems to be a question of attending to the details of that.

Because of the unfamiliarity / complexity of the event, narratives become especially reliant on the explanatory potential of the police-protest

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, pp 159, 165.

²⁰⁰ Ibid, p 167.

dichotomy. Yet while the descriptive potential of the police-protest dichotomy helps bring the complexity of this particular event into familiar conventions, in this case, the event is articulated as a profound unsettling of what *protest* and *policing* are, how they act and interact or at least how they ought to. The forms to which the dichotomy refers become especially contestable through the event. To what extent do pre-existing explanatory conventions inform explanations and understandings about police-protest relations and how they work in this case? How does the dichotomy then continue to retain narrative and therefore explanatory power?

News media discourse provides an exemplary focus for considering the way in which the police-protest dichotomy becomes a position from which to tell the event. It will be useful to further clarify this focus. The role of news media has most engaged the attention of social movement scholarship in terms of strategic action, and the extent to which movement actors are able to 'appropriate the media for their own uses.'²⁰¹ From this perspective there is a causal chain between protest performances as a social movement resource, the mass media and the wider process. This often follows early political process work on the role of media in negotiating positions between marginalised actor groups and the setting of 'the civic agenda'.²⁰² Michael Lipsky for instance noted that media presence was vital to the success of marginalised political campaigns since, 'Like a tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and

²⁰¹ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, (Second Edition), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p 116.

²⁰² (Lipsky, 1968: 1152). See especially *Protest Leadership and Communications Media*, pp 1151-3.

projected'. In a study of anti-roads protest and gatherings in the UK in the mid-1990s (in which protest demonstrations were, among other things, literally drawing attention to falling trees or to their imminent felling) Andrew Barry notes that the role of news media at such events has developed into 'a certain form of institutionalized subjectivity, however incompletely developed':

Evidence must, in principle, be gathered from all sides, and immediately.

The reporter is expected to maintain a position *in the middle* of the action, yet report the action as if she were not there – as if her presence, and the presence of technology, did not influence the course of events.²⁰³

In presenting stories for mass dissemination, news media are undoubtedly instrumental in assimilating events into their wider situations. It occupies an interpretative position between protest and policing; it also occupies a position both inside and outside *the event*. While there is certainly no shortage of questions about the extent to which news media may or may not (some of the time, all of the time, in some cases, or in many cases...) become integral to the antagonism between 'both sides', the focus here is slightly different. The issue here is that news media exemplify a position from which the event can be told, both in terms of its position as a mediating as well as interpretive form. If the police-protest dichotomy is a way of deciding the event, how does it function in the news representation of J18 (London)? The examination of press discourse will consider how patterns in the telling of the event relate to the depiction of the event's

²⁰³ Andrew Barry, 'Demonstrations: sites and sights of direct action', *Economy and Society*, (Vol. 28, No. 1: February 1999), p 85.

wider context or situation, not in terms of political process, which is already an 'ontological priority', but in terms of the demonstration *event* for which there is no such priority.

2. TELLING THE EVENT

Including the extraordinary number of columns that were dedicated to discrediting the legitimacy of the June 18 London gatherings the vast newspaper coverage alone attests to the significance of 'this event'. Newspaper reports about this event commenced at least several months prior to June 18, and ran regularly until late October, after which news attention began to divert to impending, subsequent similar episodes. Regular press coverage of the episode began at least one month before June 18th and went on consistently until late October, after which news reporting diverts to subsequent similar episodes. Taking this event reporting period as a whole helps highlight the dynamics of the telling and retelling of this event. So as to focus on the issues raised above, the examination of print news coverage will focus on two main reporting phases on June 19 and July 29 1999.

The first set of articles focus on *protest* and changes in protest (in relation to *policing*), and July 29 reports which are prompted by the publication of an official post-event investigation into the *police* participation in the gatherings, are mostly concerned with outlining official recommendations

for measured changes and adaptations in policing (in relation to J18 (London) *protest*). The excerpts represent a range of interpretive variations on the theme of the pp dichotomy. They also differ in terms of focus, in-house style, article genre – commentary, report, editorial, and so on. The excerpts included in this review are all taken from the opening paragraphs of a range of mostly national newspapers. They will be examined in chronological order, covering the start of speculation on the pending gatherings and events. Each of the excerpts forms a series of snapshot impressions of different stages and aspects of the event, from a range of perspectives. Collectively, they provide a dynamic picture of the telling of the event.

The main question concerns how the event as demonstration is rendered through *protest* and *policing*. That focus can be further refined by looking at how the initial story is set up: how does the dichotomy function in pre-event stories that delineate the scope of the event, and in post-event front-page stories that gauge eventness. Accounts of eventness can be divided into a further two sections: first, front-page descriptions of *what happened*, and second, commentaries about the causes of *what happened*. These different stages facilitate narrative movement from pre-event definitions to the way in which eventness are assimilated into its broader news environment.

Delineating the scope of the event

The first three passages are pre-event, scene setting descriptions which give some indication of what this event will involve and what can be expected. They include detailed descriptions of pre-event preparations, either from protest or policing perspectives, or from both. Thus they indicate, in a very basic sense, how the police-protest dichotomy sketches out the scope of the event prior to any taking place. *Protest* and *policing* prefigure the telling of the event which has already begun to unfold in these terms despite the fact that ‘nothing has yet happened’.

City of London police are preparing for an influx of 10,000 demonstrators next Friday as part of a global day of protest coinciding with the Cologne summit of the Group of Seven industrialised nations. The City force has cancelled all leave and is joining the Metropolitan Police and British Transport Police to deal with the action, which may dwarf the Stop the City demonstrations in 1983 and 1984.²⁰⁴

The Rickshaw Freedom Riders left York yesterday. Cyclists and marchers from Edinburgh and Birmingham are on their way. On Sunday, following a rally in Trafalgar Square, a cargo of petitions left for Cologne where the G8 economic summit is being held this weekend. From as far afield as Angola, India and Zimbabwe, an expected 100,000 people will converge on Germany to put pressure on world leaders to cancel the unpayable debt of the poorest countries and question the economic trajectory of the world’s richest – highlighting the links between globalisation, poverty and environmental destruction. Direct action, human chains, petitions, parallel summits and loud calls for justice, equality, human rights and environmental protection

²⁰⁴ Clay Harris and Sathnam Sanghera, ‘City braced for 10,000 anti-business protesters’, *Financial Times*, 11th June 1999, p 9.

are now essential sideshows to the annual circus of the gathering of world leaders. This week will also see the healthy planet forum, a series of debates and discussions built around the European health and environmental ministers' meetings being held in London, and a carnival which aims to bring the City of London to a halt on Friday.²⁰⁵

Several large City banks have told staff to cancel all client meetings today, in preparation for a day of disruption as anti-capitalism campaigners take to the streets for a day of carnival-style protests in the Square Mile. The City Police force has suspended all leave for the day; officers from the Metropolitan police and British Transport police have also been put on standby and security at all financial institutions has been tightened. Pupils at one school in the heart of the City have been told to stay home. Campaigners' internet sites explain that a network of protest hopes to transform the financial centre into a large street party, as part of an international protest today marking the start of the G8 economic summit in Cologne.²⁰⁶

The stories portray something of *what will happen*, at least in terms of how what will eventually happen, will be accounted for. The first and third of these describe preparations by various policing agencies, including two regional forces and one transport division. In both cases there is initially more detail about the range of policing activities. The second passage depicts a complex of preparation activity, awareness-raising actions, events and events within events, all of which are later be simplified as *protest*. Read together, the excerpts highlight the pre-event multiplicity of the

²⁰⁵ Alice Lynch and John Vidal, 'Long trail of protest that leads to the G8 summit in Cologne', *The Guardian*, 16th June 1999, p 5.

²⁰⁶ Amelia Gentleman, 'City protest aims to make fat cats change their tune', *Guardian*, June 18th 1999.

forms and activities that constitute *protest* and *policing*. In contrast to post-event accounts of *what happened* this set of passages highlights some of the variation and diversity that is later condensed into the terms *protest* and *policing*:

Eventness

Later accounts are based on the simplification and bifurcation of diverse gatherings into camps of *protest* and *policing* as two relatively undifferentiated block forms. Detailed descriptions of the diverse forms of protest and policing as differentiated forms of action and activity in the above excerpts contrast with the subsequent focus on the interaction of protest and policing as two clearly demarcated actor group blocks. Rather than account for the variety or diversity of the main actor-groups, the next three excerpts are based on more fixed, definite notions of protest and policing that help highlight the nature of the happening as spectacular interaction. The following passages thus indicate a shift from narrating police or protest (forms, actions etc) to narrating police-protest interactions.

Violence flared in the City of London yesterday when protesters in a “Carnival Against Capitalism” suddenly attacked police with bricks, bottles and concrete blocks, then wrecked shops and office fronts. Four officers were injured and two protesters were run over by police vans from a total of 46 casualties. At times, officers seemed to have lost control of the crowds.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁷ Andrew Mullins and Terri Judd, ‘Police battle with rioters in the City’, *Independent*, 19th June 1999, p 1.

An anti-capitalist demonstration in the City of London deteriorated into violence yesterday as protesters pelted police with bricks and bottles and attacked financial institutions, causing widespread damage. Almost 50 people were taken to hospital during more than six hours of rioting and vandalism by up to 4,000 protesters. Two demonstrators were slightly injured after being knocked down by police vans.²⁰⁸

A long day of carnival and peaceful protest against world debt, the arms trade and financial institutions turned into a riot yesterday afternoon as demonstrators trashed a McDonald's, wrecked part of the Futures Exchange, set fire to a bank, and destroyed cars and empty flats in the City of London. In some of the worst public disorder since the 1990 Trafalgar Square poll tax riots, many people were injured as police used water cannon and baton-charged up to 2,000 mostly peaceful demonstrators on horseback.²⁰⁹

The discursive simplification of what in reality is a more complex convergence is of course an expected feature of mass disseminated news about political demonstrations. This enables a post-event focus on a certain no doubt newsworthy kind of interaction which becomes the linchpin of most all subsequent accounts. The paragraphs are fairly typical front-page statements in which a more simplified representation of the dichotomy now facilitates definition of the essence of the event or *eventness*. The only front-page variation on the police-protest theme appears in a *Times* article which provides unique insight into an event in which 'anarchists fought hand-to-hand battles with City traders'.²¹⁰ In all other cases *police* and

²⁰⁸ David Millward, George Trefgarne and Peter Foster, 'Mobs put City under siege', *Telegraph*, 19th June 1999, p 1.

²⁰⁹ John Vidal and Libby Brooks, 'Day the City turned into a battleground', *Guardian*, 19th June 1999.

²¹⁰ Adam Sherwin, Adrian Lee and Tim Reid, 'Anarchists in fistfights with City traders', *Times*, 19th June, 1999, p 1.

protest underlie the re-telling of conflicting interaction which almost always constitutes the essence or event-ness in print news definitions.

Notwithstanding the seriousness of the scenes of conflict and violence, the accounts show that rupture (in *police-protest relations*) is *what happened*. *x* or *what happened* is defined as *Violence flared, deteriorated into violence, and turned into a riot*. Since *police* and *protest* conflictual interaction is the essence of the event, it becomes the *sine qua non* of the iterative expansion of the event. Here the dichotomy can be said to function as a narrative convention in terms of its capacity to sequence or chronicle descriptions and accounts of *what happened*. This sequencing conforms to certain patterns that enable repetition. For instance the sequence of all three stories is simplified and reproduced thus: *x happened: when protesters in a "Carnival Against Capitalism" suddenly attacked police with bricks, bottles and concrete blocks; as protesters pelted police with bricks and bottles and attacked financial institutions, causing...; and as demonstrators trashed a McDonald's, wrecked part of the Futures Exchange, set fire to a bank, and destroyed... : x happened following (variously defined) protest actions; this was followed by (variously defined) police reactions*. The attributed causal pattern of precipitating interruption in the usual order of things appears to repeat as well as continue across discourse types. Causality can be inferred through the sequencing of accounts.

...narrative form, to paraphrase what Wittgenstein said of the logical form of a proposition, cannot be “said” but must be “shown” – in the narrative as a whole. We recognize that a narrative cannot be summarized, or restated as an inventory of conclusions or “findings”; not that conclusions may not be drawn, but if one asks for reasons for accepting or rejecting them, the answer is not simply a recital of pieces of evidence (of the sort that would be advanced to support a generalization), but rather the repetition of the way in which the narrative has ordered the evidence. The situation is not unlike the apocryphal story told of many composers, for instance of Schubert: when asked what a sonata he had just been playing “meant,” he responded only by sitting down and playing it again.²¹¹

Nevertheless as Mink suggests there is more to narratives than simply logical conjunction in which the only ordering relation is ... *and then ... and then ... and then ...*. For Mink narratives must also contain many ordering relations as well as ‘indefinitely many ways of combining these relations. It is such combination that we mean when we speak of the coherence of a narrative, or lack of it.’²¹² This is examined in more detail in the following section.

Narrative and causality

Commentaries appearing further away from the front pages of the same day’s press indicate a somewhat unusual (for the time) interest in new media and communications technology in terms of its role in the formation of police/protest conflict in the events of J18 (London). Instead of narratively restaging violent choreographies, the following more evaluative

²¹¹ Louis O. Mink, ‘Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument’, in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki, eds., *The Writing of History*, (Madison, WI, 1978), p 144.

²¹² Ibid, p 144

excerpts provide more detailed explanations about the causes of the spectacular interaction just described. These accounts build on and extend accounts of the causes of eventness that are represented in the front pages of June 19 stories:

The chaos yesterday on the streets of London was fomented by a previously unknown anarchist umbrella group, called J18 which used cyberspace to galvanise anti-capitalism protesters around the globe. The organisation's website advertised "a day of international action, protest and carnival against capitalism" and promoted events in 43 countries. The J18 group, named after yesterday's date, planned its worldwide protest to coincide with the start of the G8 Summit in Cologne. A campaign to remove debt from Third World countries was the touchstone but the aims of the organisation are far wider.²¹³

Yesterday's rioting in the City was a new departure for protest. Until now, there had been a standard *modus operandi* whether the protest was peaceful or riotous. Organisers rounded up people to demonstrate, and did so as publicly as possible. Yesterday's protest was different – and that difference was the Internet. Before the event the police were at a loss to predict numbers, route and even the cause itself. The organisers – a loose coalition known as Critical Mass – planned a series of demos across the world and were able to operate almost in secret thanks to the Internet. What started as a light-hearted demonstration soon, and perhaps inevitably, turned extremely nasty. That is worrying for the future. Those disaffected groups which rioted yesterday will not go away and will find it increasingly

²¹³ Adam Sherwin and Tracy Connor, 'Internet message was invitation to protest', *Times*, 19th June 1999, p4.

easier to organise thanks to these new advanced communication methods.

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The “Carnival Against Capitalism” posed particular problems for authorities because it was co-ordinated via the Internet. This meant it was difficult, if not impossible, for the police to estimate how many protesters might be involved, especially as the organisers declined to co-operate with police officers. ... Although the main Internet site was liable to crash due to the weight of visitors, the pages were replicated, or “mirrored” on many other websites throughout the world. One Internet expert said that global mirroring of the pages showed that whoever was behind the protest had organised it well. Throughout the day the site was updated as events and disturbances gained pace.²¹⁵

New media are identified as the main source of the disturbances and, again this represents a uniform causal pattern. The combination *protest* and *new media* identifies the main source of the disturbances. All the above posit new media as the main source of an apparently emergent breakdown of standard police-protest routines and a separation in the spaces in which protest and policing act and interact – again, certain patterns repeat through different types of discourse. News media reports across the board were remarkably unanimous in assigning the novelty of the event to the role of communications technologies in the co-ordination of *protest*.

The role of new media and the proliferation of mediation spaces becomes a common evaluative focus. In the first passage *cyberspace* is both a

²¹⁴ Editorial, ‘Net sparks City riot’, *Express*, 19th June 1999, p 10.

²¹⁵ Tom Sykes, ‘Protest hatched on the Internet’, *Telegraph*, 19th June 1999, p 5.

mobilising tool and space, in the second, the Internet becomes a fundamental way of operating (for *protest* or *protesters*), and in the third, 'co-ordination via the Internet' impedes standard pre-event police preparation procedures as well as enables a fast response, worldwide, protest, news updating system. The second passage best exemplifies a rapidly standardised formula of causality. Here 'rioting' is the consequence of a new sort of protest, itself the result of 'new advanced communication methods'. The combination of a new sort of *protest* and *new advanced communication methods* is the cause of an erosion transparency of channels of communication between protesters and police.

Although the Internet is mostly publicly available space it was, at the time, amid growing concerns, considered as cryptic, hidden territory. In this regard it is apt to note that: 'As often happens with analogies made between virtual and non-virtual spaces, meanings shift and the comparison can be seen to conceal as well as to reveal.'²¹⁶ Perceptions of wilful concealment may to some extent explain how the gatherings take a more sinister tone within policing and security discourses.

Equally, and from a different perspective, *the event* (as such) might be seen to have attracted so much news media attention as a result of some of the questions it raised about the role of established news media in the face of 'narrow cast' news and information that was understood to be so integral to this event. (This will be explored in more detail in the next two

²¹⁶ Tim Jordan and Paul Taylor, *Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels Without A Cause?* (London: Routledge, 2004), p 79.

chapters.) But it is perhaps due to a combination of these reasons that the J18 (London)-Internet association has remained one of the most remarkable or remarked upon features of *the event*.

Far from being isolated instances the last set of passages are three of a significant number that came to form an exceptionally swift news consensus that the Internet was a major contributory factor in the day's eventness. *The event* generates a significant number as well as range and variety of stories, between which there are also significant patterns of resemblance or 'family resemblances'.²¹⁷ The orienting focus on *protest* and *the Internet* then immediately raises other, related issues: since that combination is seen to exceed the capacities of the specialist, official control of public space, or public order policing, it immediately raises concerns about the public order and, by extension, the social order. *The event* is basically, initially and essentially read through police/protest conflict and then elaborated through a background order-change diametrical opposition. *The event* signifies a brief interruption in the usual order of things or a disruption in expectations about the usual order of things.

The role of protest and policing, not just as forms of action, but more specifically as symbols of *social change* and *social order* is especially important in at least three senses. First the social change-social order

²¹⁷ The idea of 'family resemblances' was developed by L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford, 1968), sections 66 and 67.

relation acts as a conceptual presupposition of the police-protest dichotomy:

while the structure of stories bodies forth a particular conceptual scheme necessary to any understanding of the story, there are also at a more general level conceptual presuppositions of the very idea of narrative form itself, and these supervene on its many varieties.²¹⁸

Second, the social change-social order relation indicates one of the ways in which the police-protest dichotomy derives coherence as a narrative device. The coherence of a narrative, or lack of, relates to the 'many ordering relations, and indefinitely many ways of combining these relations. It is such combination that we mean when we speak of the coherence of a narrative, or lack of it.'²¹⁹ Third, in terms of the iterative expansion of *the event*. The order-change relation also becomes significant in terms of the way in which (the telling of) a turbulent event begins to be assimilated into an ordering present.

Because [the event] is or creates surprise, its nature and structure are such as to be dispersed in the flow [*l'aléa*] of events, and, as a result, also in the flow of that which does not constitute an event and withdraws discreetly into the imperceptible continuum, into the murmur of "life" for which existence is the exception.²²⁰

²¹⁸ Louis O. Mink, 'Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument', in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki, eds., *The Writing of History*, (Madison, WI, 1978), p 133.

²¹⁹ Ibid, p 144.

²²⁰ Jean-Luc Nancy, 'The Surprise of the Event', *Being Singular Plural*, (California: Stanford University Press, 1993), p 175.

Assimilating the event into an ordering present

Speculation and debate about the Internet and society were still fairly new in the UK in the late 1990s, although there was a certain preoccupation with the Internet and communications technology in London in June 1999. More specifically, around the time of June 1999 the issue of the Internet was in news terms close to synonymous with the issue of its securitisation. The following two excerpts go some way towards jolting the memory on some of the main currents of these debates:

Chief officers will decide later this month whether to give the green light to plans for a National Computer Crime Investigation Unit. They are responding to concerns from senior officers investigating 'cybercrime' – the use of the internet to commit offences, in a trend that is predicted to escalate as millions of people in the UK get online.²²¹

A top-level report is proposing a special police unit dedicated to cracking down on computer crime, The Express can reveal. A National Criminal Intelligence Squad study – based on a three-year probe – expresses concern about the growing use of the Internet and other computer systems by criminals. It predicts an increasing number of offences involving hacking, commercial espionage, fraud, pornography and political sabotage.²²²

Prior to the event it was reported that 'The computer crimes unit of the Metropolitan police and the British Bankers Association met a few weeks [before the event] to discuss the threat of hackers targeting banks and

²²¹ Elaine Fogg, 'Inter//threat', *Police Review*, 25 June 1999, p 26.

²²² David Connett and Lucy Johnston, 'Computer squad to fight cyber crimewave', *Express*, June 22nd 1999, p 4.

other financial institutions.’²²³ These pre-event concerns and/or expectations then tallied with rumours that on June 18th **hacktivists had broken into LIFFE computer systems while protesters were erecting a breeze block wall outside the LIFFE building itself.** Unpublished research suggests that there were no reports of hacking, and that no servers were impounded by police.²²⁴ Nevertheless once fielded, the concerns about the Internet, hacking and so on, remained and continue to remain a definitive subtext of *the event*.

A sense of urgency around security about the Internet had begun to gather pace a year earlier, most visibly with the issuing of a draft statement at the G8 summit in Birmingham in 1998 outlining agreed specific measures to combat ‘cyber crime’. This followed warnings that ‘cyber crime’ ‘posed a global threat to society’.²²⁵ In the UK in June 1999, news, speculation and debate about the Internet and communications technology were increasingly geared to issues of policing, security, crime, the security of business organisations and the welfare of children. This forms some of the backdrop against which narrative construction of the ‘J18-Internet’ aspect of *the event* occurs. Since concerns were ongoing before the event, they cannot be said to have arisen wholly as a result of it. The narrative construction of the J18-Internet connection does not appeal directly to existing arenas of debate about the Internet; rather it filters them through *the event*.

²²³ June 18 1999 *Financial Times*.

²²⁴ Tim Jordan, unpublished research.

²²⁵ ‘Net closes on cyber criminals’, BBC News, online archive, 16 May 1998.

While there can be little doubt that new technologies have been crucial to the reinvention of protest forms and activities, as they have been for all manner of social, political, cultural and economic activities, what is at issue here is the way in which the discursive simplification of a vast and complex field – *protest* and *the Internet* – is tailored to or through the specific terms of *protest* and *policing*. And since the particularities of police-protest dynamics and relations are contingent on the sites within which they occur at any given time, the way this issue unfolds is specific to the spatiotemporal situation of London - June 1999.

In June 1999 the Internet was still widely considered uncharted territory and, by association, the province of peculiar or unfamiliar, innovatory and thus also potentially risky forms of activity. If *protest* is dissent through incompatibility with authorised definitions, this was compounded by the idea that it occurred in an ‘unauthorised’ or a yet to be authorised domain. In this sense it became *ultra protest*. In terms of the idea of *police-protest relations* this significantly contributes to the intensification of the referential order/disorder and dis/continuity antagonisms, that is, to the narrowing of conceptual presuppositions. It adds to the de-contestation of *protest* and *policing*.

3. CONTESTED ACTION

Viewed as a whole, the stories demonstrate something of how the event comes to be told over a number of days and weeks. *The event* continues to generate stories with a subsequent second wave of reporting following the release of the post-event police report on July 28. In addition to the two principal phases of post-event news reporting between late June and early July, there was an noteworthy intermediate period during which, newspapers, broadcast and other news media agencies came under pressure following the issuing of an order by City of London police, calling for material (including 'video footage, negatives, recordings of interviews and notes, taken during the demonstrations which led to violence on June 18'²²⁶) under the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act. Discussion and debate generated by this issue became something of an event in itself. This incident especially draws attention to the roles and responsibilities of different demonstration actor-groups, of which news media are one. For instance, one editorial suggested that although the police's ability to freely investigate crime, and the press's ability to freely report on what is going on in society, are two principles that can come into direct competition, it would nevertheless be both 'dangerous and wrong' to grant police free access to material:

The protests on June 18 began in a mild, good-natured way. Our own reporters chatted with the demonstrators about their views and the purpose of the event. Some spoke unattributably. Are we seriously supposed to hand over all these notes and identify the subjects of our interviews? The police application says we must. The investigation of crime counts more to a

²²⁶ Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Demand for riot footage 'would make media into police agents', *Guardian*, July 1, 1999.

policeman than the protection of sources. If we refuse or destroy the material we may be guilty of a contempt of court. The judge in the action (to which the Guardian is a party) must consider whether this sort of coercion is compatible with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the guarantees that gives to free speech.²²⁷

In all, nine newspapers and news media groups joined to fight and win a legal action at the Old Bailey on July 2nd 1999. A BBC reporter later made the following case about the media's continued ability to 'safely and independently cover important events', again highlighting the roles and responsibilities of the different actor groups that participate in public gatherings:

Newsgathering is a difficult task. The risks are part of the job. Day in and day out our reporters and crews find themselves in tricky and sometimes very fraught situations. Outside of the war zones of a Kosovo conflict, some of the most difficult events to cover are demonstrations and protests. They can be unpredictable, if they erupt they can be very fast moving and you can never be sure when a peaceful protest will spill over into violence right behind your back and you will become part of it. But what has become an increasing tendency in recent years has been for our news crews and journalists themselves to become the deliberate target of the demonstrators' anger. What can make this 10 times worse is when the crowd believes that our crews are gathering material for the police and are doing so routinely ... If we were to find ourselves regarded as police agents then there is little doubt that we would sooner or later have to withdraw

²²⁷ Leader comment, 'Dangerous and wrong', *Guardian*, as above.

from coverage of such protests and demonstrations. The safety and protection of our teams must be paramount.²²⁸

Mobilising imperatives

The second phase of post-event news coincided with the publication of an official inquiry by the retired Metropolitan Police assistant commissioner, Anthony Speed. July 29 news reports present a near reversal of June 19 evaluations which cite the combination of ‘protest’ with ‘new media and communications technologies’ as the main source of the disturbances or the main *happening*. In the second phase of reporting, various combinations of ‘police’ and ‘poor co-ordination’ underlie the dominant ‘police blamed’ theme. Post-event police reports cited difficulties in co-ordinating and communicating orders on June 18, some of which was attributed to technical communications failures, given, for instance, that officers were often forced to communicate on more than one radio channel during the operation. Following the report, senior City of London officers assumed responsibility for ‘weaknesses and errors of judgement’ that hindered police groups’ efforts to manage ‘disorder once it had occurred’.

An astonishingly open and honest report into the City of London Police’s failure to control this year’s riot is likely to put other chief officers under pressure to do the same, according to senior sources. The frankness of the report, and the fact that the result of an internal police inquiry has been made public just six weeks after the event, is unprecedented.²²⁹

²²⁸ Phil Harding, ‘No surrender’, *Guardian*, July 5th 1999.

²²⁹ Lucy Lawrence, ‘Riot report puts police chiefs under pressure’, *Evening Standard*, July 29th 1999, p

Senior officers in charge of policing an anti-capitalist riot in the City last month made bad decisions due to their inexperience in dealing with major disorder, a report said yesterday. The City of London Police's inability to cope with the scale of violence – which caused an estimated £2million worth of damage – exposed 'weaknesses and errors of judgement' by commanding officers, according to a report by former Metropolitan Police assistant commissioner Anthony Speed. Perry Nove, commissioner of the City force, accepted the criticism made in the review of the June 18 riot during the Carnival Against Global Capitalism and said the police's handling of pitched battles in London's financial centre was 'highly unsatisfactory'. 'The City of London Police accepts that a number of described weaknesses and some judgements exacerbated the difficulties of dealing with the very serious disorder once it had occurred,' he said.²³⁰

Poor decisions by inexperienced senior officers commanding the police operation during the anti-capitalist riots in central London last month led to a failure to control ferocious violence, a critical inquiry report said yesterday. "Generic weaknesses" in procedures and systems in City of London police's operation led to a series of wrong decisions in tackling lawlessness which caused an estimated £2m damage in the City, according to the damning report.²³¹

This second phase also focuses on what kinds of police measures are called for in the aftermath of *the event*. The issues raised in next two passages, for instance, follow the polled opinions of City-based business and work groups, and a City of London police response to the inquiry:

²³⁰ 'City police 'were out of their depth' during riot', *Metro*, July 29th 1999, p 16.

²³¹ Andrew Mullins and Jason Bennetto, 'Police blamed for failing in City riot', *Independent*, 29 July 1999, p 10.

Senior business leaders yesterday called for much tougher police action if security in the City of London is threatened by a repeat of last month's anti-capitalist riot, which left several police and demonstrators injured and caused £2m of damage. As a critical report of the police's handling of the demonstration on June 18 was published, a poll of financial leaders showed a majority were worried that the incident had damaged the City's standing as a world financial centre. More than half of those surveyed in a poll for Eversheds, the law firm, were not convinced that the authorities had reacted in a manner appropriate to the demonstration which had been well flagged on several internet sites and had started peacefully. Four out of five believed that a much more rigorous response would be needed in future.²³²

Britain is facing a new era of violent protests by anarchists and other fringe political movements, a police chief said yesterday. Perry Nove, City of London Commissioner, said last month's riots in Europe's leading financial centre were a taste of things to come – in London and elsewhere. He said the City was braced for another outbreak of disorder, with the first working day of the next century being touted as a possible date and with the Millennium Dome as an additional focus for the troublemakers. The riots of June 18 "signal a new era of violent protest, which has implications for the whole country and policing at a national level. "They reveal a level of planning and sophistication not seen before. The level of gratuitous violence and criminality was unprecedented, unprovoked and unforeseen."²³³

In contrast to the specific event sequences that supported commentary and reporting in the initial June 19 phase, later articles highlight forward-looking

²³² Lisa Buckingham, 'City calls for tough action against riots', *Guardian*, 29th July 1999, City pages.

²³³ Philip Johnston, 'City riot 'was taste of things to come'', *Daily Telegraph*, 29th July 1999, p 4.

and prescriptive actions. In the last two excerpts for instance a tougher police response is needed so as to prevent a repeat of the events that may have damaged to the City's reputation as an international business centre; and, 'a level of planning and sophistication not seen before' signals 'a new era of violent protests' by anarchists and other fringe political movements which calls for a national review of public order policing.

Since debates about appeals for measured police responses occur in the context of generic questions about police organisation and policing tactics, these too might be considered in terms of some of the surrounding circumstances of the events of June 18. During this period a number of options, including the merging of police forces, were being considered. According to the introduction of a *London Evening Standard* feature one month on from the publication of the post-event police assessment:

The City of London police force, overwhelmed by rioters in the anti-capitalist demonstration in June, is discussing with the Metropolitan police how to employ the Yard's superior force and expertise in dealing with any new threats to the Square Mile. Many observers believe such co-operation should become permanent with a merger of the two forces.²³⁴

A merger between the London Metropolitan and City of London police was said not to be high on the Home Office agenda at that time but the example shows how existing political debates – including questions about the enhancement of cross border co-operation (to be discussed in detail in

²³⁴ Justin Davenport, 'Under siege: future of the City's police', *Evening Standard*, August 23 1999, pp 18-9.

the next chapter) as well as some related concerns about compromising the particular strengths and fields of expertise of different regions and functions of police groups – were sometimes related to this particular case.

4. THE POLICE-PROTEST DICHOTOMY AS NARRATIVE DEVICE

The range of commentary during the June 18 period provides some insight into the dynamics of the news telling of *the event*. Within pre-event stories protest and policing prefigure the event. There are of course, many more forms of participating activity or agency. The focus on dichotomous action/interaction which runs through subsequent stories cuts out ‘extraneous noise’.

in a good story, to use Barthes’ image, all the extraneous noise or static is cut out. That is, we the audience are told by the story-teller just what is necessary to “further the plot.” A selection is made of all the events and actions the characters may engage in, and only a small minority finds its way into the story. In life, by contrast, everything is left in; all the static is there.²³⁵

News media account for the single event, bring about its eventness or simply tell it for mass dissemination. By the same token, complicated patterns underlie that telling. In the first spate of reporting a number of

²³⁵ David Carr, ‘Narrative and the Real World: An Argument for Continuity’, *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History*, (Vol. XXV, No. 2, 1986), p 123.

interpretive strands, associations and diametrical oppositions come into play.

Protest and *policing* structure the J18 London sequence of events in very specific ways. Taking the overall sequence of reporting as another example of this, it is possible to discern in these stories, various points in the event's 'before', 'during' and 'after' phases. In this case, pre-J18 stories mark out protest and policing as the main constitutive elements of the structuring scene of a pending event. June 19 stories refer to a subsequent rupture in these structuring elements, and later to the consequent (discursive) assimilation of 'the event' into an ordering present. The police-protest dichotomy therefore provides not only a position from which to explain and understand instances of the event as political demonstration, it also acts as an acute focus for rehearsing debates about continuities and discontinuities, orders and disorders, causes and effects. The June 18 London gatherings might be seen as a complex convergence of a wide range of perspectives and positions that are 'mediated' or brought into familiar conventions through a metaphorical cutting, simplification and regularisation, most notably along the lines of the police-protest dichotomy. In this regard the event becomes a highly concentrated focus for gathering concerns about social orders and social changes.

The examination of news stories of the case highlight a number of pertinent issues. If the pp dichotomy functions as a narrative form, from what does it derive coherence? 'One conceptual problem about narrative, therefore, is

to make explicit the criteria by which in fact we recognize a narrative as coherent or incoherent.'²³⁶ Certainly a basic requirement of a narrative is that it has a beginning, a middle and an end. This is most obviously the case in fiction: 'Fiction is essentially teleological – it moves in a linear way to a conclusion or terminus. Once the terminus is reached and expectation satisfied the novel is, in a sense, exhausted of meaning.'²³⁷ For a narrative form to qualify as such, however, it must conform to certain conventions. 'An acceptable story must first establish a goal, an event to be explained, a state to be reached or avoided, an outcome of significance, or more informally, a 'point';'²³⁸ it must place the events in an ordered arrangement, 'the most widely used contemporary convention is perhaps that of a linear, temporal sequence';²³⁹ and ideally it should provide an explanation for the outcome.

While the forms of action that characterise demonstration events (protest, policing, news media) are in some way contested, or at least rendered contestable through the event, the main initial, as well as recurring focus relates to the way in which anticipated dynamics of police-protest interaction are unsettled by (changes in) protest. Again the idea of reciprocal (police-protest) change designates a starting point and to a certain extent also a finishing point in explanations and understandings of the event as demonstration. Insofar as it demonstrates patterns of fixing

²³⁶ Ibid, p 134.

²³⁷ Martin Seymour-Smith, (1980) 'Origins and Development of the Novel', in M. Seymour-Smith, ed., *Novels and Novelists*, Windward, p 55.

²³⁸ Kenneth Gergen, 'Self-Narration in Social Life', *Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader*, M. Wetherell, S. Taylor, and S. J. Yates, eds (London: Sage, 2001), p 250.

²³⁹ Ibid, p 251

starting points and moving towards a terminus, the dichotomy can be said to exhibit some characteristics of narrative. It represents a story, description, or explanation about the initiating causes and subsequent effect of observable change in police-protest dynamics.

Together with *protest-disorder* stories, the standard *protest-change* associative links portray a complex of volatile hyper change scenarios that especially bolster contingency-planning and enacting imperatives, as the second major reporting phase suggests. The focus on how protest has changed is followed by a period of analysis and reflection on existing police measures, which then leads to recommendations for changes in existing police measures, commensurate with a consensus on how protest has changed, which are then endorsed by policing and security claims about ‘a new era of violent protests’ which necessitates a major national review of public order policing. In this way, existing generic *policing-order-continuity* dictums find new directions and wider support through their diametrical association with *protest-disorder-change*. Thus post-event press representations of *the event* rely on relatively fixed notions of *protest* and *policing* in which the word-concept relation is tightened.

Regardless of the particular site that focuses different questions about pp dynamics, a recurring theme or assumption is that contemporary instances of observable pp dynamics are indicative of a spatial disjuncture, one through which other binary relations become complicated and unsettled. Nevertheless, one issue here is that the idea of police-protest relations

petitions the analyst to make a number of assumptions. The June 18 London gatherings provide a focus through which to explore both the issue of the reinvention of demonstration forms and the concomitant absorption of improvisations into normative concerns about 'the problem of social change'. Insofar as the issue is cast as a problem of social change it is by implication also a problem of (the restoration of a 'natural') social order.

The issue is not simply one about whether or the extent to which the police-protest dichotomy underlies the capacity to tell the event, but also about whether, and the extent to which it produces patterns and regularities in the ways in which *the event* can be told. Moreover, does it lead to a 'standard pre-eminent description' of *the event*?

it is clear that we cannot refer to events as such, but only to events *under a description*; so there can be more than one description of the same event, all of them true but referring to different aspects of the event or describing it at different levels of abstraction. But what can we possibly mean by "same event"? Under what description do we refer to the event that is supposed to sustain different descriptions? It seems that the ordinary use of the term "event" presupposes both an already existing division of complex processes into further irreducible elements, and some *standard* description of each putative event; then, to say that there are different descriptions of the "same" event is to say that they are selected from or inferred from that standard pre-eminent description.²⁴⁰

²⁴⁰ Louis O. Mink, 'Narrative Form as a Cognitive Instrument', in R. H. Canary and H. Kozicki, eds., *The Writing of History*, (Madison, WI, 1978), pp 145-6.

To a certain extent the dichotomies can be described as 'semic pairs'. For Barthes, *semes* essentially work through connotation rather than denotation, although connoted meanings tend to be specific to the context of a story rather than inherent in the general usage of the word(s).²⁴¹

Moreover, patterns of explanation recur across discourse types, in analytic as well as non-analytic discourses. The supplementary explanatory function of the movement/fixity opposition, order/change, continuity/discontinuity recurs throughout. The patterns of explanation do not only occur in accounts that follow changes in the dynamics of police-protest interaction in successive progression from site to site, they also function to support narrative progression in stories about one site. If the dichotomy functions as a narrative device it is not in the sense that 'the storyteller knows the plot', but because as a narrative convention, the police-protest pairing implies a plot, a sequence and conceptual presuppositions.

For Ricoeur, narrative is necessarily semantic innovation: instead of describing the world, it re-describes it. If *the demonstration* designates one aspect of *the event*, it does so through a particular definition, that is, through 'protest and policing'. In the case observed here, the police-protest dichotomy functions as a narrative device in two related ways: on the one hand, it represents a point at which to anchor descriptions of *the surprise of the event*, of the event as interruption. On the other hand, (the surprise

²⁴¹ Frank Whitehead, 'Roland Barthes's Narratology' *The Cambridge Quarterly* (Vol. XX1, No. 1, 1992).

of) *the event* is such that it also represents a change/interruption in the initially grounding organising principle, that is, in the idea of 'police-protest relations'. Hence, while the police-protest dichotomy represents June 18 (London) as eventful demonstration, it can only do so by interrupting itself as a mode of interpretation.

From another perspective, can the police-protest dichotomy be so simply reduced to a narrative device? David Carr for instance observes a reductionism in the assertion that narrative behaves as a 'cognitive instrument', and insists on the continuity between narrative and reality. For Carr the reductionist position resides in the assumption that:

Narrative structure, particularly the closure and configuration given to the sequence of events by a story's beginning, middle, and end, is a structure derived from the act of telling the story, not from the events themselves.²⁴²

Carr's position is that:

Narrative is not merely a possible successful way of describing events; its structure inheres in the events themselves. Far from being a formal distortion of the events it relates, a narrative account is an extension of one of their primary features.²⁴³

The issue as it concerns us here is whether 'protest and policing' becomes a way of structuring accounts, or *seeing as*, or whether the seeing, and the recurring patterns of seeing, correspond to the reality of the relation and/or interaction between protest and policing forms.

²⁴² David Carr, 'Narrative and the Real World: An Argument for Continuity', *History and Theory: Studies in the Philosophy of History*, (Vol. XXV, No. 2, 1986), p 118.

²⁴³ *Ibid*, p 117.

To address this issue it will be useful to refer to the start of Nancy's investigation of the *Surprise of the Event* which begins with the following quote from Hegel:

*[P]hilosophy is not meant to be a narration of happenings but a cognition of what is true in them, and further, on the basis of this cognition, to comprehend that which, in the narrative, appears as a mere happening [or pure event – Trans].*²⁴⁴

Jean-Luc Nancy reads this sentence from the *Science of Logic* in different ways, starting with what can be taken as a canonical interpretation, in which 'the task of philosophy is to *conceive* that of which the event is only the phenomenon'. More precisely:

For philosophy, there is first of all the truth that is contained in what happens, and then, in light of this truth, the conception of its very production or effectuation, (putting into force or operation), which appears from the outside as an "event, pure and simple (*bloss*)" exactly because it is not conceived. On this account, the event-ness of the event [*événementialité de l'événement*] (its appearance, its coming to pass, its taking place – *das Geschehen*) is only the external, apparent and inconsistent side of the effective presentation of truth. The advent of the truth as real, which is contained in the concept, disqualifies the event as a simple, narrative representation.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴ G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Science of Logic*, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1989), p 58, op. cit. J-L Nancy, 'The Surprise of the Event', *Being Singular Plural* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p 159.

²⁴⁵ Jean-Luc Nancy, 'The Surprise of the Event', *Being Singular Plural* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p 160.

On Nancy's reading, 'the logic of the concept' does not amount to a logic of the category (as in Kant), but to a 'logic of "the identity of the concept and the thing"'.²⁴⁶ It is the relation between the police-protest dichotomy as the concept and the police-protest dichotomy as the thing that is of interest here. Is the police-protest dichotomy is ontological and conceptual, or is there a necessary interaction between both dimensions?

The dichotomy acts as an organising principle, as a way of organising accounts about the dynamics of police-protest interaction. Within an 'eventful' demonstration such as this, the police-protest pairing provides an immediate way of accessing or making accessible some of the primary features of the event. But the pairing is, to a certain extent, an inbuilt explanatory device which precedes the event and which neutralises any question about the novelty or change of an event of that kind. When considering what is involved in re conceptualising contemporary police-protest relations, the question about the relation between the ontological and conceptual dimensions of the dichotomy is especially important.

On the other hand, while political demonstration is an historically developed and region-specific 'type' of event, it must, like any other form, be predisposed to reinvention. June 18th marks a point at which it becomes possible and also necessary to reflect on notable innovations in the timing and spacing of both forms. A particular obstacle to this, as descriptions and explanations in press and other discourses show, is that the modular forms

²⁴⁶ Ibid, p 160.

of 'protest' and 'policing' become indistinguishable from the temporal forms of 'protest' and 'policing' as *movement* and *stasis* (through their respective association with notions of social *movement* and the *state*). To what extent does the dichotomy presuppose or even impose solutions on this question?

Chapter 4

The decision of the event

1. FROM SURPRISE TO DECISION

The previous chapter considered how the police-protest dichotomy functions as a standard narrative device. The bifurcation of gatherings into camps of protest on the one hand and policing on the other minimises the complexity of the event thus resolving the problem of *what happened*. Accounts of the event as demonstration revolve around what police and protesters did or did not do, and note the sequences of action and interaction. However, definitions and explanations of what happened inhere in protest and policing as concrete forms of action, protest and policing are also generic terms that also refer to modes of action, (to order or to keep order, to move, to resist, to enforce and so on). Form and modality are interwoven so that each term carries a set of adjacent meanings (for instance *protest-movement-change* and *policing-order-continuity*).

The juxtaposition or, more frequently, the counterposition of *protest* and *policing*, inevitably reinforces this form-modality relation. A sense of some characteristic dynamic, some characteristic exchange, or interchange emerges in the very process of counterposing the two terms. The counterposition begins to tell a story before and after the taking place of any event. In this regard, the explanatory potential of the dichotomy is

routine and habitual. Moreover the dichotomy is self-referential. It is an explanation that does not need to explain itself. It does not simply function as a reference or an interpretive guide, one through which it is possible to describe, interpret, explain and understand an event like June 18 (London), but it significantly determines what it is possible to say about this kind of event. The two-fold theme that this chapter tries to develop and explore concerns how the event places strain on the dichotomy as an evaluative framework, and how that framework precludes other possible ways of understanding the event.

Events are essentially indeterminate, and as an event of a certain kind, the political demonstration can be seen and told, acted on and reacted to from any number of perspectives, interests, forms of agency and so on, without it ever being possible to finally determine *what happened*. The police-protest dichotomy provides a partial solution to this problem by managing the characteristic complexities of this (kind of) event. To the extent that it is invoked as a way of resolving the *x* or the undecidability of the event, the dichotomy acts as a decision or as the framework of decision. This relation between event and decision or event and eventness more generally can be further considered with reference to Jacques Derrida's work. Derrida states that:

The *aporia* of the *event* intersects with, but also capitalizes or overdetermines, the *aporia* of *decision* with regard to the *perhaps*. There is no event, to be sure, that is not preceded and followed by its own *perhaps*,

and that is not as unique, singular and irreplaceable as the decision with which it is frequently associated, notably in politics. But can one not suggest without a facile paradox, that the eventness of an event remains minimal, if not excluded, by a decision?²⁴⁷

In terms of the (type of) event being considered here, an impasse is quickly reached: whilst the dichotomy helps manage the characteristic complexity of the event as demonstration, it significantly determines and therefore limits what can be said about it. If it is possible to go beyond restating and rehearsing the mundane contradiction that the police-protest dichotomy provides a solution to the indeterminacy and essential contestability of the demonstration event at the same time as it determines and therefore limits what might be said about it, it is necessary to consider in detail how decisions about the event are made and how eventness is brought about.

Any number of decisions about this event can and have been made but policing represents an exemplary point of the decision of the event-as-demonstration. In this regard, policing becomes a focal point of the police-protest dichotomy as the framework for decision. One reason for this is that public order policing is a specialism in the control of public space which operates on the basis of accumulated information about what this kind of event or what the event-as-demonstration ordinarily entails. Information about dis/orders and de/stabilisations gathered from prior instances of similar and even dissimilar events²⁴⁸ forms something like a portfolio of techniques, experience and expectations. These expectations significantly

²⁴⁷ Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, (London: Verso, 1994), p 68.

²⁴⁸ For instance, techniques involving the policing of large gatherings like those at football matches have also been implemented in the policing of public political gatherings.

inform public order policing so that if an event does surprise, police knowledge represents a reliable gauge of how such expectations have been exceeded. Since this kind of policing is publicly accountable it is also expected that police will assume responsibility for determining *what happened*. If the event does surprise or unsettle, that disruption must be brought into being, discovered, invented and decided.

Since public ordering practices, discourses and performances are significantly based on accumulated information about what the event-as-demonstration ordinarily entails, they are also significantly based on expectations about how 'police-protest relations' usually work. Policing represents just one, albeit one focal evaluation point. The aim here is to look at the dichotomy as a decision-making framework. Policing discourses sharpen and clarify the way in which the dichotomy functions as an evaluative device. How does the police-protest dichotomy inject certainty into indeterminacy in the case of J18 (London), or how does it act to de/stabilise June 18 (London) as a specific moment (and place)? What is the nature of this passage from undecidability to a decision? Having considered the dichotomy as an evaluative device the chapter will consider how it also limits the possibilities of engaging with the complexities for which J18 (London) is especially noted.

The current chapter shifts the emphasis from the June 18 *surprise of the event*, based on newspaper reports, to the July 28 *decision of the event*, based on the publication of a post-event police report. It considers the determinacy of police-protest dichotomous discourse from policing

perspectives so as to sharpen the focus on the role and function of the mode of decision (the interpretive dichotomy) at the point of decision (the post-event report). Part of the utility of this is that it provides a specific focus on the question of the particularity of the event; on how and why this event is unique. The previous chapter provides some sense of how the event comes to be regarded as a particularity. How also is it then regarded as exceptional? As Derrida suggests 'There is no event, to be sure ... that is not as unique, singular and irreplaceable as the decision with which it is frequently associated'. What then is the characteristic singularity of the decision that is frequently associated with J18 (London), and what can the uniqueness of the decision suggest about the uniqueness of the event as demonstration?

The initial police conclusions on this case indicate not only the particularity but also the exceptionality of the event. If the event as demonstration has significantly exceeded its usual terms of reference, how is this excess claimed, decided and brought into being? The *Executive Summary* of the post-event police report advised that:

The demonstration signals a new era or violent protest, which has implications for the whole country, and for policing at a national level. The events of June 18 reveal a level and sophistication of planning not seen before.²⁴⁹

This is the passage around which many if not most the second phase of newspaper reports (described in the previous chapter) revolved. Coverage

²⁴⁹ *Carnival Against Global Capitalism 18th June 1999*, Executive Summary. (See Appendix 2).

tended to focus on several of the concluding paragraphs of the twenty seven-page document²⁵⁰ so that in approaching the issue from news reports it is not always clear how the contents of the extensive report lead to these particular conclusions. The aim here is to consider how these claims are made and supported through dichotomous police-protest discourse from policing perspectives so as to consider how it might be possible to move past the impasse noted above.

2. THE CONTEXT OF PUBLIC ORDER DECISIONS IN LONDON

The *Initial Examination* of June 18 (London) can be located within a more general field of police expectations about the dynamics of protest and policing that ordinarily characterise demonstrations. In order to account for the issues leading to the police report's initial conclusions it is necessary to consider the general context in which police decisions about such events are made. The aim in what follows is to briefly outline the general evaluative field that informs police assessments of demonstration events. This will provide a useful reference through which to review the report's initial conclusions about the particular case.

Police expectations that are built up from cumulative experience and information form part of what or what Donatella della Porta terms *police knowledge*. For della Porta, an element that intervenes

between the "reality" of the situation and police action [is] the perception that the police have of disturbances, of the techniques at their disposal, and

²⁵⁰ The general absence of fuller coverage of a highly consequential report which is difficult to obtain via public access,* is perhaps an inevitable result of the pressures of having to submit copy to deadlines.

*Repeated efforts to obtain a copy of the report for this research from police agencies were ultimately unsuccessful.

of the requests that come from outside their ranks. These perceptions make up part of what can be called *police knowledge*, a term that refers to the images held by the police about their role and the external challenges they are asked to face.²⁵¹

Public order action and tactics are usually considered within national contexts and Della Porta's study of *Police Knowledge and Protest Policing* is specific to the Italian case. Peter Waddington's research provides a helpful reference for the case being considered here since it specialises on public order policing in the UK and London in particular.²⁵²

Based on Waddington's account several themes initially emerge as the main, basic features of police expectations about demonstrations in London. These include expectations about 'established protesting sites', 'unofficial standard routes', and pre-event negotiation between police and the organisers of a demonstration. Informal rules that develop within particular localities emerge through time as a result of repeated repertoires of police-protest interaction from which demonstrations derive time-space-specific characteristics. Although expectations, implicit rules and conventions are informal they significantly inform public order activities. Waddington's account shows that demonstrations in London involve familiar routes, routines and procedures, meeting or assembly points and finishing points so that, 'When protesters meekly assemble at one of the commonly used assembly places and proceed along one of the "standard

²⁵¹ D. Della Porta, in D. Della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., 1998: 229.

²⁵² P. A. J. Waddington has a number of relevant publications notably *Liberty and Order: Public Order Policing in a Capital City* (London: UCL Press, 1994). The context outlined here will focus on one article entitled *Controlling Protest* (in D. della Porta and H. Reiter, eds., 1998, pp 117-140), since it provides a condensed version of the relevant points and also since the publication date is closest to the date of the case being considered here.

routes” to a rally at a frequently used location, they confirm that this is what protest means in the contemporary British context.’²⁵³ Standardised protest then combines with the police aim of enhancing control and minimising disruption to confirm what ‘a successful and *peaceful* demonstration of dissent’²⁵⁴ is. Confrontation with protesters, what Waddington calls “dying in a ditch”, is a last resort that is only considered ‘when all else fails’.²⁵⁵

So as to avoid this, part of the police role is to make decisions about what kind of demonstration is likely to go ahead based on available information that helps establish what might be likely to happen. The three themes noted above are especially important in this regard. In terms of the first point Waddington explains that:

Almost all ... major public order operations are concentrated within central London and focus on established protest sites, notably Trafalgar Square and Hyde Park. Responsibility for policing these operations is equally concentrated on a relatively small coterie of officers at the Public Order Branch of Scotland Yard and the Special Events Office at the headquarters of the police “area” responsible for central London.²⁵⁶

In addition, contingency planning for such events typically occurs on the assumption that protest groups will follow one of the unofficial but standard routes: ‘Protest marchers obligingly follow a set of unofficial “standard

²⁵³ Ibid, p 130.

²⁵⁴ Ibid, p 131.

²⁵⁵ Ibid, p 125.

²⁵⁶ P. A. J. Waddington (1998) ‘Controlling Protest’, in Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies* (University of Minnesota Press), p 118.

routes” and comply with police requests to minimize traffic dislocation.’²⁵⁷

Thirdly, there are expectations about pre-event negotiation:

Once negotiation begins, the aim of the police is to “win over” the negotiator so that the demonstration is conducted as far as possible in accordance with police wishes. Thus, negotiations are conducted with the amicability and good humour that would seem more appropriate to arranging a loan from a bank. Organizers are greeted with smiles and handshakes, those present are introduced, previous experiences are reminisced and mutual acquaintances recalled, refreshment is offered, jokes are exchanged and favors done.²⁵⁸

Pre-event negotiation is a vital aspect of public order preparation and contingency planning; so much so, the author notes, that police have been known to facilitate protest gatherings even at the expense of ‘antagonizing others, including those in positions of authority.’²⁵⁹ A protest event that was planned to mark the first anniversary of the poll tax demonstrations of March 1990 is cited as one instance in which police decided to ‘circumvent political attempts to impede or ban the holding of the demonstration.’ Despite having been ‘pressed to do so by local authorities, members of Parliament, and the government’,²⁶⁰ police refused to ban or scupper plans for the march so as to observe the primary objective of minimising the likelihood of disorder, which was considered to be high at the time:

Banning the march would simply increase the sense of grievance and marginalize the organizers. Resisting pressure to ban the march would give the protest a structure and focus that the police could use to minimize the

²⁵⁷ Ibid, p 120.

²⁵⁸ Ibid, p 120.

²⁵⁹ Ibid, p 121.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

threat of disorder. At least, knowing where protesters would assemble and from where they would disperse allowed the police to make their contingency plans.²⁶¹

An additional, crucial factor which emerges later on in Waddington's account relates to expectations about protest groups:

Institutional pressures are reflected in the stereotypes and attitudes that police officers routinely express about protest and protesters. "Ordinary decent protesters" and "professional protesters" abide by the unwritten rules of institutionalized protest. As such, they can be relied on not only to be peaceful but to enter into dialogue with the police and arrive at a mutual accommodation. "The opposition" of hard left and anarchist groups not only threatens violence but rarely "plays the game". Groups like OutRage! also belong to "the opposition" because, despite their commitment to non-violence, they challenge the police and refuse to restrict their forms of protest to the parameters of institutional boundaries. In some respects, OutRage! is more trouble than the hard left, since its "stunts" are so innovative that the police find it impossible to anticipate what they might do next.²⁶²

The passage need not necessarily suggest that police take a moralistic or political view toward demonstrators and their goals; rather it indicates a practical preference for working with groups that will operate in a way that facilitates contingency planning. Throughout Waddington's account there is an emphasis on the way in which standardised protest reduces contingencies. Thus 'Police actively seek to institutionalize protest because

²⁶¹ Ibid, pp 121-2.

²⁶² Ibid, pp 129-130.

that enhances control' and because 'The norms associated with legitimate protest minimize disruption'.²⁶³ The minimisation of factors that might reduce the ability to anticipate *what might happen next* is an important if not essential part of public order policing. It is in this regard that standardised protest is considered as legitimate protest.

To a certain extent, the practical task of categorising protest reflects the aims of expectations about established protest sites, routes and pre-event negotiation. The extent to which these requirements/expectations are met will reflect on the police perception of the kind of protest that will be involved. Within a general field of police expectations the dichotomy functions more as a more fixed guideline as well as a relatively formal evaluative framework. The three or four expectations that form some of the context of public order preparation, assessment and evaluation also set out a very particular version of 'police-protest relations' and how they are ordinarily expected to operate in demonstrations.

3. THE LIVERPOOL STREET STARBURST

The initial post-event police examination can be understood with reference to this more or less informal model of police expectations. In particular the three or four main themes elaborated in the above account help orient the contents of the police report. Even before reviewing the report, it is immediately obvious that the case being considered here exceeds precisely the kinds of routine and practice that police have come to expect of

²⁶³ Ibid, p 130.

demonstrations in London. The gatherings were multi-issue gatherings that were not situated or directed at the symbols and icons of political power and the state but were assembled in the financial district of the capital. As well as disrupting expectations that protest gatherings necessarily assemble under a ruling category, the events disrupted expectations about the conventional assembly points and procession routes that have become emblematic of demonstrations in London. Not only did participants assemble at Liverpool Street Station,²⁶⁴ but the gatherings also diverged to form four smaller groups which took at least as many routes to re-converge (in most cases) at the site of the LIFFE building which became 'a convenient geographical and symbolic focus for many of the protest factions.'²⁶⁵ The following passage provides a succinct description of the scene:

The demonstration in London involved four gigantic puppet heads each of which played music. Masks were handed out in four colours, that matched colours associated with each head, and on which were printed both reasons for the demonstration and a quote from an unnamed guerrilla (who was in fact Subcomandante Marcos). The playing of the theme from *Mission Impossible* signalled those with each coloured mask to follow their head. Eluding and confusing police, they met up again in front of the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE) which was literally walled in behind a quickly built brick wall. This symbolised the

²⁶⁴ This is significant in itself as the site falls outside the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Police area. City of London Police, the group responsible for policing in the Square Mile of the City of London, has rarely been expected to deal with demonstration gatherings.

²⁶⁵ 'A Conversation', <http://www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/MerlinCarpenter/protest.htm>, (December, 1999).

rejection of finance capital by focusing on a futures exchange, where trades essentially bet on the future prices of commodities.²⁶⁶

In policing terms the difficulties that issued from the non traditional meeting point were compounded by the fact that dispersed processions relocated from that point to a symbolic, if unconventional site. The police report recounts some of the details in the following:

Most made their way towards Liverpool Street Station where numbers built up substantially from 11am onwards. There was a lot of noise but it appeared to be more of a party atmosphere, although it was seen that many of the demonstrators wore carnival masks. It later transpired that these masks were handed out locally and that instructions had been printed on the inside of the masks. At 1.20 pm a group of approx. 600 moved from Bishopsgate south in Middlesex Street towards Aldgate. At the same time a second group of approximately 2000 moved south in Bishopsgate. This group split at Bishopsgate by Threadneedle Street with approx. 600 turning into Threadneedle Street towards the Bank and the rest continuing along Bishopsgate and turning right into Cornhill. At approximately 12.30 pm a third group moved from the area of MacDonalds in Liverpool Street south into Old Broad Street and turned right into London Wall going west. As these groups moved away from Liverpool Street Station a very high degree of organisation became apparent and overt disorder began to occur.²⁶⁷

According to the report two particular matters of concern became apparent at the point of the Liverpool Street Station dispersal which occurred between 12.30 and 1.30 pm – ‘a very high degree of organisation’ and

²⁶⁶ Tim Jordan and Paul A.Taylor, *Hacktivism and Cyberwars: Rebels Without a Cause?*, (London: Routledge, 2004), p 59.

²⁶⁷ *Initial Post-Event Summary*, Report of Commissioner of Police (23rd July 1999), points 6.4 - 6-7

‘overt disorder’. Thus the self-organised dispersal and multi-directional procession from Liverpool Street Station became an acute focus of concerns about a destabilisation in the usual terms of ‘police-protest relations’. Although the issues of organisation and disorder are inextricably linked within the report, it will be useful to initially focus on each of these issues individually as far as possible. Using the three or four main themes detailed above as a guideline for reading the initial report, the matter of organisation can be considered in relation to the issue of established sites, routes and pre-event negotiation; and police perceptions of disorder can then be considered in relation to the classification of protest, which emerged as a particular problem in the case of J18 (London).

The reasons why the protest was considered to be highly organised are reasonably clear, if only from the broad consensus that emerged from June 19 newspaper reports. By contrast, although the initial post-event report is definite in its designation of the protest as such,²⁶⁸ the reasoning behind this assessment is less clear. The second item of the report, *pre-event planning and preparation*, provides some of the clearest indications for why this protest was considered to be particularly organised:

[2.9] Some information about the day was placed on a web-site on the Internet including a list (and map) of 116 places and/or companies where demonstrators might wish to protest. [2.10] The existence of the list was carefully considered during the pre-event planning and a number of

²⁶⁸ The claim that the protest was considered to be highly organised occurs in several places in the police report itself. For instance: ‘The degree and nature of organisation by these groups of demonstrators must now be anticipated and planned for on every occasion’ (13.2), and ‘The City-wide demonstration on 18th June revealed a level and sophistication of planning not previously seen at similar demonstrations before’ (15.2).

premises were identified as potentially being more attractive to demonstrators than others. It should be emphasised that the refined list of premises was arrived at by an intellectual exercise and that no information existed which might confirm or deny this thinking. [2.11] At the time of reporting it is not known definitively who all the different organisers of the demonstration are. Most probably they include a number of individuals in some of the more extremist protest groups as distinct from a single individual or caucus. At least 33 separate protest groups were either present or had expressed an intention or interest in joining the protest on the day. [2.12] Importantly no information existed to identify (a) the ultimate point of focus of the demonstration (b) the tactical plan(s) of the organisers (c) that a violent criminal assault on premises (of the nature and scale of the assault on the LIFFE building) was planned or likely.²⁶⁹

In 2.9 the posting of information about the protest on a web site constitutes an announcement of the intention to assemble, but also an absence of face-to-face discussion, and hence a bypassing of anticipated pre-event negotiation process. Since there was no discussion police could not know in advance which of the 116 places might become demonstration sites.

It is clear, if only from news media reports, that the designation of this protest as highly organised is mostly obviously associated with the use of the Internet. For instance:

The demonstration posed unique problems for police because the organisers had used the internet to rally support. [Although] 'the organisers ... declined to cooperate with police ... the website did give detailed information on

²⁶⁹ 2-9 - 2.12.

where and when the protesters should gather ... A detailed online map noted the location of merchant banks, exchanges and law firms. 'It was a very sophisticated website,' said the [City of London Police] spokesman.²⁷⁰

The post-event report clearly associates computer-mediated communication with the lack of pre-event negotiation and the consequent imprecision of available forward intelligence. Yet whilst the Internet becomes a way of focussing what is regarded as an absence or inadequacy of available information (i.e. about intended assembly points, procession routes, demonstration sites and so on), it also appears to become a symbol of networked organisation and, by extension, of high organisation'. In this context, 'Internet organisation' comes to signify a major cause of how and why protest reneges on the informal rules of police-protest relations. In this regard, points 2.9 and 2.10 of the report are closely related.

The association between the Internet and the lack of available information, or the Internet and protest organisation is identified as a pre-event cause. In terms of the day itself, and the self-organised multi-directional dispersal from Liverpool Street, the Commissioner indicates elsewhere how and why this protest was considered to be organised. Mr Nove is quoted as stating that the handing out of masks with printed instructions to follow a designated colour 'gave the organisers a high degree of control',²⁷¹ and that the protesters were able to put the Liverpool Street starburst into action with the aid of another sort of communication device: 'Using mobile

²⁷⁰ Elain Fogg, 'Officers injured as police clash with protesters', *Police Review*, (25 June 1999), p 5.

²⁷¹ Max Wilkinson, 'The Changing Face of Protest: Idealists or Subversives?', *Financial Times*, July 31, 1999

phones they created a “starburst”²⁷² in which groups of protesters moved in different directions, creating confusion for the police.’²⁷³ Thus, although it is difficult to precisely specify the reasons this protest was thought to be well or highly organised, the theme that runs through police evaluations almost always involves the combination of information technologies and ‘diversionary tactics’.

J18 protests disrupted expectations of linearity of marches and routes, it disrupts the expectation that protest gatherings will assemble under a ruling category, a delimited set of goals and aims with a clear set of claims or demands. Crucially it also disrupted expectations about the assembly points, and therefore the targets of contentious claims. The re-siting of a public political gathering in London’s financial district and the dispersed processions from one site to another constitute a departure from familiar routines, which then becomes a focus of initial police decisions about the event.

A breakdown in the usual terms of police-protest relations, which ultimately materialises as police-protest violence and disorder, is seen to occur somewhere between Liverpool Street and the LIFFE building. More specifically the point of the appearance of such a rupture is identified by the events at Liverpool Street in what was aptly termed a starburst. This represents a crucial point at which the particularity of the event is brought

²⁷² The term *starburst* does not appear in the text of City of London Police Commissioner’s report but since it is attributed to him it is possible that the term was mentioned verbally at the press meeting or at a later interview with news media. (This article refers to statements made by Mr Nove on July 30, two days after the release of the report.)

²⁷³ Max Wilkinson, 1999.

into being. It details what is seen as a breakdown of the informal rules that ordinarily characterise police-protest relations in London demonstrations, a breakdown in the usual terms of police-protest relations.

The conclusions of the *Initial Examination* are as follows:

15.1 The Citywide demonstration on 18th June revealed a level and sophistication of planning not previously seen at similar demonstrations before.' 15.2 All dialogue with police before the event was avoided to prevent discussion and agreement about routes, numbers and martial. The many (relatively) peaceful elements in the crowd were used to mask the violent intentions of the extremists. 15.3 A number of diversionary tactics were used in conjunction with significant information published on the Internet before the event. These had the effect of dispersing police resources. Some false emergency calls were received during the disorder and were probably intended to have the same effect.

The passage comprises an overall summary point (15.1), a general point (15.2) and a point that is specific to the case (15.3). Point 15.2 reflects concerns about the anticipated negotiation process. The first part of 15.2 (the second part will be examined in detail in the next section) is a general point which in principle could be applied to any number of episodes but the subsequent item, 15.3, specifies the problems and concerns raised in 15.2. It is a statement on the specificity of the event. 15.1 is an overall summary that prefaces claims the first two claims. The protest was not restricted 'to the parameters of institutional boundaries', which made it difficult for police to anticipate *what might happen next* or *what protesters might do next*. The use of information technology heightens the problem of

diversionary tactics as well as contributes to the designation of protest as highly or well organised.

4. SECURITY AND ORDER

Point 2.11 highlights several issues, including the concern that it was not definitively known who all the different organisers of the demonstration were. It acknowledges the presence of a number of groups and a number of organisers, as well as the inability to identify them. 2.12 summarises the points adding that 'violent criminal assaults' on buildings were pre-planned.

The prominent use of variations on the term 'highly organised' is significant not least because it is most identified with criminal activity, and also because in policing discourse it is also identified with activity that has become, or is in the process of becoming upgraded to a security issue. Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh show that police tend to emphasise systematic organisation in cases of criminal damage in which it has not been possible to identify offenders. The authors find that the designation of an unresolved matter as *highly organised* is part of the way in which police have traditionally presented cases to less directly publicly accountable security services. The authors observe a tautology in which: 'a number of incidents occur; there are political overtones; the police are unable to catch the offenders; *ergo*, this must amount to activity so 'organized' that it rises to a threat to national security.'²⁷⁴ In this case the status not only of J18 (London) protest, but of protest across the board is upgraded. However, it

²⁷⁴ Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh, *In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p 383.

seems to remain a public order matter, albeit one that is now blurred with security discourse terminology. How can this be explained?

Until the end of the last century the distinctions between public order policing and crime fighting seemed reasonably clear:

Public order policing enjoys a moral ambiguity that crime fighting has traditionally lacked. Why are these two aspects of policing so different? Put simply, the criminal occupies a position outside the moral community, whereas protesters, pickets and possibly even rioters may be considered the moral equals of other citizens. It is virtually true by definition that criminals are castigated as immoral predators on the moral community. Criminalising certain activities or denuding them of any social or political legitimacy they might otherwise have ... Whatever it is that distinguishes the 'common criminal' from protesters and pickets, it certainly is not simply that criminals violate the criminal law and protesters do not, for those who protest also commit criminal offences, sometimes very serious. What distinguishes them is that protest is a conspicuous act of citizenship. Far from preying on the moral community, the protester is actively participating in that moral community, however misguidedly. Pickets, protesters and rioters do not serve purposes that are selfishly malign, but principled.²⁷⁵

What then has changed?

With the benefit of hindsight it is possible to look back at June 18 (London) as one landmark in a decade of networks and communication and the exponential growth of networked computers. The Internet had become the convenient symbol of a sweeping trend of networks and communication. Along with many social, political and economic practices, protest activities

²⁷⁵ P. A. J. Waddington, 2000, pp 156-7.

had begun to visible adapt with this process. The trend and its potential impact on society provoked a sense of unease as well as optimism. Accordingly new public order policing guidelines had begun to emerge in response as exemplified by the HMIC²⁷⁶ inspection *Keeping the Peace*. This document was published several months before June 1999. This inspection is based on the recognition that 'the Police Service requires a strategic framework²⁷⁷ within which to operate in order to effectively deal with disorder', including disorder that can arise from 'new and emerging forms of protest'. This report states that:

The strategic framework also needs to be flexible enough to provide a positive response to the specific types of disorder that have emerged in recent years from the newer forms of mass non-violent protest surrounding for example, animal exports, to environmental concerns and other single cause issues. The mobility of protesters provides a fresh challenge for the Service in that supporters form an ideological community that only becomes geographically based for relatively short periods before moving on to the next protest site. Forces have had to deal with protest and potential disorder that relate to issues and incidents outside their force area and even outside the UK²⁷⁸, particularly in relation to animal and environmental protest groups. These groups have adopted a strategic, long-term approach to their protests employing new and innovative tactics to frustrate authorities and

²⁷⁶ Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) is described as the 'The Home Secretary's eyes and ears'. The body has a 'statutory duty to inspect and report to the Secretary of State on the efficiency and effectiveness of all the police forces and police authorities.

²⁷⁷ There are two basic requirements for such a framework. First, that it can complement and be integrated into existing police service operational strategies, and second that it be flexible enough to cover a broad spectrum of disorder types 'ranging from the low level disorder associated with anti-social behaviour through to large scale public disorder'. HMIC, *Keeping the Peace*, March 1999, p 13.

²⁷⁸ The footnote within the text appears as follows: 'An example of this are the protests throughout Europe at the movement of nuclear waste, and the disruption of companies Annual General Meetings to protest at their activity in another part of the world.'

achieve their objective. There is evidence that some elements operate in cell like structures in a quasi-terrorist mode to keep secret their movements and intentions. The police response has to be equally focused and determined with energy directed to intelligence gathering and dissemination at a local and national level.²⁷⁹

Already before June 18, there is a growing emphasis on 'new and innovative tactics' with strategic intent (i.e. to 'frustrate the authorities'), but also evidence to suggest that 'some elements operate in cell like structures in a quasi-terrorist mode', so as 'to keep secret their movements and intentions'.²⁸⁰ Whereas public order evaluation frameworks have traditionally identified 'new and innovative tactics' with what Waddington calls 'the opposition', the emergence of new guidelines in the late 1990s began to define 'decentralised', flat-networked protest in terms that up, until then, were the sole province of security discourse.

On the other hand, also by the end of the 1990s there was a discernable trend in policing that was increasingly carried out in networks, both domestically and across national borders. This led among other things to the emergence of 'a dialectical tension between internal security and

²⁷⁹ HMIC, *Keeping the Peace*, March 1999:, 1.1.4 , p 14.

²⁸⁰ Scientific discourses have used the term cell-like structures to describe networks of protest (as well as a number of other practices). (e.g. S. Johnson, *Emergence*) Yet whereas research on acephalous, self-organising systems in the natural world and on 'distributed, cellular structures of self-organizing systems', draws fascinating parallels with the distributed networks, groups and issues that comprised other similar protest gatherings in 1999, the term *cellular structure* nevertheless suggests significantly different meanings within policing and security discourses.

national territory', a blurring of the concepts of *order* and *security*,²⁸¹ and an associated and by now well documented change in policing roles and functions.

5. MULTI-ISSUE ACTION, MULTI-AGENCY NETWORKS AND ORDER

The second part of the initial post-event report's conclusions is as follows:

15.4 The gratuitous level of violence and criminality was unprecedented, unprovoked and unforeseen. 15.5 Police planning for future events (whether in the City or not) must assume a worst case scenario. Tactics and resources must reflect this thinking. 15.6 The City of London Police accepts that a number of described generic weaknesses and some judgements exacerbated the difficulties of dealing with the very serious disorder once it had occurred. These are being addressed by the Force. 15.7 Action to regain the confidence of the business City and to position the Force to deal with similar events in the future must be progressed as quickly as possible.

The current section considers these points (mainly 15.6-7) in terms of the difficulties of characterising new forms of protest. Police unease about the event especially related to uncertainty about the type of protest involved in June 18 (London). These were multi-issue gatherings with a focus on new symbolic sites; they were not reducible to conventional political ideologies and hence not recognisable in conventional political terms. The post-event report highlights difficulties in establishing protest typicality, indicating that the police had very little idea of how the 'At least 33 separate protest

²⁸¹ Didier Bigo, 'When Two Become One: Internal and External Securitisations in Europe' in M. Kelstrup and M. Williams, eds., *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security, Community* (London: Routledge, 2000).

groups' that 'were either present or had expressed an intention or interest in joining the protest on this day' would take shape.

The information at that time [March 1999] was that the City of London was a broad target but that demonstrations would be likely in other areas of London as well. The likely participants were believed to include prominent environmentalist groups from all over the country and the overall objective of the day was the significant disruption of the business City. Over time a clearer picture emerged which was that the day of action, called J18, would coincide with the meeting of G8 in Cologne. A number of disparate groups, both activists and pacifists, would participate. This was believed to include Reclaim the Streets (RTS), Earth First, Movement Against the Monarchy (MAM), Rebel Alliance (South Coast Activists) and Campaign against the Animal Trade. The best known and largest group "Reclaim the Streets" was an environmentalist group opposed to the car. This group previously held unauthorised street parties. Information relating to J18 was widely advertised on the Internet. The City of London was to be the main focus and the stated intention was to disrupt the City ... The broad intelligence picture was of a day of 'carnival' type protest against global capitalism and a number of single issues which some individuals believe are derivative of the actions of big business and/or government.²⁸²

Although information about some of the individual campaigns and issue groups was available, a number of questions remained about how these might combine in a single public gathering. While this type of gathering or multi-issue gatherings will have become more familiar by now, although perhaps still difficult to define, the suggestion is that there was no apparent precedent for this kind of protest at the time.

²⁸² ibid 2.3-2.4.

The idea of multi-issue protest unsettles the coherence of part of the police-protest dichotomy; that is, it opens up, broadens out and therefore destabilises the idea of protest as a unified entity. Evidently this complicates the police task of discerning protest type and planning for contingencies. Uncertainty about this type of protest was often expressed in terms of its supposed propensity for violence and disorder. For instance, the second part of 15.2 (above) suggests that as a result of the event, it became clear that 'The many (relatively) peaceful elements in the crowd were used to mask the violent intentions of the extremists'. **Point 2.11** further clarifies this:

At the time of reporting it is not known definitively who all the different organisers of the demonstration are. Most probably they include a number of individuals in some of the more extremist protest groups as distinct from a single individual or caucus. At least 33 separate protest groups were either present or had expressed an intention or interest in joining the protest on the day.

This indicates a more direct causal link between multi-issue protest, crypto-organisation and extremist individuals. Other informally registered views amplify the idea of a link between multi-issue activity and violence and disorder, as the following excerpt from a *Police Review* editorial shows:

The violence in the City of London last Friday afternoon and evening was as predictable as the England football team losing an international on penalties. After all, a rag-tag collection of demonstrations against, among other things, capitalism, third-world debt, motor cars, the military colonisation of outer space, and genetically-modified food can easily

accommodate another group who don't much like anything about the world but thoroughly enjoy kicking a few police officers' heads in.²⁸³

Unlike the report which states that the use of the gatherings by extremists with violent intentions became apparent as a result of the event, the last passage suggests that violence and disorder is an inevitable and thus anticipated outcome of policing a multi-issue protest gathering. This raises some questions about how pre-event police perceptions about 'this kind of protest' may have pre-emptively anticipated the dynamics of police-protest interaction on the day. But whatever the case, it is clear that the idea of multi-issue protest significantly unsettles policing perspectives about the terms of police-protest relations. This suggests the possibility that the idea of multi-issue protest may in itself have been enough to destabilise of the idea of 'police-protest relations' and therefore its function as a pre-event and contingency planning device.

This issue of rupture or breakdown as it applies to the specific case can also be approached from various other angles. Waddington's account shows that confrontation with protesters, that is, with protest that is deemed to be legitimate, is considered only as a last resort because it unsettles the public, or what is sometimes referred to as the external perception of policing. The author shows that given the importance of public accountability, confrontation entails something like a double burden of security for police. Not only do violence and disorder place individuals at risk but they can also be damaging to the public perception of the police as an organisation: 'When the police battle with protesters and rioters, not

²⁸³ Editorial, 'A Thought for Mr Undermanager', *Police Review*, 25 June 1999, p 4.

only are they likely to be physically injured, the police organisation is also likely to suffer harm.’²⁸⁴ In addition:

Senior officers are intuitively aware that in the event of disorder the facts of who did what and when will be contested and there will be plenty of scope for accusations of overzealousness, provocation, and heavy-handedness to be leveled against them.²⁸⁵

The *Initial Post-Event Summary* states that the picture of external (non-police) perceptions about the police action ‘is complex and includes high levels of recrimination and concern about perceived and real failures in police action’,²⁸⁶ but which can be summarised thus:

[9.2] A great deal of the external recrimination is predicated on the belief that police knew about the nature and scale of the violence and its predictable locations before the event. On that basis, there is dismay and anger about what police did and did not do.’ [9.3] ‘Most of the external concern expressed to the Force can be grouped thus: (a) a failure to protect individual premises ab initio (b) inaction by individual or groups of officers whilst criminal damage was being committed (c) the length of time taken to deal with an obviously deteriorating situation (d) concern about the ability of the Force to cope adequately on future occasions.

The report concedes that ‘the police operation in containing and dealing with the violence and disorder was only partially successful’, and that ‘A number of weaknesses [some of which are] organisational and/or generic [and some of which] derive from judgements made by individuals in real-

²⁸⁴ P. A. J. Waddington, ‘Public Order Policing: Citizenship and Moral Ambiguity’, in F. Leishman, B. Loveday, and S. Savage, eds., *Core Issues in Policing*, second edition, (Essex: Longman, 2000), p 156.

²⁸⁵ P. A. J. Waddington, 1998, p 129.

²⁸⁶ 9.1

time which (with the benefit of hindsight) may have exacerbated the difficulties in gaining the upper hand once serious disorder and violence occurred.’²⁸⁷

Aside from this there is a range of documented police discussions about what police should or should not have done and what they did or did not do. Several kinds of discussion can be noted here. These relate to the problem of public accountability, the difficulties of a twin-force police operation and the possibility of inter-force rivalry. In terms of the first issue there is some discussion about public or external perceptions, and the use of force as a tactic. A view put forward in the following passage appears to advocate police inaction as a means of ‘allow[ing] disorder to deteriorate’ so as to then justify coercive measures.

Few will have dissented from the tone of last week’s editorial [*Police Review* editorial quoted above]. I, on the other hand, believe that the police operations in the City and at Stonehenge were a reason for muted congratulation, not recrimination, for the police won the most important battle – the political battle. We have, of course, been here before. Cast your mind back to the ‘battle in the beanfield’ near Stonehenge in 1985. The police undoubtedly ‘won’ that battle ... Yet, the police lost that battle. In the days, weeks and months that followed, it became an accepted icon of the ‘heavy-handedness’ of the police. Video footage of police officers dragging women screaming from vans and buses encapsulated the unacceptable face of British policing in the 1980s²⁸⁸ ... That event lost the British police many friends, especially those in high places, and it has taken a long time for them to be recouped. This is the reason for muted congratulation: the police emerged from the weekend fracas in the City of London and Stonehenge

²⁸⁷ 11.1

with their reputation intact. Even though officers were attired in their protective clothing and captured in photographs and videos wielding their batons, it has been accepted that they were compelled to meet violence and disorder with force ... The police can be too efficient at suppressing public disorder: it evokes worries in the breasts of querulous liberals that the police are becoming oppressive. They seek unambiguous evidence that disorder has reached such a scale that the police are compelled to resort to force to restore order. If some innocent bystanders are injured or worse by a riotous mob, then this merely confirms the seriousness of the disorder. If it isn't already in the ACPO Public Order Manual then it is time to insert it: allow disorder to deteriorate to a pitch where it is abundantly clear to everyone that there is no alternative to forceful police intervention. By these means you will win the most important battle of all – for the hearts and minds of the chattering classes.²⁸⁹

It is possible that police inaction may go some way towards explaining some of *what happened*, particularly given that police were instructed to partially withdraw at 2pm, at about twenty minutes after the first outbreak of 'unprovoked violent disorder',²⁹⁰ at about twenty minutes before 'a female demonstrator became trapped under one of the police vehicles',²⁹¹ and over an hour before the LIFFE building came under attack – police did not begin to appear at the LIFFE building until as late as 4.15pm, and even

²⁸⁸ This event took place on June 1st 1985 after a peace convoy of around 140 vehicles heading towards Stonehenge was intercepted at a police roadblock and redirected into a nearby beanfield by 1,000 officers. Accounts suggest that the brief was that whatever the cost, Stonehenge must not go ahead. The same accounts show that much of the footage to which the passage refers had disappeared: 'ITN footage of the carnage "disappeared" from its library and an impassioned TV report from the scene was replaced with a voiceover. The BBC screened the police's own video of events.' Matthew Collin, *Altered State*, (London: Serpent's Tail, 1997), p 186.

²⁸⁹ P. A. J. Waddington, 'Winning the political battle', *Police Review*, (2 July, 1999), p 11.

²⁹⁰ *Carnival Against Global Capitalism 18th June 1999, Initial Post-Event Summary*, item 6.7.

²⁹¹ *Ibid*, item 6.10.

then 'there was a further delay before the planned intervention started to take proper effect.'²⁹² It is possible that police may have been briefed not to facilitate this demonstration. In any case, although it appears in a police news journal the passage represents a columnist's opinion and not strictly speaking a police view.

From another more productive angle there is a certain amount of consensus among police that the public order operation had been complicated by the fact that more than one police force was involved in the event. A recurring view is that the twin-force City/Metropolitan operation had become unnecessarily complicated, resulting in communications and therefore operational problems, or even that these complications were a possible symptom of inter-force rivalry. For instance, the independent enquiry headed by the recently retired senior Metropolitan Police officer Anthony Speed, found 'The command and control structure [to have been] unduly complicated by two police operations, one in the City of London and the other in the Metropolitan Police District.'²⁹³ From a different perspective, a working party that was set up to gauge the views of rank and file officers on duty had noted that Metropolitan Police officers' frustration at not being able to assist City of London Police officers once they had come under attack. This account does not rule out the possibility of inter-force rivalry:

²⁹² *Initial Post-Event Summary*, item 9.2, item 6.17.

²⁹³ *Carnival Against Global Capitalism 18th June 1999, Initial Examination of Police Operation*, item 5.2 (a). This examination also found that 'Once disorder occurred the City Police Control Room did not ... properly support the tactical command of the event,' Ibid, item 5.2 (b). and that there are some questions about 'the operational effectiveness of senior officers at Silver and Bronze level due to an inevitable lack of field command experience at major disorder.' Ibid, item 5.2 (c).

A Federation spokesman for one of the forces involved in policing the demonstration, who wished to remain anonymous, said: 'I believe there were van loads of officers on standby that were never used. Could it be that there were personalities involved between the Met and the City that created the problem?'²⁹⁴

It is significant too that the City of London Police Federation working party was set up to deal with allegations regarding lack of communication between City and Metropolitan police but also the British Transport Police who were also involved in the policing of the site. In that sense, the public order operation might be considered more of a multi-force than simply a twin-force exercise. This upsets expectations about the organisation of public order policing. That is, the demonstration site comprised three different policing agencies and the estimated thirty-three protest agencies. In principle, there is no reason to suppose that multi-agency police action does not also contribute to the weakening of the idea of police-protest relations, that is, the standard conception facilitates understandings of demonstration event sites.

Outcomes reported in the *Financial Times* on 20 August, 1999 include:

- Simplification of command and control structure
- Greater flexibility in cutting demarcation lines separating the Met and City Police. Could involve senior Met taking command on some occasions.
- Scotland Yard control centre to deal with City crowd situations

²⁹⁴ Elaine Fogg, 'City of London Federation launches separate inquiry into the Square Mile riots', *Police Review*, (9 July 1999), p 5.

- More co-ordination in the training of middle ranking and senior officers in both forces dealing with serious disorder.

6. SURPRISE AND DECISION

The uniqueness of initial police decisions about the event is clearly based on a conflation between technological innovation and innovative dispersal-reassembly tactics. And again, in common with the previous two perspectives (chapters 2 and 3), within policing discourse, the decision is ultimately led by the general idea of *protest-innovation* although it occurs here in a way that is very specific to the case.

Since this mode of determination is limited to a discovery that the demonstration signals changes in protest, the principal focus is on what it is about protest that appears to have changed. This explanatory or evaluative pattern is not exclusive to police discourses but general to the police-protest dichotomy as a framework for decisions about demonstration events. The idea of reciprocal change is based on the assumption that policing change is always only a measured response to changes in protest, which of course it is, although this is still only a partial definition. For instance, looking at the particular case it is obvious that information technologies and networks are not simply a protest tactic but part of a much wider trend of social change. Whilst the assumptions implicit in the dichotomy guide attention towards protest-innovation, the question of how

it might be possible to distinguish between pervasive social change and protest innovation remains largely unattended.

As an evaluative framework the police-protest dichotomy is geared towards accounting for reciprocal (police-protest) change. Although the idea of reciprocal change works both ways in principle it is most often, if not always, deployed to indicate police innovations that *respond* to changes in protest. This is what defines police-protest correspondence. The dichotomy determines to the extent that it implicitly structures through form-modality counterpositions of *police-continuity* and *protest-change*. On this reasoning, and in its application to the specific case, protest innovation causes either the actual or the potential breakdown of the familiar terms of police-protest relations to the extent that protest reneges on standard but informal and unwritten rules.

McAdam et al have likened the terms of police-protest correspondence, police-protest demonstration repertoires to a conversation.

Performances within repertoires do not usually follow precise scripts to the letter; they resemble a conversation in conforming to implicit interaction rules, but engaging incessant improvisation on the part of all participants. Thus today's demonstration unfolds differently from yesterday's as a function of who shows up, whether it rains, how the police manage today's crowd, what participants learned yesterday, and how authorities responded to yesterday's claims. Demonstrations that begin similarly end up as mass meetings, solemn marches, attacks on public buildings, or pitched battles between police and activists. Indeed, stereotyped performances ordinarily lose effectiveness in the same way that rote speech falls flat: They reduce

the strategic advantage of their performers, undermine participants' claims of conviction, and diminish the event's newsworthiness. As a consequence, small-scale innovation modifies repertoires continuously, especially as one set of participants or another discovers that a new tactic, message, or self-presentation brings rewards its predecessors did not.²⁹⁵

The passage provides a concise statement of the ideas of police-protest relations and police-protest reciprocal change. It becomes possible to discern the day-to-day changes in the conversations and exchanges that occur within demonstrations through incessant shifts and switches between protest and policing. The extent of *police surprise* is often a good indicator and measure of the degree of *protest innovation*. Accounts of the J18 (London) demonstrations overwhelmingly focus on protest innovation although this becomes especially meaningful through the contrast with or through police perceptions. *Police surprise* or unpreparedness underscores the extent of *protest change*. If *protest change* becomes the initial point at which innovation is identified, *police expectations* represent the initial point of the determination of such change. The juxtaposition of *surprise* and *innovation* does not so much determine the *x* or the event, as provisionally re-solve it.

The surprise-innovation contrast also becomes the basis of recommendations for mobilising imperatives for further police action. The level of surprise determines the degree of reaction. Does the idea of protest innovation that is observed in this case amount to 'small-scale innovation' in which police-protest repertoires continue to be modified, or is

²⁹⁵ Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p 138.

this an exceptional case in which the usual terms of police-protest correspondence have broken down? In terms of the police report the event is clearly an exception. After all:

The demonstration signals a new era of violent protest, which has implications for the whole country, and for policing at a national level. The events of June 18 reveal a level and sophistication of planning not seen before.²⁹⁶

Nevertheless the degree of protest innovation/police surprise, that is, the issue of whether police-protest repertoires continue to modify or whether they come to a dislocated standoff, remains ambiguous.

Initial post-event police conclusions seem to be made within overlapping contexts of traditional public order evaluations models and new emerging guidelines exemplified by the HMIC inspection. Although the report considers the case to be exceptional, from point of view of new emerging guidelines, multi-issue protest, the re-situation of gatherings and so on are not new or unprecedented, but follow a gradually emerging pattern, albeit a pattern that is deemed to be exceptional by definition(s). Yet, even if June 18 (London) protest can be considered to be part of an emerging pattern of exceptional protest, to what degree can it be considered a surprise? To pose the same question from a different angle is the police determination of the event itself exceptional or unique? For instance, is the initial decision that was made public on July 28 made independently of evaluation

²⁹⁶ *Carnival Against Global Capitalism 18th June 1999*, Executive Summary. (See Appendix 1).

guidelines that were published several months earlier? The answer, based on Mr Speed's enquiry at least, seems to be no.²⁹⁷

On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the event did surprise many if not most participant-observers, not least non-police observers. In one of many accounts: 'J18 was astonishing. It went far beyond what could have been anticipated. There were elements of detailed planning, but what actually happened must have taken the organisers by surprise.'²⁹⁸ Building on the question of 'small-scale innovation' and the issue of how it might be possible to differentiate ideas of widespread social change from protest innovation, non-police participant-observers saw the exchange between police and protest, and the problems therein, as a direct reflection of widespread concerns about innovations in the business city:

The speed at which the groups dispersed from Liverpool Street station took everyone by surprise. This 'starburst' that Commissioner Perry Nove referred to in the police report has been identified as the principle cause of the collapse in communication that led to the so-called 'riot'. Starbursts are a feature of networked coalitions. J18 was essentially a battle between a networked/flat organisation and the 'command and control' structure of the police force, a reflection of the corporate debate between networks and hierarchies. Structurally, it played out in 6 hours the process corporations have been engaged in for the last 6 years.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ Mr Speed's inquiry found that 'the City of London Police Service corporate preparedness **was** fit for the purpose in that', among other reasons, it had been implementing 'The recommendations contained in a recent thematic inspection report "Keeping the Peace" published by HMI in March'. (Anthony Speed, *Initial Examination of Operation*, 4.1 (i).)

²⁹⁸ A Conversation <http://www.ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/MerlinCarpenter/protest.htm> (December, 1999).

²⁹⁹ Ibid.

The passage appears in an article that is primarily interested in the relation between ‘horizontally integrated’ corporate as well as protest groups. It defines advanced capitalist practices through the analogy of the *starburst*, noting the propensity of horizontally networked corporate groups to coalesce around a goal or objective and then disperse ‘precisely at the moment where it begins to make sense to outside agencies’. This is invoked as a parallel with *what happened* on June 18.

From this perspective, the event was as an abridged performance of ‘the process corporations have been engaged in for the last 6 years’, and hence also a literal *demonstration* of that process. It is precisely this rupture in the ordinary terms of police-protest ‘conversation’ that demonstrates what is occurring ‘elsewhere’, in a place that is symbolised by the re-situation of the gatherings in London’s business City.

If new corporate processes involving novel (for the time) horizontal integration techniques are a model, reason or motivation for *protest innovations* that became especially manifest in the J18 London gatherings, some of the problems that result from the former were ‘played out’ by *protesters* and *police* and the interaction between them. Thus the surprise and perplexity that greeted those observing corporate restructuring processes over time was analogous to the way in which ‘the police force on June 18th [had] been wrong-footed’ by the Liverpool Street *starburst*.

Whilst the perspective put forward raises some pertinent questions, it also reinforces some of the basic tenets of the police-protest dichotomy as a framework for decision. In this account *police surprise* remains a crucial

factor in gauging the degree and significance of protest change. For instance the speed of the Liverpool Street dispersal 'surprised everyone', as exemplified by the City of London Commissioner's post-event comments, and was the main cause of the rupture that is associated with that event. In addition, although this discussion acknowledges a general trend of the flattening out of groups and practices into networks,³⁰⁰ it appears to discount the idea that policing must at the same time be subject to the same trends, albeit to varying degrees.

Part of what is interesting about these ('protest' and 'policing') evaluations and assessments is how they (participate in as well as) invoke the dichotomy in different ways. The initial police examination assesses what has changed as a result of the event, that is, how protest has changed. The event as demonstration depends on implicit interaction rules. Change here is discerned by specifying the degree to which protest innovation has exceeded those rules and therefore the extent to which it has overwritten the usual terms of police-protest correspondence. By contrast, the above example of a non-police participant-observer account explores what has changed prior to the event. Here a rupture is already in existence, one that must be made public and be publicly discussed. Here, an already existing, pre-event rupture is precisely what calls the event into being. Nevertheless, this account locates the police-protest exchange within a broader complex of social, political and economic change so that it exceeds the evaluative remit of the police-protest dichotomy.

³⁰⁰ For instance it suggests that 'J18 was also a result of the tendency visible throughout the 90s for different sectors - business, creative, governmental, political - to open up and, through various networks, converge.'

It will be recalled (from chapter 1) that demonstrations in all their variants are composed of at least four different sorts of actors or actor groups (including for instance the objects of protesters' claims), but the question of *what happened*, the question that invariably tails the *singular* case, is restricted to dichotomous themes which generally reinstate the form-modality *protest-change*, *police-continuity* relation as the central problem. Within such a framework it is possible to choose any number of evaluative paths but the structure of choice or the existing interpretive scheme remains unchanged.

What is normally understood by responsible decision can easily be revealed as incessant unconscious repetition. That is, one's decision might always have been determined, or overdetermined, by some institution or structure according to which what comes to us as possibility is already predetermined ... so that what one decides makes no difference to the structure of choice itself. And, according to the same logic, we would find that a conscious repetition might always turn out to have been an unconscious decision.³⁰¹

x is always already determined by the form-mode *protest-movement-change*, with or without its juxtaposition with *policing-stasis-continuity*. The form-modality combinations that underpin dichotomous police-protest discourses are what render the *x*, or the event determinable. Although there is a wealth of material about June 18 (London) any question of what happened is reducible to the same subject-object form-modes. Any data deployed to test the question of *what happened* will inevitably mirror this formula.

³⁰¹ Ray Bishop and John Phillips, 'Manufacturing Emergencies', *Theory, Culture & Society*, (Vol. 19; No. 4, 2002), p 98.

For Derrida, any confrontation with the indescribable, any encounter with x would not only necessitate a decision but would also surprise the subjectivity of the subject that assumes responsibility for taking a decision.

Certainly the decision makes the event, but it also neutralizes this happening that must surprise both the freedom and the will of every subject – surprise, in a word, the very subjectivity of the subject, affecting it wherever the subject is exposed, sensitive, receptive, vulnerable and fundamentally passive, before and beyond any decision – indeed, before any subjectivation or objectivation. Undoubtedly the subjectivity of a subject, already, never decides anything; its identity in itself and its calculable permanence make every decision an accident which leaves the subject unchanged and indifferent.³⁰²

Whilst it is not possible to definitively state whether any subjectivity was surprised, not least because so many subjects and subjectivities were involved, it seems obvious that the event profoundly unsettles the idea of police-protest relations as a framework for decision. One symptom of this, paradoxically, is the subsequent tightening of the form-mode assumptions that underpin that idea. Post-J18 evaluations and interpretations reflect not only the (further) decontestation³⁰³ of form-mode relations but an extraordinary ‘freezing’ of the same. Narratives, descriptions, definitions and determinations show, as well as iteratively perform, a freezing of the form-modes that sustain the interpretive and evaluative potential of the dichotomy, so that ‘protest’ signifies ‘hyper-change’ and policing signifies ‘hyper-stabilisation’. This freezing distorts the reality of how protest and

³⁰² Jacques Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, (London: Verso, 1994), p 68.

³⁰³ Michael Freeden (1996) uses the terms *contestatation* and *decontestatation* in discourse analysis to examine ideologies. It is applied here to the extent that it refers to questions of constructed determinacy.

policing function as forms of agency. It simultaneously amplifies and diminishes the fact that protest and policing, respectively, are forms of action-in-process.

7. BINARY OPPOSITION

As a mode of explanation the police-protest dichotomy comes under considerable strain when it is called upon to explain the dynamics of interaction between overlapping networks rather than between clearly differentiated blocks of protest and policing. Given the range of networks and groupings, the actions of neither the police nor the protesters were clearly demarcated or at least not as clearly demarcated as the police-protest dichotomy would suggest. The weakening of the coherence of the two forms that comprise the dichotomy especially highlights how the dichotomy is predicated on assumptions about the relative homogeneity of its constitutive actor-groups. June 18 (London) displays profound complications in the clear, bifurcated focus that usually assists the making of judgements and evaluations about demonstration events. It also highlights the types of decision and conclusion that the dichotomy is likely to generate once it comes under this sort of strain.

The disruption of the terms of protest and policing is highly consequential when it is seen as corresponding to broader ideas of 'binary aggregates'. For instance, Waddington's account, like many others, typically sets out the terms and conditions of normative forms of demonstration, events which, as Waddington notes in the UK case, have derived stability for instance,

‘not because Britain enjoyed a “police advantage”, but because of a political settlement between labor and capital.’³⁰⁴

In any case, while commentators have been documenting the normalisation and standardisation of repertoires within demonstration performances, cumulative innovations in protest as well as policing throughout the 1990s came into sharp relief by the end of that decade. These changes cannot simply be reduced to the idea of police-protest reciprocal change or on traditionally recognised terms of correspondence. For instance, trends in protest in this period included increasingly more focused actions on specific issues and in specific sites (animal exportation, Brightlingsea, roads bypasses, Newbury etc) involving a more direct relation between protest, demonstrations and demonstration sites, hence the term ‘direct action’.

On the other hand, there were also fundamental changes in policing involving endogenous and exogenous pressures for reform. Frank Leishman et al noted that:

From the standpoint of the mid-1990s, there was much evidence of an emerging or immanent ‘watershed’ in the history of British policing. A service that had survived remarkably intact for many decades, still bearing many of the distinctive features of its nineteenth-century origins, was very much under siege. Challenges to the status quo of policing at that time came from a myriad of quarters and threatened to transform fundamentally the ethos of the ‘British way’ of policing, from the way the police organisation was structured and governed, to the working conditions of

³⁰⁴ P. A. J. Waddington, 1998, p 139.

police officers and the very definition of what those officers were there to
do.³⁰⁵

Stylised representations of police-protest dynamics necessarily simplify a highly complex reality for explanatory purposes. Simplified representations, the by now conventional explanatory models, can end up restricting the extent to which changes in the terms of this relation can be broached. On closer inspection there are fundamental changes occurring in both forms which destabilise conventional associative categories through which the forms have become meaningful.

Nevertheless, debate about a climate of widespread social change tends to become amplified through the idea of (changes in) protest. To illustrate this with the above example, since new technologies also suggest social change they and their effects are automatically identified with *protest*. In combination, and particularly in the context of discussions about demonstrations, the *technology-protest* equivalence suggests a sort of hyper-change scenario. In the J18 (London) case the construction of such a scenario was a basis for the determination of the event and the basis of decisions that determined the priority of one course of action over another.

Yet, by the same token, the suggestion that policing modes generally and public order modes specifically, are immune to advances in technology, is inconceivable: 'Technology has always shaped policing...One of the most visible changes in modern policing was in the technology for mobility...the

³⁰⁵ Frank Leishman, Barry Loveday, and Stephen P. Savage, 'Introduction: Core Issues in Policing Revisited', in F. Leishman et al, eds., *Core Issues in Policing*, (Essex: Longman, 2000), p 1.

use of cars for patrolling the streets and responding to calls for service'.³⁰⁶ Advances in technology have changed the timing of policing activities, expanded the scope of information that police can store, acted as a 'force multiplier',³⁰⁷ enhanced the professional status of police and the legitimacy of police organisations,³⁰⁸ been used in the development of 'smart' policing strategies that are problem oriented, intelligence led and evidence based', and so on.³⁰⁹ Advances in technology of course significantly impact on the operation of public order practices in demonstration sites.

Technology provides one example of how protest and policing modes simultaneously respond to or adapt with wider social change.

In phase with modern theories that chart the decline of vertical hierarchical social structures and the concomitant rise of horizontal networks ... a number of commentators are reconceptualising out ways of thinking about policing and security. The seminal report written by Bayley and Shearing (2001) for the National Institute of Justice has, for example, introduced the term "multilateralization" to describe the growing array of auspices and providers – demand and supply – that constitute the modern security assemblage, eschewing the traditional one-dimensional public/private dichotomy. In other texts, Shearing and his colleagues ... have developed the concept of "nodal governance" to convey the idea that policing functions and their different organizing modes can now be characterized as

³⁰⁶ Janet Chan, 'Police and New Technologies', *Handbook Of Policing*, T. Newburn, ed., (Cullompton: Willan), p 655.

³⁰⁷ 'meaning that technology can improve a police organisation's efficiency and capability without employing extra staff' (S. Nunn and K. Quinet, 'Evaluating the Effects of Information Technology on Problem-Oriented Policing', *Evaluation Review*, (Vol. 26, No. 1).

³⁰⁸ R. Ericson and C. Shearing, 'The Scientification of Police Work', *The Knowledge Society: The Growing Impact of Scientific Knowledge on Social Relations*, G. Böhme and N. Stehr eds., (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986); Manning, 1992; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997.

³⁰⁹ Janet Chan, 2003, pp 655-66.

plural...many others have come to similar or related conclusions while examining diverse cultural and geographical contexts ... Others, while acknowledging the importance of those changes, have questioned to what extent they can be interpreted as a qualitative break with the past, or even as global in reach ... According to these authors, the factors at the origins of such profound changes are many and closely interlaced, making it hard, if not impossible, to isolate or to place them in a neat chain of causality. Yet a consensus seems to exist concerning the importance of these factors in explaining a trend toward a more decentralized, horizontal, networked society. The exponential development of information and communication technologies around the globe has, without any doubt, been instrumental in the collapse of all sorts of barriers that previously corseted institutions, organizations, communities and individuals inside limited roles and responsibilities.³¹⁰

While apparent innovations in protest and policing forms in relation to information technology has become especially prominent in interaction sites such as demonstrations (this will be considered in the following chapter), analysis remains restricted to observing the effects from the perspective of one practice or the other. Compared to research that specialises either in social movements or in policing, what is especially interesting about combined police-protest studies questions is the way in which distortions in conceptual frameworks feature.

The explanatory pull of the dichotomy as a framework for decision which significantly depends on the idea of reciprocal change, does not seemed to

³¹⁰ Benoît Dupont, 'Security in the Age of Networks', *Policing & Society*, (Vol. 14, No. 1, 2004), pp 76-91.

be geared to accounting for dynamics of interaction that involve significantly modifying forms of action. New research problems that were also identified in the late 1990s highlight the question of 'how social developments involving the increased importance of information technology and enhanced globalization and regionalization are likely to affect police and protest behaviour.'³¹¹ Indeed, how might a generalised trend of change impact on two forms and the relation between them?

Moreover if the prominence of issues of police-protest reciprocity displaces the possibilities of posing such questions, is *reciprocal change* necessarily still an apposite issue in this case? Do fundamental, though analogous and simultaneous changes – basic changes in the timing and spacing of both protest and policing – necessarily affect the explanatory potential of the idea of reciprocal change? Does widespread change affect the terms of reciprocity? For instance, if J18 (London) police-protest relations occur against a backdrop of networks and communication and information technology, do they operate in new contexts of 'accelerated time' or 'overlapping spatialities'? At the very least, reciprocity implies a ground of commonality that seems largely absent from accounts of the particular case. This absence is perhaps one of the most prominent features of dichotomous accounts of this case.

Although the police-protest dichotomy brings us closer to the issue of demonstrations, it not so much precludes the possibility of posing the

³¹¹ Gary. T. Marx, Afterword, in Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, eds., *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), pp 260-1.

question about how demonstrations change, as over-determines, displaces or continuously postpones such a possibility. The decision of *what happened* is always already focused and steered via a *protest-change* equivalence, one that is then taken into a multiplicity of further directions by further agencies, interests and questions, all of which leave questions about the-event-as-demonstration unattended. Whilst it is possible to identify (reciprocal) innovations in *protest and policing* as the *as such* of a demonstration event, the task of identifying innovation in the *demonstration as such* seems more elusive.

Chapter 5

Demonstrations as sites within sites

1. QUAD ERAT DEMONSTRANDUM?

Demonstration refers to the action or process of showing or pointing out. In the broad sense, demonstration is deictic. As well as *showing* or *appearing*, for instance as a public manifestation (of some thing), demonstrations are also used to *show that*.³¹² Demonstrations can be apodictic insofar as they can be used as evidence to *show* (that some thing is the case). There are a number of contexts in which it is used, including scientific and technical, military, juridical fields. The political demonstration is defined as ‘A public manifestation, by a number of persons, of interest in some public question, or sympathy with some political or other cause; usually taking the form of a procession and mass-meeting.’³¹³

³¹² Etymologically the term originates from *demonstrare* – to point out, show, prove – which in turn derives from *monstrare* – also to show, point out. *Demonstrare* derives from the Latin *monstrum*: ‘an omen portending of the will of the gods, hence a supernatural being or object; hence a monster: from *monēre*, to warn’. (Eric Partridge, *Origins: A short etymological dictionary of modern English*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), pp 414-5.). The later form of *monstrare* was divested of its religious character and ‘omen’ passed into more common usage to mean ‘to point out, to show’. As a *manifestation* or as a *showing*, political demonstrations are still to some extent taken as a sign (of some thing) or as an omen i.e. as ‘an event or phenomenon believed to be a sign of some future occurrence’. The shifting emphasis on *monstrare* and *demonstrare* has particular resonance in debates on the history of philosophical enquiry (see e.g. Lia Formigari, *A History of Language Philosophies*, (London: John Benjamins, 2004), p 98; and is relevant to discussions about the emergence, development and shifts in scientific demonstrations as explored by historians of science (see e.g. Steven Shapin, 1988; 1994). In classical Greek the term *demonstration* has at least fourteen different inflections, and twenty words whose definition contain “demonstrate” which suggests a far wider range of nuances than the two mentioned here. See for instance <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/>.

³¹³ *Oxford English Dictionary*.

The notion of a demonstration implies the existence of a staged and singular event. In English, demonstration has apparently two distinct senses. On the one hand, it is taken to refer to a form of political event: a collective public protest. On the other hand, demonstration is a scientific and technical event.³¹⁴

While single eventful demonstrations evoke questions about *what happened* the salience of concentrated periods of demonstrations resides in questions about what such happenings have changed. Most obviously, extended periods of demonstrations are seen as the precursors or even the causes of entire changes in the social order, as in the events of 1848 or as the precursors of significant social change, as in the events of May 68. At the time of writing, forty years after the events of May 68, commentary and debate about what the events were about, what they have changed, attempted to change, or failed to change continues.

The public demonstration is political and/or contestable, as Andrew Barry explains it, because 'the telling of a truth in public can never be described as disinterested – it is always intended to have effects on, or challenge the minds, or affect the conduct of others.'³¹⁵ It becomes especially contested when it can be said to be 'of interest to a *wider* collective.'³¹⁶ Questions about the identity of the collective (discussed in chapter 1: The significance

³¹⁴ Andrew Barry, 'Political events', paper presented at a workshop on 'The Governmental and the Political', School of Politics, International Relations and Philosophy, Keele University, June 2002, p 3.

³¹⁵ Andrew Barry, 'Demonstrations: Sites and Sights of Direct Action', *Economy & Society*, (Vol. 28, No. 1, 1999), p 77.

³¹⁶ Andrew Barry, 'Political Events', June, 2002, p 10.

of political demonstrations is most often gauged in terms of questions about agency or agencies thought to be the driving force of such change.) can be 'considered part of the political expansion of the scope of event.'³¹⁷ If a public demonstration is simply defined as a *show* of some thing, the production of a trend of representations about *what it shows* is what makes it eventful. This is what Isabelle Stengers means when she states that although the measure of *the event* is the object of multiple interpretations, *the event* can also be measured by the very multiplicity of those interpretations.³¹⁸

Demonstration events, whether they represent single or aggregate cases (or both as with *Seattle*), are typically employed as illustrative foci, as markers or indicators of some kind of change. In this regard they are perfunctory indicators. They are used to *show that*. The demonstration becomes a nexus of *change* variously defined. Whether they are seen to 'succeed' to 'fail', the association between *demonstrations* (variously defined) and *change* (variously defined) has become habitual. The foregoing discussions in chapters 1-4 highlight the operation of two prevailing definitions of change in relation to the political demonstration – the social movement interest in *social change* and police-protest explanations of *reciprocal change*. Literatures discussed in chapter 1 indicate a prevailing interest in action and space. Here *the event* is analytically expanded through discourses on political action. Questions are

³¹⁷ Ibid, n 10, p 12.

³¹⁸ Isabelle Stengers, *The Invention of Modern Science*, trans. Daniel W. Smith, (London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), p 66-7.

especially framed as issues of changes in the spacing of political action, and what this in turn signifies. This is especially evident in the use of the Seattle to furnish a by now significant body of literature on movements and change. The Seattle case has also become an important starting point for re conceptualising police-protest reciprocal change. In this way, the significance of demonstrations is measured or assessed through specific definitions of *change*. Social change and reciprocal change represent two ways of tempering and managing the complex nexus of actions, interactions and transactions that comprise the demonstration. However, as seen with both approaches, the idea of *protest-change* is significantly equated with *demonstration-change*.

Since the starting or initiating focus for dichotomous police-protest accounts is based on the category of protest, assumptions about changes in protest are by implication equated with changes in demonstrations as sites of events. In second approach, issues about *what happened* are invariably structured around the police-protest dichotomy. The police-protest dichotomy not only focuses descriptions, explanations and accounts of the demonstration but also becomes something like a first-order representation of it. The last two chapters show how in non analytic discourse *demonstration-change* is automatically measured through a standardised police-protest interpretive dichotomy.

Compared to social movement approaches the police-protest dichotomy provides the most directly relevant focus for questions about the political

demonstration, that is, it does not wholly consign the demonstration to the margins. Nevertheless it still restricts questions about demonstration to questions about protest. It alerts us not to how the demonstration has changed but ostensibly to how protest has changed. If the dichotomy acts as a way of deciding *what happened* as well as determining the significance of *what happened*, it does not act as a decision about the demonstration as a complex site of interaction. In this sense, it deflects from the issue of how demonstrations as sites of interaction might be subject to change.

The central problem of the thesis is to examine whether or the extent to which the case of *J18 (London)* represents an instance of transformation in *the demonstration*. However, the demonstration is always read through the dichotomy which reinstates the problem that the dichotomy is always already a framework for decision. What is the relation between the interpretive dichotomy and the demonstration?

As a political event, the demonstration is contestable, although the form through which its contestability can be rendered is of course the protest-police dichotomy. Ultimately, the purpose is to examine the extent to which it is practicably possible to equate the idea of change in police-protest dynamics with change in demonstrations. How might it be possible to look at how an event of this kind breaks with its designation as a demonstration? This is a general problem.

If the literature reviewed in chapter 1 uses demonstration as a starting point from which to explore the variation of action in space, the aim here will be to shift the focus to look at variation in demonstrations through time. The aim of this is to consider alternative analytic possibilities rather than to offer a comprehensive survey of change in demonstrations through time.

As discussed in the previous chapter McAdam et al have likened police-protest demonstration repertoires to a form of correspondence or conversation. It becomes possible to discern the day-to-day changes in the conversations and exchanges that occur within demonstrations through incessant shifts and switches between protest and policing.

Nevertheless, from this approach, no change in police-protest dynamics would be sufficient to have any significant impact on the form of demonstration. There is no way in principle that the terms of police-protest interaction can exceed the terms of the demonstration; it is the interaction between them that makes and remakes that site. That is why the site is read through the dichotomy.

Castells' network society is as important for theorising changes in the timing and spacing of *policing* as it is for looking at the same in *protest*. Both forms are characterised by greater mobility, in terms of information-technology mediated action, and both are more mobile across conventional

boundaries. Thus on the one hand, while it is possible to create an impressive catalogue of simultaneous and analogous change in both forms, as documented in what for the purposes of comparison might be called 'primary literatures', reciprocal change-oriented approaches must emphasise a time-lag between *action* and *reaction*. From this angle, analysis struggles to represent these and other findings evenly. This is peculiar to the combined studies approach. In the very process of juxtaposing *protest* and *policing*, one is petitioned to make a number of decisions about how to select and organise data. For instance, the issue of the increased mobility of *policing* practices look significantly different once *policing* is juxtaposed with *protest*.

The political demonstration represents a particular form of contestation, one that is signified as well as decided by the police-protest dichotomy. Although the dichotomy is a crucial device for looking at and accounting for demonstrations the relation between the forms of activity to which it refers, and metonymies or second-order meanings, becomes over-determined. Because the dichotomy becomes self-referential there is a sense in which it 'fixes' the capacity to identify transformations in the demonstration as a form of engagement.

Historical research has charted the emergence, development and standardisation of demonstrations over time. If it is possible to discern patterns of emergence and standardisation, this may provide some clues about how to look at de- and possibly also re-standardisation in

demonstrations. A particular point of interest is how the dichotomy features in historical research about the development of innovations, as well as the build up of expectations and conventions that bolstered the emergence of the demonstration. The demonstration, as Charles Tilly explains it, is both an innovation and a 'remarkable political invention'.

What is the relation between the emergence and standardisation of the demonstration and the police-protest dichotomy? This can be examined in several ways: Tilly's work provides an overall, general account of the standardisation of political demonstration. This will be considered first. But also specific social histories enable a particular focus on demonstrations in London. In addition to considering the role of the dichotomy in explaining the emergence and standardisation of the demonstration, social histories also account in more detail for the emergence of regulations of spaces of public assembly. The work of Rodney Mace on Trafalgar Square, and the period 1886-7, will be a particular focus here. So as to look at the questions these reviews raise from another angle, the following section will focus on how questions of sites and space feature in explanations of the emergence of the scientific demonstration two centuries earlier. This review of historical research will provide a basis on which to reconsider the problem of how to look at demonstration change. The review will be contrasted with accounts of more contemporary, space-specific political demonstrations, and focus on Andrew Barry's account of two instances UK anti-roads sites in the mid-1990s.

2. THE DEMONSTRATION IN HISTORY

Dichotomous and multi-agency creative interaction

Historical accounts have highlighted the development of informal or unwritten codes of conduct between demonstrators and police during periods of sustained interaction between these two groups often. Farge and Revel for instance explore turbulent events in mid-eighteenth century Paris that express 'the ambiguous everyday relationship existing between the people and public authority'. Rodney Mace's account of the history of Trafalgar Square as a space of contested meanings often involves issues of the dynamics of police-protest interaction as will be seen. Elsewhere, Arlette Farge's study of public opinion in eighteenth-century France outlines a dynamic between what could be considered subversive popular discourse and public authority. The juxtaposition of 'protest' and 'policing' often betrays the complexities, not only of the interaction sites, but also the variety of issues involved. Mace and Farge consider the emergence of two sites within which different notions of public space historically emerge. While the former considers the history of a space on which public convergences occur, Farge considers the emergence of public spheres that cannot be reduced to the realm of enlightened discourse to which they are largely restricted.

Tilly's emphasis on the demonstration as an example of the way in which repertoires designate at least pairs of actors has been highlighted through this discussion. Although the demonstration emerges as a multi-agency form in this work, Tilly's research on the standardisation of repertoires of interaction has especially focussed on dichotomous interaction. One way of discerning patterns of standardisation is to look at the role of negotiation and the development of rules and conventions, which can especially, though not exclusively, be discerned through a focus on police and protesters. Since Tilly's source of data is a machine-readable catalogue of over 800 cases of 'contentious gathering' spanning 13 years between 1758 and 1820, the dichotomy also becomes a way of organising that record. His accounts of the street demonstration explain standardisation over an extended period.

While the issue of police-protest is central in this regard it might also be noted that the forms to which *protest* and *policing* refer are both varied and anachronistic. There is considerable differentiation within the forms of action that are reduced as such. For instance, in Britain during the later part of the eighteenth century, although people attended or participated in public political gatherings they did not 'engage in demonstrations as distinct displays of massed will.'³¹⁹ Nor was the policing of public meetings unitary: policing in a broad sense was undertaken by a range of groups

³¹⁹ Charles Tilly, 'Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758-1834', in M. Traugott, ed., *Repertoires & Cycles of Collective Action*, (London: Duke University Press, 1995), p 31.

including 'private guards, game wardens, local constables, posses, militias, and regular armies.'³²⁰

It was not until the beginning of the next century that the term demonstration gained currency (in the 1830s). For Tilly, the street demonstration which 'consists of gathering deliberately in a visible, symbolically important place, displaying signs of shared commitment to some claim on authorities, then dispersing', is 'a form of action that crystallized in Western Europe and North America between 1780 and 1850'.

³²¹ For Tilly, a two-century intricate process was involved in the evolution of street demonstrations which 'became a standard instrument of social movement activists',³²² though not before a two-century-old process by which 'solemn processions and presentations of petitions evolved into street demonstrations.'³²³

Before considering the relation between dichotomous interaction and the demonstration, it may be useful to begin a review of Tilly's work by looking in more detail at how and why he defines the demonstration as a multi-agency form. This has been examined as the creative interaction of at least pairs of actors, to illustrate how repertoires of interaction, 'like their theatrical counterparts...designate not individual performances, but means of *interaction*'³²⁴ among multiple actors and actor groups. The

³²⁰ Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 205.

³²¹ Ibid, p 30.

³²² Charles Tilly, 'Political Identities in Changing Polities', *Social Research*, (Vol. 70, No. 2), 2003, p 617.

³²³ Ibid, p 616.

³²⁴ Charles Tilly, 1995, p 27.

demonstration is a site of interaction, involving a complex of actions and a form that designates actions that connect sets of individuals, rather than one that simply a type of performance that is available to, or used by only one form of political action:

For Tilly, the demonstration is one of many 'contentious repertoires', and repertoires of contention have their own distinct histories. What is emphasised here are 'improvisatory adventures' between different sets of actors. Improvised learning, adaptation and innovation requires the interaction of 'at least pairs of players':

Creative interaction appears most visibly in such activities as jazz and soccer. In these cases, participants work within rough agreements on procedures and outcomes; arbiters set limits on performances, individual dexterity, knowledge; and disciplined preparation generally yield superior play. Yet the rigid equivalent of military drill destroys the enterprise. Both jazz and soccer, when well executed, proceed through improvised interaction, surprise, incessant error and error-correction, alternation between solo and ensemble action, and repeated responses to understandings shared by at least pairs of players. After the fact, participants and spectators create shared stories of what happened, and striking improvisations shape future performances.³²⁵

a repertoire of actions resembles not individual consciousness but a language; although individuals and groups know and deploy the actions in a repertoire, the actions connect sets of individuals and groups. Demonstrations have many variants: with or without marches through the

³²⁵ Ibid.

streets, with or without speeches, with or without the trappings of parades such as uniforms, costumes, banners, sings, musicians, songs, and chanted slogans. Demonstrations broadcast a multiple of numbers and commitment to a cause, with signs of intense commitment compensating to some degree for small crowds. In all their variants, demonstrations involve at least four actors: demonstrators, objects of their claims, specialists in official control of public space (usually police), and spectators.³²⁶

These four actor groups are the mainstay of the demonstration, although in reality the site often involves a far broader range of actors:

They often involve others: reporters for mass media; counterdemonstrators; allies such as dissident members of the ruling class; spies; operators of nearby establishments that crowd action might engage or endanger; pickpockets; gangs itching for a fight; political scientists eager to observe street politics, and so on.³²⁷

This provides a general sense of the intricacies of the historical demonstration as a multi-agency, multi-interest convergence complex.

The emergence and standardisation of the political demonstration

It is specifically the interaction between the first and third of Tilly's four basic demonstration actor groups that sharpens a general outline of the emergence of the nineteenth century street demonstration, as just one of

³²⁶ Ibid, pp 30-1.

³²⁷ Ibid, p 31.

the forms of interaction to which eighteenth century repertoires gave way. A subsequent focus on dichotomous interaction makes it possible to discern trends and patterns in the gradual standardisation of the street demonstration.

The French forms of the demonstration emerged from intense, continuous bargaining between various political claimants and public authorities, especially police officials, from the 1830s through the early twentieth century. The result was a dramatic narrowing and standardization of the actions that made up a demonstration, an increasing differentiation of demonstrations from public meetings, processions, parades, funerals, festivals, strikes, and insurrections. In Great Britain the demonstration took shape earlier than in France but through a similar process of experimentation, bargaining, and standardization shaped by intense interaction between demonstrators and authorities ... By the 1820s political organizers and public authorities were clearly negotiating agreements about street demonstrations, although the word itself gained currency only in the 1830s.³²⁸

It is especially in tracing the moments leading to the standardisation of demonstration as a distinct repertoire that the police-protest dichotomy becomes the central focus. This enables a perspective for instance, on standardisation; how compared to their eighteenth-century predecessors, 'the nineteenth-century forms had a national, modular, and autonomous character':

³²⁸ Ibid, pp 31-32.

They were national in often referring to interests and issues that spanned many localities or affected centers of power whose actions touched many localities. They were modular in that the same forms served many different localities, actors, and issues. They were autonomous in beginning of the claimants' own initiative and establishing direct communication between the claimants and those nationally significant centers of power. Yet they involved less direct action and immediate redress of grievances than their eighteenth-century predecessors.³²⁹

Tilly notes that 'A fortiori, general public meetings and street demonstrations on behalf of a self-defined interest took a long time to gain acceptance'. The focus on police-protest interaction becomes a pivot around which to chart the gradual emergence of negotiating agreements. In particular the development of variously formalised channels of communication, and interaction conventions between police or protesters occupy a central role in tracing the evolution of the demonstration. Thus even though repertoires and creative interaction involve at least pairs of actors in the wider outline of demonstrations, the police-protest dichotomy can be invoked to sharpen aspects of such an outline.

In Tilly's work, demonstrations have become 'a standard instrument of social movement activists', but they are also implicated in the standardisation of other forms, notably of 'a new, relatively nonviolent set of police practices for containing public assemblies'. The basic dualism is useful in showing how the modern demonstration gradually crystallised through repeated inter-actions between 'protest' and 'policing'. It acts so

³²⁹ Ibid, p34.

as to focus a broad characterisation of how the street demonstration took shape and crystallised in different ways in different times and places.

‘Broken negotiations’

Negotiation provided for the creation of ‘limits on all parties and increased the predictability of encounters in the course of demonstrations.’

Over the demonstration’s long history, organizers frequently struck bargains in advance with authorities and police. Negotiation among organizers, demonstrators, authorities, and police took place both before and during demonstrations.

The specialisation of police forces occurred once people had the right to assemble:

Once it became difficult or even illegal to send in regular troops simply because people were demonstrating or striking – authorities created specialized police forces ... The authorities put police in uniform to mark them off from the general population and to advertise their presence. Just as police facilitated their daily work on the beat by creating networks of informers and collaborators, they dealt with crowd control in part by infiltrating dissident organizations, bargaining out parade routes with leaders of protests, and calling out extra forces to police elections, public ceremonies, mass meetings, and major strikes. Early stages of the transition to policed demonstrations usually produced extensive violence ... They did so because rights of assembly and speech remained in dispute; because people challenged the authority of the new police, because at first all parties were jockeying for advantage in unanticipated ways, and because it took

time to work out standard rules of engagement ... The creation of specialized police forces nevertheless changed the relationship between demonstrators and collective violence. Police generally worked to prevent or contain demonstration. They threatened, patrolled, spied on, and infiltrated – but also negotiated with – organizers.³³⁰

‘Demonstration violence came to concentrate heavily in the category of broken negotiations: relatively low salience of damage and fairly high level of coordination as a by-product of largely nonviolent interactions.’³³¹ When violence did occur, it could be seen as a consequence of ‘failed bargaining, unanticipated encounters, breakaways by dissidents, or disruptions of coordination on one side or another.’³³²

Following that, variations can also be gauged, and within that a number of further variations: although forms of demonstration are distinct and recognisable as such, forms within it – the public meeting in an enclosed space, the assembly in an open public space and the disciplined street march’ – which sometimes combine, ‘each stems from a somewhat different prehistory, with substantial country-to-country variation according to political structure and legal codes.’³³³

Nevertheless, three features of the demonstration and related performances introduce significant particularity into their histories: first, their evolution

³³⁰ Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p 205.

³³¹ Ibid, p207.

³³² Ibid, p 207.

³³³ Charles Tilly, ‘Introduction to Part II: Invention, Diffusion, and the Transformation of the Social Movement Repertoire’, *European History Review*, (Vol. 12, No. 2, 2005), p 313.

from distinctive national traditions; second, the negotiation and adaptation that goes into the very process of diffusion; and third, the local culture that informs the actual operation of any transplanted performance...‘Modular’ performances ordinarily show two faces: one presenting a recognizable visage to the outside world, the other encoding local secrets and symbols.³³⁴

Tilly notes that the working out of standard rules of engagement took time, but that this occurred in particular ways within particular contexts and setting. While the accounts highlight the diversity of actor groups, a general albeit historical police-protest dichotomy acts as a means for seeking patterns in the general of a form that have regional specificities.

Trafalgar Square

Social histories provide additional insight into the relation between the regularisation of political demonstrations and their relation to evolving forms of protest as well as policing in London. What follows provides an account of the spacing of the demonstration in mid-nineteenth century London. This provides an opportunity to consider the issue of negotiated agreements around demonstration events, and their situation in London, or more specifically still, in particular sites within London.

Rodney Mace’s study of *Trafalgar Square* is not a study of political demonstration *per se*. It offers a perspective on the Square as a ceremonial site, a site of struggle, and a place of contested meanings. Although the

³³⁴ Ibid, p 313.

Square was designed as a nineteenth century imperial space, it became a site for public political gatherings. Nearby Charing Cross was for three hundred years 'the site for a continuing sparring match between the State and the people...Charing Cross was, as it were, "without" the Palace of Whitehall walls, a place where the "State" and "People" could and did demonstrate their often mutual distaste and disapproval of each other, and sometimes their pleasure and rejoicing.'

³³⁵

During times of social unrest or political disturbance, for instance 1848 and 1886-7, special efforts were made to protect ceremonial sites like the Square. In 1848, a hardening of the ban of public meetings in Trafalgar Square had the impact of moving assemblies to Hyde Park (meetings in the street were unlawful). The alternative site was deemed 'less of a threat to the centre of Government'³³⁶ than the former. At this time it appears that authorities were sensitive to banning meetings altogether, although between then and the early 1870s a certain degree of ambiguity remained, not so much in terms of negotiating agreements between police and protesters, but with regard to the status of sites like Trafalgar Square, and right and regulation of assembly therein. The passing of the Royal Parks and Gardens Acts in 1872 had the effect of clearing up only some of this ambiguity.³³⁷

³³⁵ Rodney Mace, *Trafalgar Square: Emblem of Empire*, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), pp 23-4.

³³⁶ Rodney Mace, 1976, p 156.

³³⁷ *Ibid*, p 158.

The period 1886-7 in particular raised a number of questions about the status of the Square, particularly since rising unemployment among casual and unskilled workers, and a corresponding increase in the rate of homelessness brought an influx of 'nightly campers' into the Square in 1886. Mace's account of the period 1886-92 provides a focus to look at the development of a dynamic, not so much between 'broken negotiations' and the partial regularisation and standardisation of public political demonstrations, but of the designation of spaces within which public assemblies could take place.

In Mace's account it emerges that discontent, political unrest, as well as various organised political activities steadily emerging from a range of quarters, converged in Trafalgar Square on 8 February 1886:

In the early part of 1886 several socialist and social democratic organisations were trying, by one means or another, to organise the unemployed. As is usual in such times, the working class were not only assisted by the organised left towards a resolution of their plight but were constantly assailed by propaganda in one form or another by the right. On this occasion the Tories told them that unemployment was the result of "Free Trade" and unfair foreign competition. The "Tory Fair Traders" (or to give them their proper title on this occasion "The London United Workers Committee") had organised several small demonstrations in London during January leading up to what they expected to be their longest and most effective protest so far, a mass demonstration in Trafalgar Square on 8 February...Thus it was that on 8 February in Trafalgar Square, three groups, the Fair Traders, the S.D.F. and a large group of unemployed workers with

no particular affiliation to any cause except their own cold despair, gathered in the Square to demonstrate their grievances. The police, caught a little off guard with only sixty-six men present, made attempts to get the leaders to persuade the crowd to disperse. When this did not succeed, they asked for an orderly procession to be led to Hyde Park. This the S.D.F. speakers agreed to do...As the demonstration moved off along Pall Mall it was abused by "clubmen" from the safety of their first floor windows...The demonstrators returned the abuse with stones, the S.D.F. quickly lost control, and riot ensued. Looting began, and breaking of windows continued up St. James' and into Piccadilly and later Oxford Street where £40 worth of damage was done to Peter Robinson's and £80 worth to Marshall & Snelgrove's. People were assaulted, carriages overturned, and the crowd's activities were relatively unhampered by the police.³³⁸

Mace finds that 'As subsequent events were to show, the importance of 8 February was not that a demonstration took place and some property was damaged, but lay in the strength of the middle-class reaction.' The *Times* for instance described 'some mysterious sympathy'³³⁹ and a crowd that 'continued under concealed leaders.'³⁴⁰ A sense of panic continued to escalate the following day with reports of the return of "the disorderly classes", and of 'ten thousand...destroying as they came'³⁴¹, although most of these rumours were unfounded.³⁴²

³³⁸ Ibid, pp 164-5.

³³⁹ The *Times*, 9 February 1886, in R. Mace, 1976, n23, p 201.

³⁴⁰ Ibid.

³⁴¹ Rodney Mace, 1976, p 166.

³⁴² No large groups were seen approaching from any direction although as many as several thousand people had gathered in various places waiting to join a procession.

A Report to Enquire into the Origin and Character of the Disturbance that took place in the metropolis on the 8th Day of February, 1886 and the conduct of the Police Authorities in Relation thereto, was instituted, and a Committee of Inquiry met to take evidence from 15 – 20 February. The Committee highlighted weaknesses in the police performance and made a seven-point recommendation to that effect:

- '1. Insufficient number of officers of superior rank and education.
2. Want of a more efficient telegraphic system.
3. Absence of an adequate force of mounted police.
4. A defective chain of responsibility among the superior officers of the force.
5. A want of published police regulations for dealing with large meetings.
6. The position and duty of officers in charge of meetings.
7. Absence of a proper system of communication with the Home Office in the event of emergency.'³⁴³

On the day after the inquiry the SDF held a meeting at Hyde Park which was attended by a large civil force representing around one fifth of Metropolitan Police numbers. Troops were also in attendance, as was a magistrate in various locations, who would 'accompany the troops to the disturbances and if need be read out aloud the appropriate dispersing clause of the 1715 Riot Act.'³⁴⁴ In the event, Sir Edmund Henderson, the third Metropolitan Police Chief Commissioner resigned, and was replaced by Sir Charles Warren.

³⁴³ R. Rodney Mace, p 168.

³⁴⁴ Ibid, pp 168-9.

By the summer, the continuing economic situation had added to already high levels of unemployment, particularly among unskilled and casual workers. Sir Charles Warren received letters from the Vestry of St Martin's-in-the-Fields complaining of the 'unseemly conduct of persons sleeping at night in Trafalgar Square and performing their ablutions in the morning in the basins of the fountains...'³⁴⁵ and 'the most terrible sight of open-air human misery in Europe.'³⁴⁶ If the response of some was to urge for public support to 'bring some comfort to these poor creatures, who, it may be in many cases from no fault of their own have come to this', the response of others such as the SDF was to organise under the banner *Not Charity, But Work* by late September 1887.

It was these first signs of an organised movement among the "inhabitants of the Square" that prompted Sir Charles Warren, against the advice of some of his officers, to invoke the relevant clauses in the Vagrancy Act in order to clear the Square. The Act, he said, was to be "enforced more in the spirit of charity than punishment". However, the carrying out of the order was not to be straightforward. For quite soon the daily use of the police began arousing considerable and unfavourable comment from the Press and some of the local inhabitants. This comment, needless to say, was no march for the powerful voices supporting the police's action. On 17 October, Sir Charles Warren gave orders for the clearing and temporary closure of the Square "for the safety of the Metropolis".³⁴⁷

³⁴⁵ 'bathing or paddling' was one of the acts prohibited by *The Trafalgar Square Regulations*, 1952, See R. Mace, 1976, Appendix G, p 297.

³⁴⁶ Rodney Mace, 1976, p 171.

³⁴⁷ Ibid, pp 175-6.

Public meetings and demonstrations continued in Trafalgar Square, Hyde Park, Charing Cross and elsewhere. For the Chief Commissioner the position in the Square was becoming an increasingly source of concern. For him, demonstrations that initially seemed disorganised were beginning to cohere as a result of 'constant practice' and also because it was 'now the policy of the mob leaders to settle in private their tactics for each day on how to elude the police'. The most important concern however was that: 'by some private signals they appear able to get together now to the number of two or three thousand in two or three minutes about the region of Charring Cross.'³⁴⁸ Thus in the beginning of November the Commissioner issued an order prohibiting all meetings and gatherings in the Square: 'Notices of the Order were pasted up before dawn all over London the following day. As in 1848 the stage seemed set for a final battle.'³⁴⁹

One effect of the ban was to increase support for a proposed meeting in the Square on Sunday 13 November which was initially organised to bear witness against the imprisonment of William O'Brien in Ireland:

Outraged by this denial of the freedom of speech, groups such as the Metropolitan Radical Association and the newly formed Law and Liberty League (among the aims of which was the establishment of popular control of the police) came together and drew up hasty plans for joining the demonstration.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ Ibid, p 177.

³⁴⁹ Ibid, p 179.

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p 179.

Sir Charles Warren issued a further notice of prohibition on 12 November that 'No organised procession shall be allowed to approach Trafalgar Square on Sunday 13 inst.'³⁵¹

Although by the middle of the afternoon the organised ranks of the demonstrators had been broken one by one as they came into conflict with Sir Charles Warren's outer cordon; this did not, of course, prevent individuals and small groups from continuing on separately. On arriving at the Square these "helpless units", as William Morris called them, faced an impenetrable mass of 1,500 police. Here too, mounted police repeatedly charged upon people on the roads and pavements alike and, as before, the demonstrators defended themselves.³⁵²

Mounted and foot police were also assisted by troops. As the 1st Life Guards formed around the police cordon divided into two, the 2nd Life Guards appeared in the middle of Whitehall so that the gathering of people was hemmed in between police and soldiers:

When at ten to five a detachment of Grenadier Guards appeared from behind the National Gallery with rifles on their shoulders, their bayonets fixed and twenty rounds of ball cartridge in their pockets cries of "We want free speech" and "Britain shall not be ruled by leaden bayonets" arose from the crowd. As the Grenadiers got in front of the National Gallery they opened their lines and drove the crowd off into the road and into the police. Some of those demonstrators who resisted found themselves looking at the point of a bayonet, while others received punches to the face or blows to the shins with rifle butts. This show of force by the police and the military could

³⁵¹ Ibid, p 181.

³⁵² Ibid, p 188.

find no match in the demonstrators and by the early evening most of them had made their weary way home. By 7.15 only the regular to and fro of the patrolling Life Guards disturbed the emptiness of the Square.³⁵³

The events of what came to be known as Bloody Sunday³⁵⁴ had a number of effects, including the swearing in of thousands of special constables for more than a fortnight afterwards.³⁵⁵ On the 18th November Sir Charles Warren issued a further ban on demonstrations and processions in the Square. The order read: 'No meeting shall be allowed to assemble or any person allowed to deliver a public speech in Trafalgar Square or in the streets or thoroughfare adjoining or leading to it. ... These regulations and directions are to continue until further notice.'³⁵⁶ A large demonstration of strength in police numbers in and around the Square followed two days later.³⁵⁷ Police were aware of a peaceful 'indignation' meeting taking place at Hyde Park on the same day. At the end of this meeting, many returned to their homes via Trafalgar Square 'just to see if Sir Charles Warren's display of strength was really as great as rumour had it':

³⁵³ Ibid, p 189.

³⁵⁴ 'During the whole day at least 200 people were treated at the local hospitals for injuries received by batons or horse hooves. Two people 'W. B. Curner and a man called Cornell, were to die within a couple of weeks as a result of their injuries. Another victim, a man called Harrison, died after a long illness.' (189)

³⁵⁵ John Burgess wrote that: 'For more than a fortnight after Bloody Sunday, Trafalgar Square was in a state of siege. On Friday, the 18th, thousands of special constables were sworn in. On Sunday the 20th the Square was garrisoned by 5,000 constables, 20,000 specials, 1,300 specials in reserve, of whom 500 were posted in Palace Yard and the remained in Marlborough House.' (R. Mace, 1976, p 192).

³⁵⁶ Rodney Mace, 1976, p 195.

³⁵⁷ '2,000 were posted to Trafalgar Square by one o'clock, 1,000 to St. James' Park an hour later, and a further 2,000 were evenly distributed to Russell Square, Lancaster Gate, Hanover Gardens, Berkeley Square, Grosvenor Square and Great Cumberland Place. All this plus a show of both regular foot and horse police...'. R. Mace, 1976, p 192.

As the crowds gathered the mounted police began plunging through them “in a fashion with which London is now so familiar”. During one of these “wild charges”, which a witness later described as though the police “were trying to imitate the heroes of Balaclava”, a young, radical law-writer, Alfred Linnell, fell and was trampled on by a police horse. With his thigh smashed, Linnell “was carried groaning in his agony across the turbulent eddying flood of human life that surged round the Square” to Charing Cross Hospital where he died on 3 December.³⁵⁸

The regulation of public meetings in public spaces

The legality of the ban on demonstrations was not openly challenged until March the following year in a debate in the House of Commons during which Sir Charles Russell, the Liberal MP for Hackney South, put the following motion:

That having regard to the importance of preserving and protecting the right of open air meetings for Her Majesty’s subjects in the Metropolis and with a view to preventing ill will and disorder, it is desirable that an enquiry should be instituted by a committee of this House into the conditions subject to which such meetings may be held and the limits of the right of interference therewith by the Executive Government.³⁵⁹

Sir Charles highlighted four main points: that the Chief Commissioner’s actions would not have arisen if London had been a self-governing community; that the Square was a ‘no man’s land’ given that it did not fall within the jurisdiction of the 1872 Royal Parks Act; that given that the

³⁵⁸ Rodney Mace, 1976, p 192.

³⁵⁹ Ibid, p 195.

Square was 'created by public money for public accommodation' (roughly three quarters of a million pounds), the assumption of the 1844 Act that it belonged to the Crown was mistaken; and that the 1844 Act was 'a statute for *regulating*, not *preventing*, processions or meetings.'³⁶⁰ The question of the ban was not raised again until June 1890 when the Home Secretary confirmed that the November 1887 ban remained in force. The impasse continued until August 1892 when the Tory government was defeated by the Liberals at the general election, after which a set of regulations covering public meetings in Trafalgar Square had been drawn up and come into effect on 31 October of the same year.

The new regulations stated that 'it is expedient that public meeting should be permitted to be held in Trafalgar Square, subject to such regulations as may be necessary with a view to the public convenience and safety and due to the observance of order'. The regulations required that: public meetings should be held between specific times on specific days, that meetings were required to give 'four clear days' notice to the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, that 'speeches shall not be delivered except from places authorised by the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Works and Public Buildings', and that 'Not more than one meeting will be allowed at the same time'.

Hyde Park and sites of assembly

³⁶⁰ Ibid, p 195.

The right to public assembly was never 'recognized by English law',³⁶¹ (although Article 11 of the *Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union* now provides for such a right). On some accounts provisions for public assembly were instead inscribed into the police perception of its duties and functions.³⁶² Thus the issue of public assembly has been governed by a degree of ambiguity. Moreover, different conventions have been written into different spaces within London. For instance, unlike Trafalgar Square, Hyde Park came under the 1872 Parks Regulation Act.³⁶³ Free speech on that site was regulated as such, but also incorporated into the Rules of Hyde Park. Yet although the Act of 1872 designated a site in Hyde Park for public meetings, there was no legal guarantee of free speech:

What was ... unique about the 1872 Act is that it extended police powers across the Royal Parks and, in effect, established a new police unit dealing exclusively with matters concerning those Parks. While the Metropolitan Police still governed Hyde Park after 1872...Park Rangers could nevertheless feed their expert knowledge to the Metropolitan Police. In addition, parliament established separate Rules for each Royal Park in London.³⁶⁴

³⁶¹ P. A. J. Waddington, 'Controlling Protest', *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in Western Democracies*, Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter, eds., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p 129.

³⁶² For instance: 'The police perception of their task includes recognizing the unquestioned right of citizens to protest'. Ibid, p 129.

³⁶³ 'In 1974 the Parks Regulation (Amendment) Act was passed and the Royal Parks Keepers became the Royal Parks Constabulary (RPC). After a review of the RPC by Anthony Speed, The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) took on the responsibility for policing the Royal Parks on 1st April 2004.' <http://www.royalparks.org.uk/about/police.cfm> (accessed September 2008).

³⁶⁴ John Michael Roberts, 'Expressive Free Speech, the State and the Public Sphere: A Bakhtinian-Deleuzian Analysis of 'Public Address' at Hyde Park', *Social Movement Studies*, (Vol. 7, No. 2, 2008), p 108.

If objections about public assembly are raised they are more likely to dispute the suitability of the site for assembly rather than the right of assembly. It was on these grounds that the Minister for Culture banned a march to Hyde Park's Speaker's Corner as recently as 2003, on the occasion of the 15 February anti-war march. The ban was later revoked and the minister issued the following statement:

I have today agreed that Hyde Park should be the venue for the Stop the War rally on 15 February. This follows several days of intensive work by my Department to find a better venue for the Rally. Everyone agrees that Hyde Park is far from ideal for an event of this kind at this time of year...The right of protestors to organise and take part in peaceful marches and rallies has never been questioned. The issue has only ever been to find a venue that is as safe as possible for those taking part.³⁶⁵

Focussing on Hyde Park as a site of public assembly, John Michael Roberts follows a 'dialogic struggle' between the state and users of the space for debate and discussion. He notes that three public-speech metaphors – the right to enjoy unrestricted utterances; the right to participate freely in a marketplace of ideas; and the right to engage in serious and meaningful debate – that have developed on and as part of the site, have been subject to specific forms of regulation and, moreover, that 'these regulatory forms have been created historically through expressive performative struggles

³⁶⁵ http://www.culture.go.uk/reference_library/minister_speeches/2094.aspx (accessed September 2008).

between the state and different groups using Hyde Park to exercise free speech.’³⁶⁶

Although something like a police-protest dynamic emerges in this part of Rodney Mace’s study of Trafalgar Square, it is also clear that the forms of *protest* and *policing* being described here did not refer to a unified form of policing or to a single claim-making agency. For instance, the events indicate a simultaneous de standardisation and re standardisation of policing. While a process of establishing the new police in 1829³⁶⁷ indicated the development of a policing under civilian control, the events depicted here include the significant involvement of troops. The same events also indicate a significant consolidation of police numbers, no doubt as a response to concerns about the intensification of what were supposed to be organised political and other activities that either resulted from, or capitalised on the decline in the living standards of many of the region’s inhabitants.

In some respects, the events of 1886-92 indicate a continuing process of ‘standardization shaped by intense interaction between demonstrators and authorities’ that Tilly observes of the 1820s. This several-year period does not so much suggest the standardisation of public assemblies or the emergence of negotiating agreements; rather it especially highlights the consolidation of spaces on which this might be done. Also, considered in

³⁶⁶ John Michael Roberts, ‘Expressive Free Speech, the State and the Public Sphere: A Bakhtinian-Deleuzian Analysis of ‘Public Address’ at Hyde Park’, *Social Movement Studies*, (Vol. 7, No. 2, 2008), p 108.

³⁶⁷ A process that took place between 1829 and 1856 according to Robert Reiner.

relation to the regulation of Hyde Park, it indicates a more or less heterogeneous regularisation of places in which public meetings might be held.

Moreover, if the idea of the *political* demonstration was at this point still only half a century old, so too was the initiation of the new police as well as the emergence of the idea of *the masses* as a political subject, for which, in the English case, Chartism became a particular focus. There is an obvious way of connecting these developments. For instance, some accounts suggest that concerns for the social order that were prompted by Chartist agitation, were clearly at the forefront of debates for police reform throughout Britain.³⁶⁸ There is a sense in which historical narratives obviously converge to suggest something like a single form of political activity in relation to a unitary form of order and/or control, within the context of the demonstration as a very specific type of public convergence, gathering, meeting.

On the other hand, social histories especially highlight the heterogeneity of forms of action and interaction, public spaces, and their regulation. Detailed descriptions yield some insight into the particularities and particularisation of the spaces in which public gatherings occurred and even to the linking of these different sites. Mace's account especially draws attention to the ambiguities of the Square as both a site and a public space on which a great number of interests and issues could and often did

³⁶⁸ Robert Reiner, *The Politics of the Police*, third edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp 34-39.

converge. It was simultaneously a meeting place, and on occasions a place of shelter, a symbol of the Crown, of imperial pride, and of civic pride, a focus for authorities' concerns about the public order (following for instance the events of 1848), concerns about social conduct in public spaces, and so on. As Mace notes, 'as in any drama, the stage and all that is on it form an integral and indissoluble historical link with the narrative.'

3. THE SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HOUSE OF EXPERIMENT

The scientific demonstration

If the police-protest dichotomy manages the complex dynamics of sites that it renders, there is also a sense in which it can obfuscate questions about the sites on which the rehearsal of these dynamics is contingent. While it often leads to a focus on the interplay of specific or specified forms of agency, the dynamics of convergence and convergence spaces can be articulated in a number of other ways. For instance, two overall issues emerge from the foregoing discussion: on the one hand is the initial question about the historical emergence of the political demonstration in general, and on the other, an issue about the sites on which public meetings take place. In addition to the dynamics highlighted so far is an additional question about the relation between the sites on which demonstrations were performed and the demonstration itself as the site of events. Steven Shapin's study of the emergence and development of the scientific demonstration two centuries earlier is particularly concerned with this dynamic. Shapin has especially focused on the social settings in which claims to new knowledge were made:

The physical and the symbolic siting of experimental work was a way of bounding and disciplining the community of practitioners, it was a way of policing experimental discourse, and it was a way of publicly warranting that the knowledge produced in such places was reliable and authentic. That is to say, the place of experiment counted as a partial answer to the fundamental question, Why ought one to give one's assent to experimental knowledge claims?³⁶⁹

At the centre of the rise of a programme of systematic experimentation in the seventeenth century was the showing or the 'display to others of a working experiment, what is commonly called demonstration.'³⁷⁰ (What was most often being "tried" in experiment was some hypothesis or other explanatory item.'³⁷¹) The scientific demonstration in the seventeenth-century *House of Experiment* was thus a site within a site.

The scientific demonstration was not contestable because it involved claims-making by a collective, political identity (to simplify), but because it involved the making of knowledge-claims and claims to truth. Although political and scientific or technical demonstrations are distinct forms of showing with distinct histories of emergence, there is some sense in which some of these differences can be provisionally collapsed so as to examine further the issue raised above. As Andrew Barry explains it,

³⁶⁹ Steven Shapin, 'The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England', *ISIS*, (Vol. 79, No. 3, 1988), p 373-4.

³⁷⁰ Ibid, p 400.

³⁷¹ Ibid, p 400, n 75.

‘Demonstration, whether it is understood in a technical or a political sense, is, or can be made to be, a political matter.’³⁷²

Given Tilly’s specification of roughly speaking three streams of demonstration that often combine or interconnect, the scientific demonstration can be likened to ‘the public meeting in an enclosed space.’ To this, further distinctions of private and public space can be added. That is, while this form of demonstration mostly occurred in domestic space:

a house contains many types of functionally differentiated rooms, each with its conditions of access and conventions of appropriate conduct within them...social life within the house involves a circulation from one room to another ... the career of experimental knowledge is predicated upon some sort of circulation.’³⁷³

Scientific trials were, for practical reasons, conducted in a laboratory that might be at the back of a house. If scientific and technical trials in the contemporary laboratory demonstrate what is already known, the experimental trial in the seventeenth century carried a sense of risk and indiscipline:

The experimenter might not be in control of the scene. The thing might fail. It might fail for lack of technical competence on the part of the experimenter, or it might fail for want of theoretical resources required to display the phenomena docile. Trials were undisciplined experiments, and these, like undisciplined animals, children and

³⁷² Andrew Barry, ‘Demonstrations: sites and sights of direct action’, *Economy and Society* (Vol. 28, No. 1: February 1999), p 77.

³⁷³ Steven Shapin, ‘The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England’, *ISIS* (Vol. 79, No. 3, 1988), p 399.

strangers, might be deemed unfit to be displayed in public. That is why experimental trials were, in fact, almost invariably performed in relatively private spaces ... rather than in the public rooms of the Royal Society.³⁷⁴

Thus 'discussions about scientific findings and theories typically took place in the public rooms of the residences occupied by public persons.'³⁷⁵

The study emphasises a crucial distinction between "'trying" an experiment, "showing" it, and "discoursing" upon it' ('the force and sense of which seem to have escaped most historians of science.')³⁷⁶ If 'showing' relates to the display of a working experiment to others, 'trying' relates to the testing of an experiment. For Shapin the distinction is crucial because each of these aspects relates to often separate and distinct spheres of activity. The relation between trials and shows designates a relation between private and public space. Showing and discoursing, judging the success or veridicality of a trial were events that occurred in relatively public space.

But if the scientific demonstration provides another angle from which to observe the relation between the demonstration as the site of an event and the site of demonstrations, it offers little reprieve from issues of freedom, order, regulation and restraint. This study of 'the rise and institutionalization of a program devoted to systematic experimentation'

³⁷⁴ Steven Shapin, 'The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England', *ISIS*, (Vol. 79, No. 3, 1988), p 401.

³⁷⁵ Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth: Civility and science in Seventeenth-Century England*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994), p 409.

³⁷⁶ Steven Shapin, 'The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England', *ISIS*, (Vol. 79, No. 3, 1988), p 399.

documents the emergence and development of conventions surrounding the showing of scientific trials that sometimes contradicted traditional schemes of plausibility, but which also had to be regulated by a cognitive order.

On the one hand, 'changes in the foci of intellectual interest and in the boundaries of cultural participation' (from the early part of the century) 'brought new experiences to the attention of those who had previously not cared or known.'³⁷⁷ New ontological possibilities not only impressed receptive minds but also 'A degree of ontological openness was the mark of the free man as well as the wise man' who was compelled to make public, new knowledge. On the other hand, rules, regulations and conventions needed to be put in place in order to facilitate the process of making as well as warranting new knowledge claims. In the middle of the seventeenth century such decisions had not yet been formalised or institutionalised. Prior to the meetings of the Royal Society, experimental science was done within the private houses of public persons (such as William Hooke's rooms or Robert Boyle's laboratories). These were the physical and symbolic sites of experimental work around which 'conditions regulating access to such venues' and 'conventions governing the social relations within them' initially developed:

These conditions and conventions counted toward practical solutions of the questions of how one produced experimental knowledge, how one evaluated

³⁷⁷ Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth: Civility and science in Seventeenth-Century England*, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1994), p 194.

experimental claims, and how one mobilized and made visible morally adequate grounds for assenting to such claims.³⁷⁸

Since a degree of ontological openness was ‘the mark of the free man as well as the wise man’, truth-telling practices were not always uncontroversial:

There was no more characteristic ‘modern’ English philosophical move than the inversion of authority relations between word and world. Legitimate new experience must not be rejected because it conflicted with existing plausibility schemes; instead, those plausibility schemes must be set aside or rejected because they conflicted with legitimate new experience.³⁷⁹

For the most part, the ‘badge of gentry’ solved the problem of trust in underwriting social order. Shapin explains that solutions to the problem of trust were, necessary for building both social and cognitive order, two issues that were inseparable at the time.³⁸⁰ Thus witnesses to experimental work were drawn from the ranks of gentlemen:

That tiny fraction of the people of England regarded themselves as the political nation, and, so far as having a voice in the sanctioned public forums was concerned, they *were* the political nation. It was their voices that were heard in the national political deliberations; they effectively exercised their individual wills in economic, legal, and political deliberations; they spoke for all the rest.³⁸¹

³⁷⁸ Steven Shapin, ‘The House of Experiment in Seventeenth-Century England’, *ISIS*, (Vol. 79, No. 3, 1988), p 379.

³⁷⁹ Steven Shapin, 1994, p 198.

³⁸⁰ Steven Shapin, 1994, pp 27-9.

³⁸¹ Steven Shapin, 1994, p 46.

Within the house of experiment, dealings between the relatively private laboratory domain (usually at the back of the house) and the ensuing discourse that occurred in more public spaces like drawing rooms were all regulated and governed by the same principle of trust ('One's word was one's bond only if one was not bound in giving it.'³⁸²

In charting transformations in this form of experimentation, Shapin notes a gradual but decisive separation and discrimination in the spaces in which an experiment could be tried, showed and 'discoursed upon it'. A number of elements combined to form this trend. 1660s experimentalists such as Boyle and his Royal Society colleagues had begun to initiate a campaign questioning the validity, truth and therefore the legitimacy of experiments that were conducted in relatively private settings. Boyle for instance condemned what he regarded as 'unwarranted secrecy and intellectual unsociability.'³⁸³ Whilst a trial conducted in private might fail or otherwise be seen not to have succeeded, it might by the same token be counted as a well working experiment on a different hypothesis or theory: 'In the views of [other] relevant actors, nature might perhaps speak unexpected words, and the experimenter would be obliged to listen.'³⁸⁴

Access to experimental sites operated under a semi formal system of recognitions, rights and expectations that were familiar to the society of gentlemen. Likewise, similar codes governed access to and conduct in the

³⁸² Ibid, p 39.

³⁸³ Steven Shapin, 1988, p 385.

³⁸⁴ Ibid, p 401.

rooms of the Royal Society, although patterns within the rooms of the Society were clearly also modelled on House of Commons procedure: 'Fellows addressed their speech to the president, and not to other fellows, just as members of the House of Commons conventionally addressed the Speaker.'³⁸⁵ But, overall, Shapin views the model of social relations that were developed in the Royal Society as most closely resembling those governing the public rooms of a gentleman's house.³⁸⁶

Agencies and convergences

The Royal Society described the experimental public that patronised its rooms as a celebration of social diversity. Although the participation in the experimental programme of 'vulgar hands' was deemed necessary, it was deemed essential that 'the farr greater Number are Gentlemen, free, and unconfin'd.'³⁸⁷ Technicians were needed to enable the working of machines and equipment but were thought to lack qualifications to make knowledge, and were thus not part of an experimental public. As Shapin describes it, technicians were technically not there in much the same way and for the same reasons that Victorian families could speak in front of servants: 'if they told what they heard to other servants, it did not signify; and if they told it to gentlemen, it would not be credited.'³⁸⁸ Mixed status technicians like Hooke were paid both by Boyle and patrons of the Royal Society to

³⁸⁵ Ibid, p 392.

³⁸⁶ Ibid, p 393.

³⁸⁷ Ibid, p 396.

³⁸⁸ Ibid, p 395.

perform similar tasks, yet a gentleman's testimony was deemed credible and reliable because he was not paid and therefore obliged offer it.

By the following century there were signs that aspects of the trust that underpinned the conventions of scientific experimentation were becoming eroded. As David Hume put it:

There is not to be found, in all history, any miracle attested by a sufficient number of men of such unquestioned good-sense, education, and learning as to secure us against all delusion in themselves; of such undoubted integrity as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to deceive others.³⁸⁹

Shapin posits the erosion of trust as a decisive factor in the eventual transformation of the form, function, role and site of the scientific demonstration and documents a shift from trust that is bestowed on familiar individuals to trust that is 'accorded to institutions and abstract capacities thought to reside in certain institutions.'³⁹⁰

The disjunction between places of residence and places where scientific knowledge is made is now almost absolute. The separation between the laboratory and the house means that a new privacy surrounds the making of knowledge whose status as open and public is often insisted upon.³⁹¹

Daily life now depends on our giving assent to the institutions of modern society. Thus:

³⁸⁹ Shapin, 1994, p 411.

³⁹⁰ Ibid, p 411.

³⁹¹ Ibid, p 404.

it appears that the causal link posited by gentlemanly culture between truth-telling and free action had been turned upside down. Objective knowledge is not now through to be underwritten by the participation of “gentlemen, free and unconfined,” but by the institutions which most vigilantly constrain the free action of their members. Robert Merton was, accordingly, well aware of apparent *lèse-majesté* in declaring that “the activities of scientists are subject to rigorous policing, to a degree perhaps unparalleled in any other field of activity.” The modern place of knowledge here appears not as a gentleman’s drawing room but as a great Panopticon of Truth.³⁹²

For Shapin, it is not the idea of ‘truth-through-the-policing-of-interest’ that is new in the twentieth century, just its extension and dominance.’³⁹³ Here the gentleman has been replaced by the scientific expert and individual free action by institutional surveillance.

4. THE COMPLEXITIES OF CONTEMPORARY DEMONSTRATIONS

A portrait of sites of contemporary demonstration

Movement and overlap between public and private spaces is often a prominent feature of contemporary demonstrations. This is especially apparent in Andrew Barry’s study of the UK anti-roads protests of the early-mid 1990s. If the demonstration is a public convergence, it sometimes also takes place on private sites. In trying to explore some possibilities for

³⁹² Ibid p 413.

³⁹³ Ibid, n. 12.

opening up the question of how demonstrations might be seen as subject to variation and transformation through time, it will be useful to begin with an initial comparison with Tilly's description of the multi-agency composition of the street demonstration in history. Certainly this would not be a comprehensive contrast and comparison, not least because the former provides a description of a general form that emerged over a period of sixty years across Europe and North America, whereas Barry's survey examines just two sites of demonstration in more time and space-specific contexts. A rough comparison would nevertheless provide a starting point from which to consider possibilities of exploring scarcely addressed questions about the multi-agency demonstration.

The following two passages sketch the scene at the site of the Newbury bypass in Berkshire on January 23, 1996 and the Fairmile protest camp on 24 January 1997.

Along with about 50 protestors and 300 security, contractors and police, there were maybe 20-30 people observing the protest and taking some record. A crew from the local independent TV company *Meridian* who turned up early along with a photographer working for the magazine of the *New York Times*; one of two freelance photographers hoping something might happen; an observer from Friends of the Earth as well as several independent legal observers working on behalf of the contractors; a BBC crew with a reporter (Margaret Gilmore) who arrived rather late in the day and approached me for an interview after one protester fell off a tree and had to be taken to hospital. The video crew from Oxford who had given me a lift out to the site from the station. I had my notebook and my camera. In

addition the police were in radio contact with each other and others on all sides carried mobile telephones. Many of the protestors' camps were linked together by radio.³⁹⁴

A freelance photographer (Peter MacDiarmid) with a Power Mac and a digital camera is editing and selecting photos directly on the screen in the middle of a field. Then transmitting them using a modem and a mobile phone to the *Evening Standard* in London although he hasn't spoken to them yet. One or two freelancers with less sophisticated equipment cluster round to have a look, impressed. At the bottom of the hill a protester (Pixie Pete) is sitting in a van with a CB radio which he can communicate with another CB in the tunnel system two hundred yards away in which five protesters had managed to escape into when the police and security came to evict them the previous night.³⁹⁵

The descriptions more or less confirm a continuing participation of the four basic actors or actor groups that Tilly observed: 'demonstrators, objects of their claims, specialists in official control of public space (usually police), and spectators.'³⁹⁶ They also confirm the enduring presence of other participants in Tilly's extended portrayal, including for instance, 'reporters for mass media' and 'political scientists eager to observe street politics'.

Coming forward in time, the actions of familiar demonstration actor groups seem to traverse different layers of space through elaborate and sometimes less elaborate networks and technologies of communication. If

³⁹⁴ Andrew Barry, 1999, p 76

³⁹⁵ '8.40am 24 January 1997 from my diary the morning after police and security came to evict protesters from Fairmile camp, A30 protest', Ibid, pp 85-6.

³⁹⁶ Charles Tilly, 1995, pp 30-1.

the composition of the demonstration of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries already indicates multi-agency complexities, the architecture of the contemporary modern demonstration becomes more intricate still. In particular the mediation of action through technologies appears to create additional layers of interaction in further sites within sites. The field notes highlight additions layers of space that change, as well as enable a continuation of different forms of agency. Protesters for instance are linked to each other through CB radio and mobile phones, as are police and security, and in the second passage a photographer is linked directly to the newspaper he is recording the events for. Thus technologies both alter as become part of the form of the different participative agencies. Throughout the paper there is evidence of significant modification in all the main demonstration actor groups through the use of information, electronic, communication technologies.

In terms of *protest*, Barry observes: a shift from gathering at centres of public administration to the 'place where others were seeking to act or which others owned and controlled',³⁹⁷ and therefore a shift from protest directed 'at the icons of 'the state' (parliament, the offices of the prime minister)' to 'the dispersed actions of the authorities and the consequences of their actions';³⁹⁸ a shift from protest as truth-telling argument to '*pointing out* to others the likelihood that environmental destruction would occur', and therefore a shift from protest understood as 'representing the

³⁹⁷ Andrew Barry, 1999, p 81.

³⁹⁸ *ibid*

views of a particular constituency' to one that 'show[s] damage and destruction':

By pointing directly to what they perceived as the indifference of the road-builders to the land and the lives of its human and animal inhabitants, they sought to demonstrate through their action a different truth: that the existence of humans, animals and the land were, in whatever way, mutually implicated.³⁹⁹

Although the demonstration takes place on private space, the site is made public by the presence of a variety of freelance, local, national, international, private and public media groups, individual media actors directly networked to news production sites and so on. In addition there is a multiplicity of police groups. As well public police, private security contractors and bailiffs are present. All main actor groups participate in the production of overlapping private and public spaces.

The return of the police-protest dichotomy

Variations in the mode of the control of space can likewise be observed. Since the site of the demonstration takes place on private site, the main group of actors who exercise control within that site are private security. This reduces public policing to an assisting role. Hence this main group are neither 'specialists in official control of public space' or 'police'. The status of the site thus appears to alter the ways in which both police and protesters act – public police performed an ancillary role and while

³⁹⁹ *ibid*

protesters' were apparently 'limited' to *pointing out*. The practice of pointing out occurred over longer periods than the standard demonstration, that is, for as long as protesters could evade eviction.

But there is significant change in the timing and spacing as well as variation in all the basic participant-observer agency types. This perhaps inevitably alters the forms of interaction that might be observed; or rather, it complicates the way which interaction might be observed and explained. As a reliable point of anchorage, the police-protest dichotomy facilitates a starting point for making sense of these complexities, even while the terms of that 'dichotomy' becomes more complicated:

The struggle between protesters and the contractors and the police was a struggle in which images and machines played a key part. Police and security routinely used video and still photography in order to track the movements of protesters as well as to secure convictions for trespass and other offences.⁴⁰⁰

Later I learned that the police began eviction at that time because their surveillance cameras had picked up a significant number of 'protestors' leaving the camp for the village. The tactical surprise that the police had achieved was one of the main themes of the Sheriff of Devon's press conference at the camp site, and one of the main stories told about the events in the national press and national coverage the day after the eviction ('Police raid camp as bypass protestors spend dole at pub', *Daily Telegraph*, 25 January 1997).⁴⁰¹

⁴⁰⁰ Ibid, p 80.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid, p 90, n19.

The account offers some insight into the complexities of contemporary demonstrations, both in terms of agency modes and types, the effect of information technology on these modes and types and the consequent transformations of the contemporary architecture of the political demonstration. Police secured arrests, through private security technology. Telling the event from whichever perspective entails the simplification of a political space. Despite the complexity of the event, narratives become especially reliant on the structuring potential of the police-protest dichotomy. In this way, the police-protest dichotomy becomes decontested even and perhaps especially while the *forms* to which it refers appear to increase in complexity.

The dichotomy does not simply provide a means for simplifying a contested space for the mass dissemination of news, it provides a relatively 'stable' position on which to base analytic observations. Even if some revert to familiar cause-effect positions, the complication of the private/public dichotomy is clearly implicated in the complication of the position from which sites of mid-1990s UK demonstration events can be explained as the following two passages suggest:

A development that has paralleled the emergence of new social movements has been the involvement of private security in their control. There is nothing new in this either: private security was often involved in the more bloody confrontations that occurred in the USA in the first half of the twentieth century. However, the institutionalisation of labour conflict during

that century in most liberal democracies saw not only an accommodation between the two sides of industry but also the involvement of the public police as more or less neutral arbiters. However, movements associated with environmentalism have shifted the site of action back to the private sphere. Protests against the building of roads and airport runways have often taken place on private land. In Britain, the legal remedy for the removal of those obstructing such constructions is civil, rather than criminal, and the appropriate authority is that of the under-sheriff assisted by bailiffs and private security personnel. Police attend these locations ostensibly to 'preserve the peace', but are drawn into the conflict as protesters challenge the authority of the under-sheriff. Sometimes, police find themselves unwillingly enmeshed in the conflict because of what they regard as the ineptness of the bailiffs and, often hastily recruited, security guards.⁴⁰²

Simply by being there, protest camps escalate the political conflict over the particular project and bring it into the public eye ... The combination of state police and private security implicates the state as siding with big corporations and promoting economic growth, infrastructure extension and the destruction of countryside as being equal to 'development' or 'progress'. In this way, direct action can be understood as making symbolic challenges to dominant assumptions about the role of the state and about what 'development' or 'progress' are.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰² P. A. J. Waddington, 'Public Order and Political Contention', *Handbook of Policing*, T. Newburn, ed., (London: Willian Publishing Ltd, 2003), p 414.

⁴⁰³ Benjamin Seel and Alex Plows, 'Coming Live and Direct: Strategies of Earth First!', *Direct Action in British Environmentalism*, B. Seel, M. Patterson, and B. Doherty, eds., (London: Routledge. 2001).

5. WITNESSING DEMONSTRATIONS

Barry is especially interested in how changes in the way in which actors' are able to witness *the event* impacts on the telling of *the event*:

Demonstrating in public today may involve some attention to ethics and the art of demonstration. But it also requires an attention to the electronic media which may be used to witness and to monitor a demonstration taking place. How do electronic and photographic media figure in the conduct of a political demonstration? Does the development of electronic media necessarily lead to an over-production of information in which any sense of the point of the action is lost? What place do new media technologies have in oppositional forms of demonstration?⁴⁰⁴

Barry is not only narrowly concerned with the effect or impact of the mass media as witnesses to a demonstration, but with the role of technological monitoring, communication, images and so on features in the 'visible' alteration of the demonstration architecture. How does the immediacy and instantaneity of new media feature in the way we have come to experience and witness our actions and interactions in the political demonstration as a historically evolved form of *showing*? To what extent does the accelerated rate at which technology and information enables groups and individuals to act, transform action?

Further questions can be added. In terms horizontally networked or linked 'single issue' demonstrations like *J18 (London)* that took place just two or three years later, the participant-observer, however defined, has at her

⁴⁰⁴ Andrew Barry, 1999, p 84.

disposal a wealth of available information on any single site. This instantaneous information contributes to a stretching of *the event* which becomes allied with *movement* so as to render the latter inert. If a single contemporary single episode is liable to generate vast tracts of instant, perpetual information (within a perpetually changing landscape of archived information), this is only part of the issue. The initial problem of how to look at 'one' *event* is met from another angle by the appearance of the omnipresence of *the event*. For Paul Virilio:

The history of the end of this millennium, held in a levitated state, is based almost solely on the incessant *tele-presence* of events which do not really succeed each other, since the **relief** of instantaneity is already winning out over the **depth** of historical successivity?⁴⁰⁵

Given the foregoing discussion of the issues and problems one encounters simply by trying to pose the question of how to look at transformations in one instance of an event of a certain kind, Virilio's idea is instructive: if the case that is of interest here exists in 'accelerated time', how would it be possible to discern patterns of change in the event, that is, *change* as something that can be measured by time?

Assuming that the question of transformations in demonstrations can be addressed through the police-protest dichotomy, would the dichotomy indicate *change* simply in relation to 'time', or does what Virilio calls the 'acceleration of real time'⁴⁰⁶ superimpose itself on the timing that is implicit

⁴⁰⁵ Paul Virilio, *The Information Bomb*, (London: Verso, 2005), p 127.

⁴⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p 118.

within the dichotomy; that is, on the relation between *movement* and *stasis* which provides some indication of where one might be in the present?

Advances in technology, shifts in the sites and foci of claims-making, and the apparent emergence of new modes of action appear to produce evolutions in the modern demonstration. For instance, information and communications technologies appear to introduce additional spaces or layers of space in these interaction zones. These also appear to have some impact on the sequencing and pacing of event dynamics in which, for example, 'machines and images played a key part'.

Demonstrations are of course markers of change, but how are they also marked by change? Because the idea of police-protest dynamics assumes a standardised relational set of dynamics, the reliance on the police-protest pair as the main explanatory strategy is limiting. Historical research shows that the standardisation of forms of protest and policing and repertoires of police-protest interaction are a crucial factor in the emergence and normalisation of the demonstration as a site of interaction. For instance, Tilly's work views the demonstration as a form of creative interaction that involves gradual improvisations between at least pairs of actors, and, as such, as having much in common with its theatrical counterparts. Whilst this work opens up and explores the much neglected details of a police-protest/demonstration explanatory relation that has come to be viewed simply as a given standard, the challenge that remains is how to conceptualise changes in the contemporary terms of police-protest

relations. There is enough evidence to suggest that considerable changes in the terms of these dynamics warrants a re-conceptualisation that is not confined to ideas of a standardised police-protest relational pair.

Any such re-conceptualisation would need to account for demonstrations as sites within sites. For instance, one of the causalities of a main focus on police-protest relations as a standardised set of dynamics is the neglect of the physical and/or geographical specificities within which these dynamics occur. The focus on what might be happening overtakes the importance of questions about exactly where this might be happening. Virilio's work for example draws on Hans-Thies Lehman's observations on contemporary theatre to illustrate:

a loss of that founding element of theatrical fiction termed the unity of time, made up of a beginning, a middle and an end ... This is done to establish the dimension of *time shared*, in all senses of the term *hic et nunc*, by actors and audience. To such a point that it can happen, in this perspective, that actual duration ceases to apply, with all events remaining suspended, strictly centred on the *nunc* and the present of its immediate now-ness to the detriment of the *hic*, the 'here' of the scene – of any 'scene' or any 'act'.⁴⁰⁷

For Virilio, 'Here no longer exists; everything is **now**'.

The political demonstration can be considered as both a 'centre' and a 'margin'. While they remain central to accounts about social change and

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid, p 125.

transformation, they are rarely considered as a subject of (or as subject to) change. The frequency with which demonstrations are invoked as indicators of change does not simply overshadow issues of how demonstrations might be subject to change; it almost entirely precludes the possibility of posing such questions.

Conclusion

J18 (London) designates an event. It is effectively also a spatiotemporal focussing point for examining the relation between police-protest relations and the demonstration as a site of interaction. This 'police-protest/demonstration relation' (and the mutual unsettling of one by the other) has been the overall strategy for setting out the question of how or whether J18 (London) can be said to have been a fundamentally new kind of demonstration. This strategy enables critical reflection on underlying methods that are used for explaining and accounting for the event as demonstration. It highlights some of the limits of explanation, but also opens up possibilities for exploring some alternatives.

In terms of the limits of analysis, the demonstration is both a basic, indispensable unit of analysis, and a tremendously marginalised subject of analysis. The main literature reviews in chapters 1 and 2 demonstrate this clearly. In the literature reviewed in chapter 1 the demonstration merely facilitates the formation of the anti-globalisation case which then becomes the main event in question. In the literature in chapter 2, there is an obvious, but non essential relation between police-protest dynamics and the demonstration sites within which these occurred. The focus of police-protest studies literature is police-protest dynamics and not the demonstration as the site of interaction.

There is an obvious, logical explanatory relation between these dynamics and this site – the demonstration is the as such of the event, and police-protest dynamics is the as such of the demonstration. In police-protest studies this is a tacit starting point and is not therefore the main focus. There are two main reasons for why the issue of the further empirical grounding or ‘siting’ of ‘police-protest relations’ never arises in this literature. Firstly, much of this research follows progression, development, and especially reciprocal innovation in police-protest relations from site to site. Thus, the principal interest in much of the post-Seattle research resides in discerning the patterns and regularities, or differences and inconsistencies in police-protest dynamics, through the successive progression of events, or from site to site. The study of police-protest dynamics is a study of interaction continuity, change and variation through time or from site to site. Inasmuch as there is a focus on ongoing police-protest reciprocal innovation and adaptation, questions about the specificities of sites never arise.

The focus on police-protest reciprocal change can only be sustained by a certain amount of uniformity in the sites in which these dynamics may be observed, although in practice very little research has been done on the extent to which comparative sites can be deemed to be similar or dissimilar. In this respect there is a notable similarity between this field of analysis and news media discourse which simply reads the event through the idea of police-protest relations. In effect, there is no necessary relation

between the particularities of a site and the particularities of the dynamics therein.

Secondly, the absence of the further empirical grounding of police-protest dynamics does not arise precisely because 'police-protest relations' is as much the method of research as it is the subject of research. To a significant extent, explanation is based on and depends on the form/mode relation (described in chapters 2, 3 and 4) – the relation between protest and policing as concrete forms of action, and protest and policing as modes of action on the other. Consequently, protest and policing are often compared by means of ideas about what they generally represent rather more than by means of the actualities of how they function.

We have seen this in relation to the way in which order/change and continuity/discontinuity map onto the police/protest pair. This is indicative of the way in which the new incorporation of the idea of a global/national binary starts to feature in the phrasing of problems about contemporary dynamics. The problem here is often articulated in terms changes in the spacing of protest (the globalisation of protest) which then challenge policing practices, especially given that traditionally, public policing has been understood as a territorially bounded form. One of the problems with reconceptualising 'post-Seattle' police-protest relations in terms of the idea of a dynamics between *local policing* and *global protest* is that 'the global' and 'the national' are not mutually exclusive spaces. Another is that the

simplification of these oppositions detracts from questions about the specificities of the sites within which police-protest dynamics unfold.

This problem is symptomatic of the way in which causal necessity plays out in questions about demonstration-related events. As an instrument of explanation the police-protest dichotomy is primarily led by the protest-change (cause) equivalence. From this perspective, any change in policing would have to be a reactive or reciprocal one, one that occurs in response to initiating protest-change.

With or without the juxtaposing of protest with policing, this protest-change equivalence is a basic, recurring theme in the perspectives and approaches discussed in chapters 1-4. In chapter 1, for instance, *protest-change* is invariably seen as the primary cause of the emergence of an anti-globalisation movement which then becomes the main focus; in chapter 2 changes in the spacing of protest is the main attributed cause of changes in the terms of police-protest relations; in chapter 3 protest-change that is seen as the principal cause of the peculiarity of the J18 (London) event is seen to have been exacerbated by the impact of technological advances, and in particular the pervasive use of the Internet; and in chapter 4, change in the terms of protest is seen to be the cause of subsequent change or need for change in policing.

There is an obvious pattern of causality in all cases, albeit one that is not always easily reconcilable with the available evidence. The pattern of

causation cannot account for or accommodate significant changes in policing, that is, changes that were afoot in the months leading up to the event. This period marked a point at which traditional decision-making contexts began to merge and interact with new emerging guidelines on public order policing. Around the time of June 1999 there is an incorporation of security discourses into traditional public order policing evaluation strategies. The evidence shows that this occurs both because of and in spite of the J18 (London) case.

Due to its reliance on binary oppositions as the main way of framing questions, combined police-protest research, and particularly 'post-Seattle' research, has been unable to incorporate, comment on, or apply recent findings in specialist literatures on policing and police organisation. These literatures have documented the impact of technological innovation on policing practices, the increasingly networked organisation of policing, transnational contexts of policing, even the partial de-coupling, in practice, of the conventional state-police pairing, and so on. This adds weight to the case evidence presented here, that policing in London in June 1999 was effectively adapting to and with all of the kinds of change that were assigned to protest, and for which *protest* was held to be the principal and only cause of a manifestly new or unfamiliar political demonstration.

This is not to suggest that *policing* somehow now only represents discontinuity and change – little if anything can be gained by the gratuitous unsettling of categories. Rather, this highlights the necessity of critical

reflection in the use of research on the standardised relational police-protest pair, particularly where the aim is to look at themes and issues concerning the re-conceptualisation of contemporary police-protest dynamics.

The evidence derived from this research, which is backed up by the findings of specialist literatures, both in policing and social movement studies, suggests that in the run-up to the event, fundamental, analogous, and simultaneous changes in both protest and policing become a strong candidate for explaining much of how J18 (London) appeared to be such a chaotic and unintelligible site of demonstration. Both protest and policing forms and practices were subject to cumulative and fundamental changes and advances – for instance, in networked communication, technological innovation, decentralisation and horizontally networked integration – in the run-up to the event.

Up until June 1999, public political gatherings in the UK, for instance those associated with single issue groups, involved smaller and more geographically dispersed public political gatherings. June 1999 (London) marks a point at which protest and policing would converge at a mass gathering for the first time in a significant while. It also marks a point at which the cumulative changes that were afoot in both forms in the intervening period would likewise converge. Under these terms, even before any ‘eventful’ action or exchange, the mere convergence of both

forms on site would have been, and apparently were enough to appear to challenge the standards of demonstration conventions in London.

Available evidence clearly shows that at the time of 1999, protest and policing forms were undergoing simultaneous and in some ways analogous change. From this perspective there is ample evidence of a simultaneous causality. Both forms were subject to fundamental changes during this period. There is no doubt an element of reciprocity in the dynamics of police-protest interaction – for instance, innovations and adaptations learnt over time. Whilst this is an important issue, the findings here show that *the terms of reciprocity* are nevertheless time-space contingent. Given this, it is necessary to critically reflect on the idea of reciprocal change as the main method of analysis that can be almost uniformly applied to each and every site. In the case that has been observed from various angles here, the issue of reciprocal change is one that must be based on, tempered by, or supplemented by the evidence there is for simultaneous causality.

Moreover, as noted, the uncritical application of reciprocal change questions to contemporary sites limits the potential of the police-protest/demonstration explanatory relation. That is, whilst the dichotomy allows us to say something about the site, or rather allude to it, it almost never permits a direct engagement with the site. One might be content to continue to justify this either by the admission that demonstrations are simply better at being theory-building blocks than they are at sitting for portraits, or that like crowds they are simply not an appropriate object for

rational deliberation. But there is a simpler way of accounting for all of this. The marginalisation of the demonstration as a site of interaction, as a relational space, ultimately boils down to the widespread reliance on the narrow definition of demonstration, in which the practice of *showing* is exclusively 'owned', as Tilly puts it, by a single, and no doubt privileged form of agency. From this point of view, the fact that this *showing* must also be witnessed, documented, discussed and regulated in order for it to count as a showing appears as no more than incidental.

The demonstration is the arena within which demonstration as form of action takes place. Moreover such an arena is the main prerequisite of that form of action. The prevailing treatment of the demonstration as a form of action effectively deprives the demonstration site of its spatiality and therefore also of its temporality. If, in this view, demonstrations are not spaces of interaction, they are almost certainly not spaces of interaction that are also then subject to change. Instead, demonstrations are subject to a causal necessity of a very specific kind – *protest/change*. This is the recurring theme of the perspectives outlined and examined in chapters 1 to 4.

Chapter 5 highlights a necessary correspondence between police-protests dynamics and the demonstration as an event site within a site (within its physical or geographical setting). This provides an alternative angle of approach in which the protest/demonstration explanatory relation obtains further empirical grounding. Here, the police-protest/demonstration

relation is not simply a free-standing logical conjunction; it has specific historical significance, and is at the same time space-contingent. J18 (London) represents one point from which to reflect on these contingencies.

This chapter finds that the physical or geographical setting of the police-protest/demonstration relation is crucial to accounting for standardisation of forms of demonstration. Part of the way in which the demonstration derives its import is through the specificity of its geographical or physical setting. In the case of the scientific demonstration, for instance, the physical setting is the private home of the gentleman who is also a public figure. Shapin's historical survey finds that the overlap and interaction between public and private spheres of experimental activity eventually became a decisive factor in the eventual standardisation and institutionalisation of the scientific demonstration. In general terms, this suggests some of what is involved in de- and re-standardisation, and in the evolution of the demonstration as a historically evolved but region-specific site of interaction.

There can be little doubt about the salience of the private/public distinction in terms of what has been discussed here. For instance, in Barry's work that distinction becomes crucial in accounting for the intricacies and new architectures of the sites of demonstration that he observes. Here, as in the J18 (London) case, new technologies render new geographical sites. In the J18 (London) case, technological advances do not necessarily or unidirectionally globalise a particular form of action because they also

assist in bringing localities together. Moreover, because technological advances are not the exclusive province of one form of action, they also shape (and are shaped by) spaces of interaction. In the case of J18 (London) there is a sense of change in the timing and spacing of both the site and the constitutive forms of agency. There is multidimensional rather than unidirectional causality.

Demonstrations in general and political demonstrations in particular continue to be sites of creative communication and discovery. Even if the stories we can tell about political demonstration tend to be narrowly confined to stories of protest, contestation, regularisation, or police-protest dynamics, the endeavour to relate these back to demonstrations as sites within sites, enables reflection on the possibility of spontaneous and even ‘uncaused’ activity, and the role of this in the continuing production of spaces of interaction. If the demonstration is an artefact or a creative product of human interaction, as it is for Tilly, then it must also be a relational space, a space of interaction. And “‘space’ cannot be a closed system: it is not stasis, it is not defined negatively as an absence of temporality’.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁸ Dorren Massey, ‘Space-Time, ‘Science’ and the Relationship Between Physical Geography and Human Geography’, *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, (Vol. 24, 1999) p 264.

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