SUMMARY OF UCPI INTERIM REPORT – JUNE 2023

Digested Summary by some Non-State, Non-Police Core Participants

Introduction to this Summary

What follows is a summary of the Interim Report published by the Undercover Policing Inquiry (UCPI) on 29th , by Core Participants in that Inquiry. The report itself is long (95 pages plus annexes), so we hope this summar to deciphering such a dense document.

The UCPI is mainly examining the conduct of two undercover policing units: the Special Demonstration Squad Intelligence Unit (NPOIU) from 1968-2010, i.e., over 42 years.

This Interim Report covers the first 14 years of the existence of the SDS (initially called the Special Operations Unit tasked with assisting control of public order.

It is important to stress that Lord Justice Mitting's Inquiry is ongoing, and that this Interim Report barely addres was set up. By way of example, there is not a single mention of the practice of 'vetting' or 'blacklisting' workers examination of spying on trade union activities, both of which are well established as having occurred.

There is also a lack of any critical analysis of how these findings so far relate to contemporary issues facing th identified by the Macpherson Inquiry); institutional corruption (as identified by the Daniel Morgan report) and e misogyny following the kidnap, rape and murder of Sarah Everard and identified in the Casey Report. We can still ongoing, and that judgement on those issues, and on the overall unlawfulness of the operations, is being d heard.

The most important takeaway from the report are the conclusions that it was very quickly clear these spying op the worst practices (such as theft of dead children's identities and abusive relationships with members of the p beginning, and that the units should have been shut down in the early 1970s.

These were clearly unjustifiable operations, deploying unethical and illegal tactics, which the Police and Home public outcry.

This will be important going forward, as the Inquiry will have to consider how these practices were able to cont Commissioners, changes in Government, the end of the Cold War, the introduction of the Human Rights Act a Act, and the creation of a new unit in 1999.

These events must be looked at from an institutional learning perspective. This report contributes by recognisi raised all the way up the Police's chain of command into the Home Office.

Please note that the summary is based on the wording of the Interim Report. Hopefully it'll be obvious where v

SUMMARY OF UCPI INTERIM REPORT

This is the first "open"[1] interim report to be published by the Mitting Inquiry. It covers the Special Operations S to early 1982, a period which the Inquiry has called 'Tranche 1'. The report contains only partial conclusions ba [3]It contains a **Foreword** from the Chair, Sir John Mitting, which stresses that the report is part of a work in pro being addressed until all of the evidence has been heard.

Those include some of the most serious aspects:

- The impact of the conduct of male police officers on women deceived into sexual relationships, and on the
- The impact of the theft of deceased children's identities;
- The purpose of gathering intelligence on family "justice" campaigns for people killed in police custody;
- The attitude of police officers and managers towards deceitful sexual relationships;
- Wider issues such as the possibility that the SDS was one of the instruments set up by a conservative state wished to produce radical change by political means.

The **Introduction** explains the background to the Inquiry, established on 12 March 2015 in reaction to wide-ra misconduct by undercover officers that were brought to the public eye by journalists and activists, including, no into sexual relationships, and police whistleblower Peter Francis.

Chapters 1-5 offer an account of some of the evidence examined, in chronological order, starting with the **Forr Squad (SOS)** in July 1968. The initial purpose was to gather intelligence about a demonstration to be staged Campaign (VSC), known as the "Autumn Offensive", by pretending to be supporters of the demonstration. The 16 deployed officers at the date of the October demonstration.

Chapter 2 examines the decision to continue **The Special Operations Squad after 27 October 1968**, subsec changes to the way the unit operated. The continuation of the unit was by no means a given and many expect

However the unit's founder Conrad Dixon, the Security Service (MI5) and high-ranking officers such as Chief S Commander Ferguson Smith, Assistant Commissioner Peter Brodie, and the Commissioner John Waldron him approval for the unit's continued existence. James Waddell, the Home Office's Deputy Under Secretary with re Office approval for continued funding of the squad.

On 26 November 1968, Dixon produced a study paper setting out his template for the future conduct of the un provide information in relation to public order problems, and that service should continue for no more than one

However, the purposes of the unit quickly expanded into "gathering and recording information for long-term int number of tendencies in this period: deployments were not limited to twelve months; a wide variety of left-wing an immediate threat to public order; there was no prohibition on accepting official positions within a group; and information about individuals.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 deal with **the SOS 1971** and **the Special Demonstration Squad (SDS) 1972 to 1973; 19** periods the above tendencies continued to deepen.

Between 1971 and 1973 the standard duration of a typical operation settled at about four years, with an increa "subversives" rather than policing public order. A number of themes emerge that will be important to the Inquir

- Failings go right to the top of the Police
- The role of the Home Office

- The relationship with MI5
- Random and pointless tasking of operatives
- Positions of influence in target groups
- Intrusive reporting
- Sexual relationships
- The theft of dead children's identities
- Impact on the families of undercover officers
- The decision not to spy on the far right

These issues are examined in more detail below.

Chapter 6 presents Mitting's **analysis and conclusions.** He identifies four key issues that should have been a funding the unit from the outset:

1. **Long-term deployments** into political groups inevitably led to intrusion into the lives of many hundreds of p relationships which the report finds were "*common knowledge among many of them"* [C4,§43]and were to bec *throughout the remainder of its history."* [C4,§8]). There was no justification for this.

2. **Gaining entry into private homes** of members of infiltrated groups by deceit might make an undercover of would have had to have been considered.

3. **Positions of responsibility** within infiltrated groups, such as branch treasurer or membership secretary, ro distribution of confidential information (such as bank details) and reporting the personal details of people enga involving "direction setting and incitement" also meant influencing political activity and helping to organise unla

4. **Theft of deceased children's identities** should have been referred to senior officers within the Met and to have been bound to give rise to legitimate public concern and embarrassment to the Commissioner and the H

None of these issues appears to have been addressed by senior officers or Home Office officials during this pe *been addressed at the highest level".* [C6,§27] If that *had* happened, he considers it would have resulted in the

Notwithstanding his (often controversial) pro-establishment approach, it is Mitting's view that only three out of t considered a 'legitimate target' for undercover policing of any kind, let alone the intrusions of the SDS. He con *the end justified the means […]. I have come to the firm conclusion that, for a unit of a police force, it did not; a publicly known at the time, the SDS would have been brought to a rapid end."* [C6,§29]

Themes Emerging in the Interim Report

Failings go right to the top of the Police

The early reports from the SDS were passed to Commissioner John Waldron, and informed his meetings with Commissioner Sir Robert Mark, is known to have visited the unit and is described as taking a *"close personal i* [C4,§1]Annual reports seeking renewal of its funding were made by Assistant Commissioners.

The role of the Home Office

The Home Office approved funding for the unit over and over again. The Report notes common threads in the for this continued Home Office approval:

- Although there had been no serious outbreak of public disorder in 1969 and 1970, it would only take an em

number of potential issues were identified, including Vietnam, Northern Ireland and sporting ties with South
- It would be difficult to restart an effective undercover unit if circumstances should require it.
- Gathering of intelligence about extremists was a worthwhile and justified end in itself.

There is little documentary evidence of which documents were sent to the Home Office, or read by James Wad Home Office file that would have contained all retained documents about the SOS, QPE/66 1/8/5, is inexplicab

A search of all Home Office archives failed to find a single document relating to the SDS, despite the Home Of Fortunately, the Metropolitan Police had kept some copies.

The report concludes that it is inconceivable that James Waddell – the Deputy Under Secretary with responsib not aware, throughout, of the general nature of the activities undertaken by the SDS. [C2,§12]

The Report notes that contemporaneous documents suggest that the Home Office took little, if any, interest in received little information about them. However, letters seeking annual renewal of funding were still sent by the Deputy Under Secretary, and the Home Office continued to sign off on funding despite this apparent lack of inf

On 16 July 1984, Roy Harrington wrote to Peter Phelan that he had reported on his reading of the annual repo Cubbon, the Permanent Under Secretary, and that both were entirely content with the way that the squad's rol circumstances, and also with the arrangements for liaison with the Security Service. [C5,§7]

The relationship with MI5

From the early 1970s onwards, there was a shift in focus towards gathering information for MI5, also known as

"John Clinton" (HN343) understood, from the start, that the purpose of his deployment was twofold: to provide disturb the public order; and to gather information about subversive activity and those participating in it, which Service." [C3,§26]

"Bob Stubbs" (HN301) understood the function of the SDS to be gathering intelligence about those who posed *"gradually morphed into more of a general intelligence-gathering unit".* [C3,§29]

Chapter 2 ends with a comment about the "Terms of Reference for a Special Branch" which included responsil in gathering intelligence. Mitting makes no comment on the appropriateness of that tasking, noting only that m about that document and that with the shifting focus of the SOS in this period towards long-term intelligence ga task. [C2,§38]

Chapter 4 dedicates some space to the definition of "subversion" and the *"task of the Security Service: to defe arising from actions of persons and organisations which may be judged to be subversive of the state".* [C4,§2]

This is because from inception, much of the written intelligence reporting generated by the SDS was forwarde 1974 there were six-monthly meetings between the managers of both services to discuss targeting and operat 1974 to March 1985, SDS reports were sent by courier direct to MI5 and put on file. Indeed, most SDS underc reporting would be forwarded to the Security Service. These links deepened in 1976 when a Security Service l at Special Branch for frequent use. [C4,§6]

Surviving records of the interaction between the Security Service and the SDS between the end of 1974 and e that the relationship became stronger after 1979. In 1981, it was stated that the extreme left-wing section of M and that monthly targeting meetings were held. [C5,§2-5] The Security Service frequently expressed appreciat coverage of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) from 1977 onwards, and it seems that most SDS effort was be

Random and pointless tasking of operatives

A key difference identified in the report between the way the SOS and Special Branch operated was that, while instructed to attend specific public meetings, from the very beginning SOS officers joined the groups on which *their own tasking".* [C1,§8]

They would begin by attending public (advertised) meetings and then attend private (unadvertised) meetings, that none of the undercover officers cited received any training, beyond reading the reports of deployed officer deployed into a field, many chose their own target groups. It is remarkable how haphazard the targeting was a achieved. For example:

"["Douglas Edwards" (HN326)] chose his own targets. None of them posed a threat to public order or to the sta demonstrated." [C2,§20] Despite that, the groups he targeted were specifically identified as three of the groups public order in applications for continued funding for the unit in 1969.

- *"HN333 was tasked to infiltrate a left-wing group […] but it posed no threat to the state."* [C2,§21]
- *"The passage of time may have dimmed ["Dick Epps" (HN336)] memory of the detail; but what is clear is th about which groups to infiltrate and did not encounter or report on anything that posed a serious threat to p*
- Jill Mosdell (HN346) infiltrated anti-apartheid and anti-racist movements. *"Surviving reports, from Novembe peaceful demonstrations… None of these plans posed any real threat to public order."* [C2,§32]
- Mike Ferguson (HN135) and "Sean Lynch" (HN68) reported on Irish Republican groups of 'potential interes was little in the reporting to justify the intrusion. *"Both undercover officers reported on the bitter disagreeme the groups – about the alleged misappropriation of funds and about the politics of leading members."* [C2,§
- "Alan Nixon" (HN340) was not tasked to infiltrate any particular group, but was encouraged to attend a pub others. *"Nothing of significance occurred… On his own initiative, he took over the role of tea club secretary surnames."* [C2,§34]
- On the infiltration of the Women's Liberation Front the Report notes "*["Sandra" (HN348)] did not question th time, but in hindsight does so. Her contemporaneous reporting must have made it clear to her superiors tha posed no threat to public order or to the state."* [C3,§12]
- "Alex Sloan" (HN347) was tasked to report on a small Maoist group, the Irish National Liberation Solidarity *justification for the deployment … is far from clear. It was, and was throughout known to be, no real threat t*
- "Stewart Goodman" (HN339) followed "Douglas Edwards" (HN326) in infiltrating the Dambusters Mobilising *reference to any past or prospective breaches of the criminal law. In hindsight, he believes that he was task gaining entry to a more militant group. He may be right. It is difficult to conceive of any other justification for*
- HN299/342 ("David Hughes") deployment lasted five years (1971-1976) *"he did not witness or participate in*
- HN349 and "Peter Fredericks" (HN345)[6] "*had short deployments, which appear to have achieved nothing.*
- *"None of the groups on which "Jim Pickford" (HN300) reported were a legitimate target of undercover policing name, but not by description, in the 1974 annual report"* [C4,§28]

Mitting notes that from the early 1970s until the late 1990s, Trotskyist groups were regularly infiltrated by SDS

Trotskyist groups posed any threat to the safety or well-being of the state. […] The annual reports […] do not s threats by undercover officers made a material contribution to dealing with [threats to public order].” [C4,§23]

The Interim Report specifically deals with reporting on some public disorder events such as the mass picketing Laboratories in June and July 1977, the “Battle of Lewisham” clash between fascists and anti-fascists, and the 1979 on which Blair Peach was killed by police.

Mitting stresses that it is not within his Terms of Reference *“to enquire into how or by whom [the fatal injuries]* u *which the MPS handled the subsequent investigation”.* [C5,§41]Instead he notes that this and other events pro SDS reporting to the policing of events, having provided only a *“marginal contribution,”* [C5,§44] and that *“SDS overall assessment of the likelihood of disorder.”* [C5,§45]

The infiltration of the Stop the Seventy Tour (STST) is also examined in detail, including the evidence of Profes Hain. In December 1969, Mike Ferguson (HN135) began to infiltrate meetings of the Ad Hoc Organising Comr home. [C2,§25-30]

Mitting cites Hain’s two-part criticism that there was a lack of clarity about the unit and a lack of checks and ba institutional culture of inappropriate and highly politicised surveillance.

He considers the first criticism is justified; and claims that the second criticism is only partly justified, on the gro believed there was a need to infiltrate a body of extremists bent on exploiting any emotive issue to create publ

In his memorandum of 18 November 1970, Phil Saunders made the following observation:

“When there was a sufficiently emotive issue – such as the ‘Stop the Seventy Tour’ campaign which guarantee of the mass media [–] the extremists were able seriously to threaten the maintenance of order, making it imper plans was available.” [C2,§30]

However, Mitting states that *“Even without the benefit of hindsight, his observation is difficult to understand or might have happened had the tour not been called off, but it is not an accurate reflection of what in fact occurr*

This is a rare example in the report of Mitting actually criticising a member of the SDS, albeit one now decease SDS were guilty of overstating the risk to public order posed by the target groups. In any case, he concludes th *inadequate explanation for most serious incidents of public disorder on the infrequent occasions on which they the infiltration of groups which posed no such threat.”* [C2,§36]

Several paragraphs are also devoted to the withdrawal of a number of undercover officers after “David Roberts of a Maoist group. It is notable that Mitting disregards the evidence, given by Diane Langford, that “Robertson” stating his personal belief that *“it is very unlikely that ”Robertson” made a threat… She had nothing to fear fror have caused him to believe that such a threat might be effective.”*[7]

It is also notable that while the MPS reports suggest the reason for the withdrawal was the personal safety of t *“the true reasons may have included a wish to protect the secrecy of the SDS within the MPS and the reputati*

Positions of influence in target groups

The report describes how, from the outset, officers not only attended and reported on meetings, but may also h One early meeting of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign was attended by at least nine MPS undercover officers [C1,§11]

An examination of reporting on Trotskyist groups, particularly the SWP, reveals that most of the reporting was

groups and that many undercover officers took key roles in the organisations they infiltrated.

For example:

“Michael Scott” (HN298) infiltrated the Putney branch of the Young Liberals. Within a fortnight, he was elected [C3,§33]

“Jeff Slater” (HN351) was designated the organiser of newspaper sales for *Socialist Worker* in the Tottenham l [C4,§21]

“Roger Harris” (HN200) joined the Twickenham branch of the IS in, or shortly before, October 1974. He was ap regular reports on the activities of the branch from December 1974 until late October 1975. Most of these conc topics. [C4,§22]

Richard Clark (“Rick Gibson” HN297) was instrumental in setting up the South East London branch of the Troc unopposed as secretary, and was repeatedly selected to attend TOM London Liaison Committee meetings on selected to stand and subsequently elected to the post of TOM London organiser. [C4,§33-34]

Vincent Harvey (“Vince Miller” HN354) approached the International Socialists (IS, by then renamed the Socia newspaper. He became a member of the Walthamstow branch. He was elected branch treasurer in or soon af London district in late July 1977, and elected to the branch committee on 26 April 1978. He had access to the branch and district and reported on both throughout his deployment. [C5,§9]

Like many other undercover officers, “Geoff Wallace” (HN296) was elected to branch offices (also in the SWP) branch members and those with whom they were in contact. By May 1976, he had become treasurer; by July sales of the *Socialist Worker* newspaper; and in January 1977, he was elected organiser for distribution of *Fla* 1978, he agreed to become one of a three-member committee to manage logistical arrangements for an Anti-I 1978. [C5,§12-13]

Intrusive reporting

The Interim Report contains some interesting analysis of tendencies in SDS reporting. For the calendar year 1 retrieved.

- 182 (28%) deal with the identification and lives of individuals;
- 456 (71%) deal with the political activities and organisation of the groups.
- Only 160 (25%) contain any reference to activities which might have something to do with public order. [C3

A similar analysis of documents from April 1975 to May 1978, shows that of 2600 documents retrieved:

- The *majority* 53.8% deal with the identities and lives of individuals;

- O*nly 7.6%* (200 out of 2,600 written reports) contained any information which might have had an impact on

A striking feature of the reporting of almost all SDS undercover officers is the extensive details about individua working life, relationships with others, and family and private life. This was not an accidental by-product of repo

Sexual relationships

Chapter 4 also notes that it is in this period that the evidence establishes the occurrence of sexual relationship officers in their cover identity and women they encountered during their deployment. Mitting notes that this “*wa*

them" and that it was to become *"a perennial feature of the SDS throughout the remainder of its history."* [C4,§

- "Jim Pickford" (HN300) is described as having "fallen in love" with one of his target group by an officer who hearing, and confirmed by "Pickford's" second wife and daughters, who state that during his deployment he sometimes referred to him as "Jimmy". She became his third wife after he left the SDS.

Unsurprisingly, his managers claim to have no recollection of any of this. *"Angus McIntosh stated that he had n believes that the deployment of "Jim Pickford" (HN300) ended without incident"*

Mitting is perhaps unreasonably generous in offering his opinion that McIntosh *"was doing his best to tell the tr* clear that *"his memory of these events is imperfect."* [C4,§29-30]

An officer who knew Richard Clark ("Rick Gibson" HN297), testified in closed hearings that he was told by him relationships with two different women, to whom he had given different accounts of his background, leading to deployment. It is not in doubt that Clark conducted sexual relationships with at least two and probably four fem

The evidence given by SDS managers Geoffrey Craft and Angus McIntosh, who dealt with this incident, is inco describes it as "*two honest witnesses, doing their best to recall what happened […] neither recalls serving with* concludes, they did serve together and took part in the events described.

Fortunately we have a more rounded picture of these incidents because *"Unusually in this era, there are two li about his activities from the standpoint of activists who knew him"* (Richard Chessum and "Mary") [C4,§31-40]

- "Graham Coates" (HN304), a *"careful, plainly truthful, witness",* described the exchange of sexual banter be the regular twice-weekly meetings. Richard Clark (HN297) had a reputation for being a "ladies' man". "Jim I philanderer (as confirmed by the evidence of HN200 and others). [C4,§41]

- "Phil Cooper" (HN155) is recorded as having had two or three (possibly more) sexual relationships *"and tha drink.*" He gave conflicting evidence to risk assessors and to the inquiry, however Mitting accepts that these

- HN302 records how early in his deployment a friendship developed between him in his cover identity and a both went to his cover flat, where they had protected sexual intercourse by *"joint agreement*". Mitting states activist", without recognising that as his inquiry has chosen to restrict HN302's cover name, there is no way deceived in this relationship. In the absence of her potential evidence, Mitting chose to believe that HN302

- HN21 was married when deployed. He said that he had protected sexual intercourse on two occasions with admitted to kissing and fondling another woman on the same course. The Inquiry has made efforts to trace Subject to the possibility that she may be traced and may contradict his account, Mitting chose to believe th truth. [C5,§80]

- Two officers who gave evidence in secret, closed hearings spoke about sexual relationships. [C5,§79]

- Vincent Harvey ("Vince Miller", HN354) joined the SDS in early 1976 and reported on the SWP and trades u statement, Harvey admitted that he had, as he put it, four "one night stands", two with female activists. [C5,

One of them, "Madeleine", provided a written witness statement and gave oral evidence. She was a member o him and believed him to be a fellow activist. Mitting accepts that where her evidence conflicts with his, hers is t continued for up to two months. During that time, they would have sexual intercourse in her room approximate leave before dawn.

The evidence relating to Harvey is particularly important because of how he was subsequently rewarded by th the National Criminal Intelligence Service.[8]

Despite recognising that the extent to which managers knew about the relationships and/or tolerated them is a evidence, in a touching act of seemingly blind faith, Mitting concludes: *"The evidence … does not establish tha a tactic generally used by undercover officers to gain acceptance by infiltrated groups; and I am satisfied that t they had done so."* [C4,§43]

It is curious to note that managers claim relationships would have been a serious disciplinary matter, yet althou feature" of SDS deployments from the very beginning, nobody can cite a single instance of disciplinary procee

Miscarriages of justice and participation in crime

One deployment, that of "Mike Scott" (HN298), is examined in considerable detail in Chapter 3 (and also Chap received no formal training and was not tasked to infiltrate any particular group. He infiltrated the Putney branc attended meetings of what Mitting describes as *"an ineffectual group of libertarian anarchists."*

On 12 May 1972 he took part in an action outside the Star and Garter hotel in Richmond, as part of an anti-Ap sporting team staying there. Fourteen were arrested for a sit-down protest and charged with blocking the highv the execution of his duty. The facts and circumstances of the arrest and pending court proceedings were repor Rodger – the then Commander of Special Branch, and Deputy Assistant Commissioner Ferguson Smith.

It was suggested that "Scott" would probably have to apply for legal aid and attend meetings with all those arre in the proceedings under his cover name and pleaded not guilty with the other defendants. There are at least t defendants' meetings he went to – a police spy breaching lawyer/client confidentiality.

Mitting says *"This is the first occasion on which a deliberate decision was made not to disclose to the prosecut undercover officer in the events, which gave rise to the contested case".*[C3,§40] The case was referred to the miscarriage of justice (the convictions have now been overturned.)[9]

The Report also notes that "Barry/Desmond Loader" (HN13) was arrested on two occasions for public order of name. On both occasions, managers attended court and privately told court officials that "Loader" was a police *public order field".* [C5,§52-54]

The deployment of "Stewart Goodman" (HN339) ended abruptly after he crashed his SDS car into a tree wher with activists in a pub. Uniformed officers attended the scene. He told them who he was. He was charged with and pleaded guilty. Detective Chief Inspector Phil Saunders attended court and took steps to ensure that "Goo

Theft of dead children's identities

Chapter 4 notes that it is probable that the first officer to research and in part adopt the name and date of birth (HN298), in 1971.[C4,§32] By early 1974, it had become the established practice for SDS undercover officers the date of birth and death of a child, with a view to adopting the name of the child as a cover name.

No surviving SDS manager has been able to explain when or for what reason the practice was started and the thought to the propriety of its use. [C4,§7]

Richard Clark ("Rick Gibson" HN297) abruptly departed his deployment because he was confronted by two me with the birth and death certificate of "Rick Gibson", the dead child whose identity he had stolen.[C5,§35]

Impact on the families of undercover officers

The deployment of “Graham Coates” (HN304) is reported as having had a major impact on his family, his wife *that he was divorced because of the stresses and strains caused by it.”* [C5,§57]

“Michael James” (HN96) joined the SDS in late 1978. At his suggestion, his superiors, Michael Ferguson and A to his then wife and reassured her that they would look after the security of her husband. This is the first evide to the spouse of an undercover officer about to be deployed. [C5,§58]

The decision not to spy on the far right

This period saw the first reporting on the far right, and it is striking because it was not a police or Security Serv (HN303) was instigated to report on extreme right-wing groups, the Legion of St George and the National Fron (WRP), which he was infiltrating at the time. Mitting notes *“It is evident that HN303 found this aspect of his dep*

No undercover officer was directly deployed into an extreme right-wing group during this period.The reasons g *excellent sources within the extreme right”* and *“infiltration carried with it an unacceptable risk of violence – eith required to participate to prove his credentials.”* [C5,§64]

The Report does not address the obvious questions this raises about why the police would infiltrate groups tha groups recognised to be violent.

Mitting offers his opinion that *“the fact that in this period no decision was made to infiltrate right-wing groups di of those responsible for targeting”* [C6,§29]However, he offers no supporting evidence about political bias, so conclusion is based upon.

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[1] This published interim report only refers to evidence presented in open sessions. A separate, closed interim presented to the Home Secretary.

[2] The original name was the Special Operations Unit and it changed name several times, but is generally refe Squad or SDS.

[3] Tranch 1 evidence was heard between 2 Nov 2020 and 22 Feb 2023. Lists of witnesses and copies of the e UCPI website www.ucpi.org.uk

[4] Memorandum proposed by Chief Superintendent Arthur Cunningham dated 20 May 1969 suggesting aims

[5] In later correspondence Commissioners such as McNee continued to take a close interest in the unit, and a and other senior officers are known to have visited the SDS’s safehouse.

[6] Characteristic of his treatment of the officers, Mitting’s examination of the evidence relating to Fredericks go *discredit on him”.* No mention at all is made of his disgusting and revealing comments in his oral evidence abo *you ask me to infiltrate some drug dealers, you can’t point the finger at me if I sample the product. If these pec is necessary to engage that little more deeply, then, shall we say, I find this acceptable, but I do worry about th children that may result from the relationship.”*

[7] This rejection by Mitting of the possibility that a police officer might threaten a member of the public is indi report: to believe that cops are basically decent, don’t really make errors and certainly don’t lie. It makes for qu want to absolve almost all individual officers of any wrongdoing, yet his conclusions point to institutional failing to have been ended almost as soon as they began.

[8] https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/spy-officer-who-slept-with-activists-went-on-to-top-job-ttpsslx6f

[9] https://ccrc.gov.uk/news/anti-apartheid-protesters-historic-convictions-overturned-by-crown-court/

June 29, 2023

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Interim



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